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Abstract 
 
Research on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has largely focused on economic 
explanations of M&A choices and subsequent performance implications. However, as M&A 
transactions are essentially made between people, understanding M&A processes and outcomes 
requires more attention to social-psychological factors underlying acquisition decision making. 
To address this gap, in this dissertation I combine the Carnegie tradition of decision making 
research with social-psychological theories to study the role of key organizational individuals 
and groups on acquisition decision making processes and outcomes. This dissertation consists of 
three essays that extend the Carnegie and social-psychological perspectives on decision making 
to the M&A domain and tests derived theoretical propositions in a unique dataset of over 500 
M&A deal-making processes conducted between 2001 and 2015 by large publicly-listed US 
companies in a range of industries.  
 In the first essay, I examine performance consequences of comprehensive acquisition 
decision making procedures. Drawing on the procedural rationality theory, I argue and find that 
procedural rationality in M&A decision making during private takeover phase of M&A has a 
reducing effect on acquisition premium paid by the acquirer. The findings suggest that imposing 
procedural rationality mitigates well-known limitations and biases in M&A decision making.  
 In the second essay (coauthored), we investigate the effect of group processes in M&A 
decision making of target firm boards. Based on the comprehensive review of social-
psychological research on group dynamics, we identify two distinct characteristics of boards as 
groups – interaction frequency and interaction timeliness. We then test the effect of these group 
characteristics on acquisition decision making process and outcomes. The findings suggest that 
frequent and timely meetings of boards in target firms during M&A negotiations lead to more 
value-enhancing acquisition decisions and higher acquisition premium received. 
 In the third essay (coauthored), we study the role of personality and interpersonal 
dynamics in M&A decision making during the negotiations phase. Findings suggest that the 
personality profiles of both acquirer CEO and target CEO influence decisions regarding the 
turnover of executives in the combined firm. Furthermore, our results reveal that the effect of 
CEO personality on executive turnover decisions is contingent on the nature of social 
interactions between the acquirer CEO and target CEO during M&A negotiations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have been among the most studied phenomena in strategy 
research (e.g., Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Graebner, Heimeriks, Huy, & Vaara, 2017; Haleblian, 
Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Historically, 
scholars have been examining M&A antecedents and consequences by drawing predominately 
from economic and financial economic theories and research (e.g., Lubatkin, 1983; Trautwein, 
1990). This stream of work portrayed executives and firms as rational decision makers using 
acquisitions as a vehicle to improve firm performance (e.g., King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 
2004). However, economic and financial economic perspectives on M&A are subject to several 
major limitations, three of which I particularly tackle in this dissertation. 
 First, economic work is predominantly concerned with substantive rather than procedural 
rationality (Simon, 1976, 1978) of M&A decisions, meaning that it thoroughly investigates 
M&A choices, rather than processes through which these decision choices are made. Despite the 
general agreement that the choice perspective on M&A should be supplemented with a process 
perspective which recognizes acquisition decision making process as an important determinant 
of M&A outcomes (e.g., Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Pablo, Sitkin, & 
Jemison, 1996), the process theory of M&A remains underdeveloped. Moreover, certain phases 
of the M&A process received little attention in the strategy research. Whilst a growing number of 
empirical studies examines the integration process (for a recent review, see Graebner et al., 
2017), research on the negotiation process still awaits for its momentum (for a recent review, see 
Parola & Ellis, 2014). Similarly, substantially more attention has been given to the M&A process 
from the perspective of a buying firm, than from the perspective of a selling firm (e.g., Graebner 
& Eisenhardt, 2004). Therefore, multiple aspects of process theory of M&A negotiations, as a 
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theory which might have “the highest degree of plausibility” (Trautwein, 1990), should be 
further developed. 
 Second, substantial body of literature taking economic perspective has examined the role 
of corporate governance during the M&A process (e.g., Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Cotter, 
Shivdasani, & Zenner, 1997; Fich, Cai, & Tran, 2011; Kosnik, 1987). Trying to understand 
effective governance mechanisms that increase shareholder returns from M&A deals, this 
research has predominantly studied structural characteristics of boards such as board 
independence, boards size, chief executive duality, and board committee structures (e.g., 
Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996), but found little or no effect of these structural characteristics 
of boards on M&A decision effectiveness (e.g., Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; 
Dalton & Dalton, 2011). Despite multiple calls to move beyond structural characteristics of 
boards to better understand board effectiveness, empirical research on corporate governance in 
M&A has almost entirely ignored the characteristics of directors as groups of individuals as well 
as their group processes (e.g., Boivie, Bednar, Aguilera, & Andrus, 2016; Forbes & Milliken, 
1999; Hambrick, Misangyi, & Park, 2015). Thus, there remains significant space for the 
development of new theory of board effectiveness driven by board processes not just over the 
course of M&A, but also during the periods of business normalcy. 
 Third, picking on Roll’s (1986) idea that “takeovers reflect individual decisions” recent 
research has considered the role of decision makers’ personality for economic choices such as 
the likelihood of initiating M&A deals, the size of M&A deals, and the number of M&A deals 
pursued by a firm within a given time period (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Malhotra, 
Reus, Zhu, & Roelofsen, 2017). However, there is virtually no research addressing the role of 
executives’ personality for M&A processes and outcomes (with one exception; see the work of 
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Aktas, de Bodt, Bollaert, & Roll, 2016 on the effect of narcissism on M&A negotiations speed 
and likelihood of deal completion). This is surprising because it is well-known that personality 
substantially influences negotiations, inter-personal dynamics and relationship building (e.g., 
Barrick, Stewart, Neubert, & Mount, 1998; Greenhalgh, Neslin, & Gilkey, 1985; Morris, Larrick, 
& Su, 1999), all of which occur in the M&A deal-making context and all of which are difficult to 
examine from the economic perspective. Therefore, better understanding of M&A processes and 
outcomes might be obtained by studying the personality characteristics of individuals and groups 
involved in M&A deals. 
 In this dissertation, I address these three gaps by drawing from the social-psychological 
theories and research. Social-psychological perspective is concerned with the effect of social 
context on decision making behavior (e.g., Collins & Guetzkow, 1964; Katz & Kahn, 1978; 
McGrath, 1964; McGrath, Arrow, & Berdahl, 2000; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). As such, it 
particularly lends itself to understanding decision making processes of individuals and groups, 
social dynamics in group decision making, as well as the role of interpersonal interactions in 
organizational decision making. In fact, a modest stream of research already recognized the 
importance of social-psychological factors for M&A decision making (e.g., Duhaime & 
Schwenk, 1985; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986) and has based arguments on Simon’s (1947) notion of 
bounded rationality to argue that various characteristics of decision makers as well as 
characteristics of the situation that the decision makers find themselves in affect M&A decisions 
making and their subsequent performance outcomes. For example, Zhu (2013) utilized social 
psychological theories of group decision making to explain extreme acquisition premium 
decisions determined by boards of directors. Similarly, Malhotra, Zhu, and Reus (2015) drew 
from social psychological research on decision making and social comparison to investigate 
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whether acquisition premium decisions may be anchored on the premium decisions of 
comparable others. Ullrich, Wieseke, and Dick (2005) deployed social identity theory to explain 
how features of the post-acquisition company structure affect organizational identification and 
change decisions. Finally, Ellis, Reus, and Lamont (2009) used social psychological research on 
procedural justice to explain value creation in M&A integration. In a related fashion, I extend 
social psychological theories and research to address three critical gaps in the M&A literature as 
described above. Specifically, the dissertation consists of three essays. In each essay I derive 
theoretical arguments from one social psychological theory or one line of social psychological 
research to investigate the role of key organizational individuals and groups in acquisition 
decision-making processes and outcomes. 
 The first essay concentrates on the relationship between acquisition decision making 
processes and acquisition outcomes for the acquiring firm. Prior research on acquisitions 
identified an extensive set of flaws in acquisition decision making (e.g., Coff, 1999; Duhaime & 
Schwenk, 1985; Haunschild, 1994; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Kim, Haleblian, & Finkelstein, 
2011; Malhotra et al., 2015). However, this line of research less thoroughly examined 
mechanisms that could potentially prevent or mitigate the effects of these biases. Drawing from 
the procedural rationality theory (e.g., Dean & Sharfman, 1993, 1996; Fredrickson & Iaquinto, 
1989; Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984; Simon, 1976), I propose that debiasing of acquisition 
decisions might be achieved through the enforcement of comprehensive acquisition decision 
making processes. Consequently, acquirers might improve short-term acquisition performance. 
The main research question I examine is: 
How does procedural rationality in acquisition decision processes of the acquiring firm 
influence acquisition performance? 
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According to the procedural rationality theory, procedural rationality resembles the extent 
to which the decision making process reflects a desire to make the best decision possible under 
the circumstances (e.g., Dean & Sharfman, 1993). A central theoretical construct in this literature 
is decision comprehensiveness which refers to the extent to which the decision maker collects 
and assesses the information necessary to understand the problem at hand, uses that information 
while deciding, and relies on external sources to assess the quality of a decision before its 
implementation (e.g., Fredrickson & Iaquinto, 1989; Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984). In the 
context of acquisitions, I define comprehensiveness through the acquirer’s efforts to collect 
information about the target, to rely upon analysis of information revealed during the due 
diligence review when making acquisition-related decisions, and to use third-party objective 
assessment of its choices when assessing and implementing acquisition decisions. As the 
conceptual model presented in Figure 1 shows, I propose that acquirers benefit from all 
dimensions of comprehensiveness by paying lower acquisition premiums to the target firms. 
Furthermore, I propose that comprehensiveness is particularly valuable under the conditions of 
high dyadic politicality i.e. when target firm deploys power and political tactics to affect deal 
negotiations. 
I tested these ideas in a sample of over five hundred M&A deals between the publicly 
listed firms in the United States in a range of industries which were announced during the 2001-
2015 period. Overall, I found strong support for the theoretical model. In this essay, I extended 
the theory of procedural rationality to the M&A domain and demonstrated than the decision-
making process itself is an important antecedent of acquisition performance. Findings from this 
essay have important practical implications for managers and boards of directors in the acquiring 
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firms as they suggest that managing acquisition making in a comprehensive manner pays off 
economically because it reduces acquisition premium paid to the target firm. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model with hypothesized relationships in the first essay.  
All hypothesized relationships are fully supported (p < 0.05). 
The second essay investigates the relationship between board of directors’ group 
processes and acquisition decision effectiveness in the context of firms targeted for acquisitions. 
Prior research on corporate governance has focused on several structural adjustments in the 
boards as mechanisms for high board effectiveness (such as, for instance, adjustments in the 
board independence, board size, chief executives’ duality, board diversity, board committee 
structures, etc.). However, empirical evidence suggest that boards still have relatively little or no 
impact on strategic decisions and firm performance (e.g., Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton & Dalton, 
2011; Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007). We depart from work suggesting that novel insights 
about board effectiveness could be obtained by conceptualizing boards as decision-making 
groups (e.g., Boivie et al., 2016; Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Drawing from the theory and 
research on group processes from social-psychology (e.g., Gladstein, 1984; Hackman & Morris, 
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1975; Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; McGrath, 1964, 1984; McGrath, 1991; Steiner, 1972) 
we investigate whether group interactions of target firm’s board affect decisions the target firm 
makes during acquisition negotiations and subsequently, acquisition premium the target firm 
receives. Put formally, we investigate the following research question: 
How do group interactions of target firm’s board of directors influence acquisition 
decision making processes and outcomes? 
An extensive review of social-psychological literature on groups suggests two important 
characteristics of group interactions for group decision effectiveness – frequency (e.g., Chatman 
& Flynn, 2001; Hackman & Morris, 1975; Kerr & Tindale, 2004; Waller, 1999) and timeliness 
(e.g., Chatman & Flynn, 2001; Gersick, 1988, 1989; Lim & Murnighan, 1994; Parks & Cowlin, 
1995; Waller, 1999). In the context of acquisition, we therefore examine board meeting 
frequency and board meeting timeliness as two critical variables that might affect decisions 
during deal negotiations. As our multiple moderated-mediation model presented in Figure 2 
illustrates, we propose that the target firm board meeting frequency increases the probability of 
making value-enhancing decision during acquisition negotiations, which in turn is associated 
with higher acquisition premium received by the target firm. Furthermore, we propose that target 
board meeting timeliness amplifies these effects. 
We tested these ideas in a sample of over five hundred public firms in the United States 
in a wide range of industries which, during the 2001-2015 period, were targeted for an 
acquisition. Our results provide support for the theoretical model. Findings from the second 
essay contribute to the corporate governance theory as they imply that effective governance 
originates in social processes of directors rather than structural features of the boards emphasized 
by prior research. Additionally, these findings have theoretical implications for the process 
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theory of M&A as they link board processes to intermediary decisions made in the M&A 
negotiations process and acquisition performance. 
 
Figure 2. Conceptual model with hypothesized relationships in the second essay.  
Hypothesized relationships in bold are fully supported (p < 0.05). 
The third essay examines the relationship between executive personality and executive 
turnover following acquisitions. Prior research on post-acquisition executive turnover identified 
several antecedents to executive turnover including prior firm performance (e.g., Walsh & 
Ellwood, 1991), relative standing between the acquirer and target executives (e.g., Hambrick & 
Cannella, 1993), firm-specific human capital (e.g., Wulf & Singh, 2011), financial and strategic 
incentives (e.g., Chang, Mais, & Sullivan, 2013), and social embeddedness (e.g., Ishii & Xuan, 
2014). Taken together, this line of work emphasized a wide range of contextual factors thereby 
leaving a critical gap in our understanding of how personality of and interpersonal dynamics 
between the acquirer firm executives and target firm executives impact executive retention in a 
combined firm. Drawing from the theory of personality and interpersonal dynamics (e.g., 
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Asendorpf & Wilpers, 1998; Barrick & Mount, 1991; Zimmerman, 2008), we explore the role of 
personality characteristics of acquirer CEO and target CEO as well as their mutual interpersonal 
dynamics on target CEO’s post-acquisition retention in the combined firm. We pose the 
following research question: 
How do acquirer and target CEO personality, and their mutual interpersonal dynamics 
during acquisition negotiations influence target CEO retention in the combined firm? 
 According to the research linking personality to employee turnover decisions, 
extraversion (one of the Big Five personality traits) has been found to be the most consistent 
predictor of turnover (e.g., Bauer, Erdogan, Liden, & Wayne, 2006; Zimmerman, 2008). 
Building on this research and extending it to the M&A domain, we suggest that extraversion of 
acquirer CEO and target CEO will affect post-acquisition decisions regarding the target CEO 
retention in the combined firm. As our theoretical model illustrated in Figure 3 indicates, we 
propose that the acquirer CEO extraversion increases the likelihood of target CEO retention, 
while target CEO extraversion decreases it. Furthermore, we suggest that the effects of acquirer 
CEO extraversion and target CEO extraversion are contingent on the interpersonal dynamics 
between the two CEOs during acquisition negotiations. With that regard, we examine three 
specific contingency factors namely the length of private acquisition negotiations, the 
involvement of acquirer CEO and target CEO in M&A negotiations, as well as the nature of 
interactions between the acquirer CEO and target CEO (i.e. direct or face-to-face interactions 
versus indirect or technology mediated interactions via phone calls or video conferences). 
We tested our theoretical model in a sample of four hundred completed acquisition deals 
between publicly listed companies in the United States in a wide range of industries and during 
the 2002-2012 period. Our results largely support our hypotheses. Findings from the third essay 
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have implications for the theory of personality and interpersonal dynamics, literature on mergers 
and acquisition, and research on executive turnover and employee turnover in general. 
Specifically, we establish the relationship between CEO personality and post-acquisition 
retention decisions. Our findings also have managerial implications for managers and boards in 
both acquiring firms and those being acquired. 
 
Figure 3. Conceptual model with hypothesized relationships in the third essay.  
Hypothesized relationships in bold are fully supported (p < 0.05). 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. An essay titled Diligentia 
Quam in Suis Rebus: Procedural Rationality in Acquisition Process and Acquisition Premium is 
presented in Chapter 2. It is followed by an essay titled Periculum in Mora: Board Meeting 
Frequency and Timeliness, M&A Process and Acquisition Premium in Chapter 3 and an essay 
titled The Lure of Extraverted CEOs: How Personality and Interpersonal Dynamics Affect 
Acquired Firm’s CEO Retention in Chapter 4. Finally, general discussion of the dissertation 
results, summary of theoretical implications, as well as suggestions for future research are 
presented in Chapter 5.  
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Diligentia Quam in Suis Rebus:  
Procedural Rationality in Acquisition Process and Acquisition Premium 
 
 
Abstract 
Prior research has identified a number of irrationalities in firm acquisition decision-making 
which typically cause negative M&A performance for the acquirers. Drawing on the procedural 
rationality theory, we argue that these decision flaws can be mitigated through the reinforcement 
of comprehensive acquisition procedures. We predict that three dimensions of procedural 
rationality in acquisition decision making: analytical comprehensiveness, integrative 
comprehensiveness, and external comprehensiveness all have a reducing effect on the magnitude 
of acquisition premium. Furthermore, we argue and show that the effect of procedural rationality 
on acquisition premiums is pronounced when the politicality in the negotiating dyad is high. We 
discuss implications of these findings for the procedural rationality theory, literature on mergers 
and acquisitions, and business practice. 
 
Keywords: acquisition process; acquisition premiums; decision making comprehensiveness, 
procedural rationality; 
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INTRODUCTION 
Research on strategic decision making has increasingly sought to establish an understanding on 
how various irrationalities are induced into strategic decisions (e.g., Schwenk, 1984; Eisenhardt 
& Zbaracki, 1992; Rajagopalan, Rasheed, & Datta, 1993). This line of research extensively used 
the context on acquisition decision making to question substantive rationality of acquisition 
decisions (e.g., Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Chatterjee & Hambrick, 
2007; Kim, Haleblian, & Finkelstein, 2011; Zhu, 2013; Malhotra, Zhu, & Reus, 2015). Findings 
suggest that firms often conduct incomplete due diligence on the target firm and overestimate 
synergistic deal potential (e.g., Jemison & Sitkin, 1986), fail to properly alter bargaining 
positions during negotiations (e.g., Coff, 1999), act aggressively and ignore, rather than solve, 
critical issues early in the acquisition decision making process (e.g., Kim et al., 2011), and 
ineffectively deal with the complexity of acquisition decisions (e.g., Duhaime & Schwenk, 
1985). Consequently, acquirers experience unfavorable short-term effects such as high premium 
payments as well as long-term effects such as difficult integration and poor performance (e.g., 
Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009). While on the one hand, existing 
research continuously finds evidence of flaws in managers’ acquisition choices, on the other 
hand, it provides little insights into the decision processes that firms can put in place to mitigate 
these flaws and their adverse effects. In this study, we focus on the understudied phase in the 
M&A decision-making process - due diligence and negotiations, and examine how procedural 
rationality of these processes affects acquisition premium decisions. 
According to the procedural rationality theory, procedural rationality resembles the extent 
to which the decision-making process reflects a desire to make the best decision possible under 
the circumstances (Simon, 1976, 1978, 1979). Literature on procedural rationality in strategic 
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decision-making process (for a recent review, please see Elbanna, 2006) suggests that such 
intended rationality is characterized by an effort to collect and assess the information necessary 
to understand the problem at hand, the use of this new information while making the decision, 
and relying on external sources to assess the quality of decisions before their implementation 
(e.g., Fredrickson, 1984; Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984; Fredrickson & Iaquinto, 1989; Dean & 
Sharfman, 1993a, 1993b, 1996). Consistent with this tradition of rationality as the collection and 
analysis of information (e.g., Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976; Fredrickson, 1984; 
Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988), we define procedural rationality of the acquisition process as the 
extent to which acquirers put effort to collect information about targets, rely upon information 
revealed during the due diligence review, and use third-party assessment of their choices while 
making and implementing acquisition decisions. The extent to which rationality of the 
acquisition process impacts the effectiveness of acquisition decisions maps directly on to issues 
at the core of the theory of procedural rationality, thus making the effect of procedural rationality 
on acquisition decisions a critical untested question in the acquisition research. 
 We use procedural rationality theory to study acquisition premium decision as it appears 
to be a focal point in the due diligence process and a key decision to be made during deal 
negotiations (e.g., Haunschild, 1994; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Although most executives 
see the premium decision-making process as “synoptic and rational” (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; 
Hitt & Tyler, 1991) there is a plethora of evidence on “behavioral and non-rational impacts” and 
a high amount of “subjectivity” in the premium setting process (e.g., Rappaport, 1979; Duhaime 
& Schwenk, 1985; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). We hypothesize that procedural rationality of the 
pre-acquisition process might help acquirers deal with such irrationalities, and is as such an 
important determinant of the magnitude of acquisition premium. Acquirers that reinforce the 
26 
 
“diligentia quam in suis rebus” rule (an old, Roman law principle imposing the duty of care, 
structure, and discipline with respect to conducting important matters) in their acquisition 
procedures, benefit substantially from paying lower acquisition premiums. 
 Decision-making theory posits that decisions are simultaneously influenced by rationality 
and politicality (e.g., Pettigrew, 1977; Hickson, Butler, Cray, Mallory, & Wilson, 1986; 
Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992). Politicality is defined as “the degree to which influence is exerted 
through a decision-making process upon the outcome” (Hickson et al., 1986: 59). Perhaps more 
than in other decision-making contexts, acquisition decision-making is under the concurrent 
impact of procedural rationality and politicality during the negotiation process. For example, any 
intention with respect to information collection by an acquirer, might be restricted by the 
politicality of a target intended to intensify the bidding competition or pose negotiation deadlines 
(e.g., Zajac & Bazerman, 1991; Coff, 1999). Whilst prior research on intra-firm decision-making 
processes considers independent influence of rationality and politicality in the decision making 
process (e.g., Dean & Sharfman, 1993a, 1993b), there appears to be a significant 
interdependence between procedural rationality and politicality in the context of inter-firm, 
acquisition decision-making (e.g., Parola & Ellis, 2014). To investigate such a contingent nature 
of procedural rationality, we hypothesize that the effect of procedural rationality on the 
magnitude of acquisition premiums depends on the level of politicality in the negotiating dyad 
(i.e. the target’s use of politics). We empirically test our hypotheses using a fine-grained data on 
due diligence and negotiations in 507 acquisitions in a range of industries. 
 By empirically examining how procedural rationality relates to firm acquisition 
decisions, our study makes several contributions to existing theory and research. First, we 
expand acquisitions research in multiple ways. We contribute to the process perspective on 
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acquisitions (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986) by showing that the extent to which acquirers use 
comprehensive acquisition processes is an important determinant of acquisition outcomes (e.g., 
Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). Further, despite acquisitions being one of the most studied phenomena 
in the field of strategy and finance (e.g., Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Haleblian et al., 2009), 
there is almost no empirical research on due diligence and negotiations processes. On the one 
hand, theoretical strategy research argued for the importance of the process considerations in the 
pre-acquisition phase for acquisition outcomes (e.g., Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Haspeslagh & 
Jemison, 1991; Pablo, Sitkin, & Jemison, 1996). Recent finance research, on the other hand, 
empirically studied substance of decisions firms make in the negotiations phase (e.g., Boone & 
Mulherin, 2007; Aktas, De Bodt, & Roll, 2010; Fich, Cai, & Tran, 2011; Heitzman, 2011). 
Taken together, scant empirical research on the pre-acquisition process has primarily been 
concerned with substantive rationality and has studied the implications of pre-acquisition 
choices. We, however, focus on procedural rationality and investigate how characteristics of 
processes through which key acquisitions decisions are made affect acquisition outcomes. 
 Relatedly, we expand research on strategic decision making by demonstrating the 
importance of procedural rationality for mitigating biased and self-serving decision-making of 
executives. Specifically, the acquisition decision making literature identifies several sources of 
irrationalities that go into acquisition premium decisions (e.g., Haleblian et al., 2009), however, 
it largely neglects how processes can be put in place to mitigate them. The findings of this study 
therefore challenge a commonly accepted assumption in prior research that making effective 
choices represents a sufficient condition for acquisition success (e.g., Capron & Shen, 2007; 
Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2013). Our results suggest that we should think differently about 
acquisition decisions (and other strategic decisions) and consider both substantive rationality 
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(i.e., why decisions are made) and procedural rationality (i.e., how decisions are made) to fully 
understand their effectiveness. 
 Second, we advance the theory of procedural rationality (e.g., Fredrickson, 1984). The 
concept of procedural rationality has been widely used in studies of various intra-firm decision-
making process (e.g., Atuahene-Gima & Li, 2004; Talaulicar, Grundei, & Werder, 2005; 
Heavey, Simsek, Roche, & Kelly, 2009; Riedl, Kaufmann, Zimmermann, & Perols, 2013), and 
our work extends this theory to the study of inter-firm decision-making processes. This nascent 
line of research suggests that a high degree of procedural rationality in inter-firm decision 
making seems to be a valuable coping mechanism enabling firms to effectively deal with 
uncertainties, avoid critical decision-making mistakes, and successfully coordinate and integrate 
decisions with those of partners across the whole lifecycle of the inter-firm arrangements (e.g., 
Walter, Kellermanns, & Lechner, 2012). We thus believe our results serve as an impetus to shift 
the current conversation focusing on why firms deviate from rationality in inter-firm decisions, 
towards how the deviations happen, and what processes can be put in place to prevent them. 
 Finally, we contribute by testing the notion of procedural rationality and its contingent 
effect on acquisition premiums. Specifically, we introduce the notion of dyadic politicality and 
show that the effect of procedural rationality on the magnitude of acquisition premium becomes 
pronounced when the level of dyadic politicality is high, i.e. when the target attempts to use 
politics to shift the negotiations game from the field of rationality into the field of bargaining. 
Under such conditions, an acquirer faces higher danger of falling into the politicality trap and 
thus making flawed decisions. We therefore contribute to the research stream that investigated 
the interdependency of procedural rationality and politicality within firms (e.g., Eisenhardt & 
Zbaracki, 1992; Dean & Sharfman, 1993a, 1996), by initiating a corresponding stream of 
29 
 
research to examine this interplay in an inter-firm context. Our results suggest that prior studies 
(e.g., Boone & Mulherin, 2007) may not have found a significant impact of political factors on 
acquisition outcomes because they only examined the direct, rather than the indirect impact via 
acquisition processes. These findings further emphasize the importance of studying processes to 
obtain a complete understanding on the determinants of acquisition outcomes. 
BACKGROUND THEORY 
Acquisition Process 
Many theoretical perspectives have been utilized to study the determinants of acquisition 
decisions (see Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Haleblian et al., 2009 for recent reviews). However, 
in contrast to the rich literature on acquisition choices concerned with the substance of 
acquisition decisions, we have substantially less understanding with respect to processes through 
which these decisions are made. Yet, researchers argue that conceptualizing acquisitions in terms 
of decision-making process can improve our understanding of acquisition outcomes (e.g., 
Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Haunschild, 
Davis-Blake, & Fichman, 1994; Pablo et al., 1996). They suggest that adopting a process 
perspective allows a more thorough examination of the drivers of acquisition results, rather than 
the results themselves (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). With the exception of Walsh (1989), who 
examined the impact of merger negotiation process on target company top management turnover 
following the deal closure, a majority of the process-oriented M&A research focuses on the 
integration phase of the acquisition process. 
Overall acquisition process, however, comprises of two main processes - pre-acquisition 
deal-making and post-acquisition integration (Hunt, 1990; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Pre-
acquisition processes cover internal deal initiation decisions and target selection (e.g., Lubatkin, 
30 
 
1983), acquisition due diligence and negotiations with the chosen target (e.g., Walsh, 1989; 
Pablo et al., 1996), and the processes around acquisition announcement and completion (e.g., 
Datta, Pinches, & Narayanan, 1992). Despite the consensus that pre-deal processes, especially 
due diligence and negotiations, are critical for deal success (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986), several 
factors limited theoretical advancements in this domain. First, collecting data on due diligence 
and negotiations is challenging because these activities are typically conducted behind the closed 
doors (e.g., Cullinan, Le Roux, & Weddigen, 2004). Second, existing insights into the pre-deal 
processes are scattered across several disciplines (e.g., Parola & Ellis, 2014). Finally, recent 
advancements in our understanding of the pre-deal phase appear in the domain of finance which 
is traditionally phenomenon-, rather than theory-driven (e.g., Boone & Mulherin, 2007), and 
concerned with substantive rather than procedural rationality (e.g., Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). 
Extant acquisition literature implicitly provides rationale for studying pre-acquisition 
processes of due diligence and negotiations (e.g., Walsh, 1989). In the due diligence stage, 
assumptions about the target are tested against new information, allowing the acquirer to re-
evaluate the acquisition opportunity (e.g., Puranam, Powell, & Singh, 2006). Despite the 
acquirer’s positive assessment of strategic fit with the acquisition target, the process of 
negotiating the acquisition may become prerequisite for success (e.g., Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; 
Hunt, 1990). During the private takeover phase, acquirers have the opportunity to cope with 
information asymmetry which may be particularly severe in deals that involve targets in 
knowledge-intensive industries (e.g., Coff, 1999). Similarly, pre-deal phase allows acquirers to 
prevent or diminish the effect of executives’ biases (e.g., Hayward & Hambrick, 1997) or 
personal interests (e.g., Grinstein & Hribar, 2004) that may taint the acquisition process and 
affect key decisions such as acquisition premiums (e.g., Haunschild, 1994). 
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Pre-acquisition process therefore provides an ample opportunity for the acquirers to 
improve the rationality of acquisition decisions. During due diligence, acquirers may obtain 
detailed information about the targets and subsequently use this information to improve the 
quality of acquisition decisions. Relying extensively on such a comprehensive process could 
allow acquirers to better assess the quality of the target and mutual fit, reduce uncertainty 
surrounding the deal, prevent biased and self-centered behavior of executives, and ground the 
bargaining process. The extent to which rationality of the acquisition decision-making process 
affects the quality of acquisition decisions maps directly on to issues at the core of the theory of 
procedural rationality. By drawing from this theory to study acquisition processes, we shift the 
attention in the acquisition research from examining what decisions are made (i.e., choice 
perspective concerned with substantive rationality) towards investigating how decisions are 
made (i.e., process perspective concerned with procedural rationality) (Simon, 1976, 1978). 
Procedural rationality 
Theory of procedural rationality originates in the work of Simon (1976, 1978) who suggested 
that a complete theory of rational behavior should give equal attention to the extent to which 
appropriate decisions are made and procedures which are used to make those decisions. Strategy 
scholars built on these ideas to develop synoptic model of strategic decision-making process (for 
a review, please see Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; Rajagopalan et al., 1993; Elbanna & Child, 
2007). They define procedural rationality as the extent to which a decision process reflects 
decision makers’ intentions and efforts to make the best decision possible under the 
circumstances (e.g., Fredrickson, 1984). Such intended efforts are realized by an attempt to 
collect the information relevant to the decision problem at hand, rely upon the analysis of this 
information when deciding, and use independent sources to assess the quality of decisions before 
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their implementation (e.g., Mintzberg et al., 1976; Fredrickson, 1983, 1984; Fredrickson & 
Mitchell, 1984; Fredrickson, 1985; Fredrickson & Iaquinto, 1989; Dean & Sharfman, 1993b)  
 Comprehensiveness is a central theoretical construct used to describe this exhaustiveness 
and inclusiveness in the decision-making process and is most-essential dimension of strategic 
decision-making process (e.g., Fredrickson, 1984; Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984; Fredrickson, 
1985; Fredrickson & Iaquinto, 1989). Conceptualizing rationality of the decision process in 
terms of its comprehensiveness enables the study of process issues without studying an endless 
number of decisions at any given point in time by focusing on the objective, observable 
dimensions of the process (Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984). Consistent with the idea of rationality 
as the intended effort to collect and analyze information (e.g., Mintzberg et al., 1976; Bourgeois 
& Eisenhardt, 1988) comprehensiveness pertains to the “absolute amount of investigatory 
activity rather than investigatory completeness per se” (Miller, Burke, & Glick, 1998). 
 Empirical research, almost exclusively based on survey methods, demonstrates that 
procedural rationality varies substantially across strategic decisions (e.g., Dean & Sharfman, 
1993b) and that rationality of strategic decision-making processes influences decisions’ 
effectiveness, i.e. the extent to which they result in desired outcomes, in a variety of intra-
organizational contexts (e.g., Hitt & Tyler, 1991; Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; Dean & 
Sharfman, 1996). For instance, Atuahene-Gima and Li (2004) investigated procedural rationality 
of new product development process and its impact on new product quality and market 
performance. In a similar setting, Talaulicar et al. (2005) studied the comprehensiveness and 
speed of decision making in new technology ventures. On a corporate level, Heavey et al. (2009) 
found that procedural rationality is positively related to the extent to which a firm pursues 
corporate entrepreneurship, while on an operation level Riedl et al. (2013) showed that 
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procedural rationality improves supplier selection decisions. Taken together, prior research 
predominantly studied procedural rationality within organizational boundaries. 
 Yet, there are reasons to believe that procedural rationality may have substantial impact 
on the outcomes of inter-organizational decision processes such as acquisitions. Given the 
emphasis that the theory of procedural rationality gives to processes of gathering information 
(e.g., Mintzberg et al., 1976), using new information to improve decisions (e.g., Fredrickson, 
1984) and assessing information by a third-party (e.g., Fredrickson, 1985), due diligence and 
negotiations phase of the acquisition process appears to be critical for improving the rationality 
of acquisition decisions. Puranam et al. (2006), for example, argue that a key objective of due 
diligence is to discover and act on information that may lead to re-evaluation of the acquisition 
opportunity and react in an appropriate manner, i.e. by revising an acquisition bid. Similarly, the 
use of politicality between decision-makers in the negotiating dyad may affect rationality of 
decision-making procedures (Cray, Mallory, Butler, Hickson, & Wilson, 1988). Such dynamics 
gets a particularly important determinant of procedural rationality in the inter-organizational 
context, where political actions of a second party (i.e., target firm in acquisitions) influence the 
intended procedural rationality an acquirer tries to achieve in the deal-making process. 
 Altogether, we contend that new insights on the effect of pre-acquisition process on 
acquisition outcomes may be obtained by bringing the procedural rationality theory in the 
acquisition context. Concurrently, given the emphasized interplay between the rationality and 
politicality in the acquisition decision processes, there is an opportunity to learn about the 
contingent nature of procedural rationality in the inter-organizational decision-making. In this 
study, we argue that acquirers benefit from efforts put in making acquisition process 
comprehensive, because comprehensive processes lead to lower acquisition premiums. Finally, 
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we argue that the effect of procedural rationality depends on a level of politicality that the target 
firm induces as various phases of the pre-acquisition process. 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Procedural Rationality and Acquisition Premiums 
An acquirer typically begins acquisition process with a limited knowledge about a target. It then 
uses due diligence review and pre-deal interactions with the target to improve the assessment of 
the deal’s potential. Acquiring firm attaches initial value to the deal by relying on publicly 
available, often limited information provided by the target. Notwithstanding, a rational acquirer 
does not accept that information at its face value. Aiming to improve rationality, it puts effort in 
additional information collection as well as in independent analyses, individually or with the help 
of an external third-party (e.g., Cullinan et al., 2004). Subsequently, an acquirer considers new 
information and revises key terms of its acquisition offer (e.g., Fredrickson, 1984; Puranam et 
al., 2006). Due diligence and negotiations thereby provide ample opportunity for improving the 
rationality of acquisition decisions. 
However, the extent to which acquirers follow such a comprehensive deal-making 
process varies extensively (e.g., Rappaport, 1979). Prior research shows that, once the 
acquisition process is initiated, various individual biases (e.g., Hayward & Hambrick, 1997), 
group biases (e.g., Zhu, 2013), and cognitive simplification processes (e.g., Duhaime & 
Schwenk, 1985; Malhotra et al., 2015) that affect information processing capability of the 
acquirer, may taint acquisition process and subsequent premium decisions. Managerial biases 
may drive premature deal closure thereby reducing the opportunity for careful and objective 
assessment of the target (e.g., Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). In such cases, due diligence becomes an 
exercise in “verifying the target’s financial statements rather than conducting a fair analysis of 
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the deal’s strategic logic and the acquirer’s ability to realize value from it” (Cullinan et al., 
2004). Process comprehensiveness, on the other hand, leads to a more thorough and critical 
analysis of wide-ranging information, increases the likelihood that deal-related risks and costs 
are made explicit and salient (e.g., Fredrickson, 1984) and thus decreases the likelihood that 
biases drive premium decisions.   
Analytical acquisition processes also ensure better assessment of strategic and 
organizational fit between the acquirer and the target. Substantial findings from prior research 
suggest that acquirers struggle with the evaluation of strategic fit, often overestimate synergy 
potential of a deal (e.g., Coff, 1999; Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999), and therefore pay 
unreasonably high premiums to the targets (e.g., Coff, 2002). Successful buyers are often cited 
for their superior process and above-average efforts in analyzing strategic and economic factors 
relating to strategic fit with the targets (e.g., Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 
1991). Moreover, extensive information search and sound analysis may not only make the 
acquirer more confident in their decisions (e.g., Fredrickson, 1984), but can also be used in 
bargaining to convince the target in the rationality of the acquisition offer (e.g., Rappaport, 
1979). With that respect, Vaara and Tienari (2011), for example, suggest that as more effort is 
put in the pre-acquisition process, both parties increasingly focus on the potential synergy gains 
from the acquisition. Similarly, comprehensive process increases considerations given to 
organizational fit and corresponding integration issues (e.g., Jemison & Sitkin, 1986), thereby 
forcing managers to provide better estimates of the business combination’s costs and benefits. If 
an acquirer realizes integration is hard, it will pay lower acquisition premium to compensate for 
the expected integration costs (e.g., Krishnan, Hitt, & Park, 2007). 
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In addition to alleviating uncertainty about expected synergies, analytical approach in the 
pre-acquisition phase may reduce uncertainty regarding the quality of target’s assets (e.g., Coff, 
1999). The less information is publicly available and the more it is ambiguous (e.g., Marquardt 
& Zur, 2015), the higher the buyer’s need to obtain more information about the target in the pre-
acquisition phase. Moreover, it may be in the interest of the target’s executives to provide 
inflated assessments of the company’s assets, particularly if they own stock and would therefore 
benefit from high premiums (e.g., Coff, 1999). In such cases, acquirers should invest more effort 
into analyses and lengthen the due diligence and negotiation process until any potentially 
harmful risk is eliminated (e.g., Pablo et al., 1996). Therefore, by reducing information 
asymmetries between the acquirer and target, analytical comprehensiveness may reduce the 
magnitude of acquisition premiums (e.g., Laamanen, 2007). We thus posit the following: 
Hypothesis 1. Analytical comprehensiveness of the pre-acquisition process is negatively 
related to the magnitude of acquisition premium. 
A discovery and analysis of new information about the target as part of the comprehensive deal-
making procedures is a necessary, however, not necessarily a sufficient condition for improving 
premium decisions (e.g., Fredrickson, 1984). Following the discovery and analysis of new 
information about the quality of the target’s assets, acquirers should use new findings to revise 
acquisition offers and renegotiated terms of the deal (e.g., Tanner, 1991; Parola & Ellis, 2014). 
Failure to adjust acquisition price down, in case of the discovery of negative new information 
(e.g., Martin & Shalev, 2016), or failure to prevent unjustified optimism which would lead 
acquirer to offer the price that exceeds the value of the target, in case of the discovery of positive 
new information (e.g., Giliberto & Varaiya, 1989), would lead to high acquisition premiums. 
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Thus, by the means of attenuating the potential effects of adverse selection and preventing 
winner’s curse, procedural rationality reduces the magnitude of acquisition premiums.   
Similarly, executives involved in the acquisition process may become overcommitted to a 
target and continuously increase their bids. Moreover, they often offer bids that are higher than 
the initial bids, despite the negative information obtained from the due diligence review (e.g., 
Haunschild, 1994). Further, noncomprehensive decision processes tend involve greater reliance 
upon intuition (e.g., Wally & Baum, 1994), which may limit the consideration of potential costs 
and risks. Likewise, noncomprehensive processes could limit devils’ advocacy and cognitive 
conflict (e.g., Schweiger, Sandberg, & Rechner, 1989), thus reducing the level of negative 
information considered when making integrative decisions. By enforcing a highly disciplined 
and comprehensive approach to the due diligence and bargaining process, acquirers pay attention 
to critical information, use objective decision-making criteria, attend to the results of the 
investigatory analyses, and use the due diligence results as prerequisites for premium decisions 
(e.g., Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984; Dean & Sharfman, 1993b). 
While deviations from comprehensive acquisition process that result in high acquisition 
premiums may be unintentional, executives may intentionally try to make acquisitions serve their 
own private interests rather than interests of shareholders (e.g., Kroll, Wright, Toombs, & 
Leavell, 1997). In those deals, executives may be more concerned with quick execution and 
closure of the deal, rather than with the payment of a fair price (e.g., Black, 1989). Consequently, 
they may put less effort in due diligence and bargaining, willingly accepting to pay higher 
acquisition price for the sake of their compensation, power, or personal risk diversification 
interests (e.g., Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Wulf, 2004). Imposing comprehensive due diligence 
procedures i.e. requesting sound revisions of the magnitude of premiums executives are willing 
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to pay for the target, diminishes their empire-building intentions (e.g., Rhoades, 1983), thereby 
making them act in the interest of shareholder. 
Finally, integration of information through terms revision helps boundedly rational 
executives deal with the complexity of acquisition decisions and limited attentional resources 
that they can dedicate to the acquisition process. Faced with a complex decision on how much to 
pay for an acquisition target, acquirers engage in a sequential process in which offer amounts can 
be revised in a series of concession makings as new information from the due diligence becomes 
available (e.g., Walsh, 1989; Boone & Mulherin, 2007; Parola & Ellis, 2014). Such integrative 
procedures help acquirers deal with the information load, enhance premium effectiveness by 
ensuring that acquirers attention is focused on the critical issues of a decision, and that all these 
critical issues are timely accounted for (e.g., Langley, 1989). Additionally, integrating new 
insights through offer revisions may lead the target to reveal preferences with respect to expected 
price and premium during deal negotiations (e.g., Rubinstein, 1985). Acquirers thereby may 
better assess the target’s perspective on the deal, and consistently with Langley’s (1989) 
findings, use formal analysis as a persuasion mechanism, when other means to achieve 
integrative comprehensiveness are not available. Taken together, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 2. Integrative comprehensiveness of the pre-acquisition process is negatively 
related to the magnitude of acquisition premium. 
Acquirers may additionally improve procedural rationality of the decision-making process by 
relying on external, third-party assessment of the quality of due diligence information (e.g., 
Fredrickson, 1984; Fredrickson & Iaquinto, 1989). Specifically, in the context of acquisitions, 
the assessment of preliminary deal-related decisions may be requested by independent external 
parties such as financial advisors that are not directly involved in merger negotiations (e.g., 
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Bebchuk & Kahan, 1989). These external analyses by independent experts, typically with an 
emphasis on acquisition price, are called fairness opinions, and their use may affect acquisition 
premiums in two ways. First, acquirers may use fairness opinions to assess the quality of their 
own analysis (i.e. identify mistakes, verify findings through alternative data analysis techniques, 
prevent self-serving analyses, etc.) and induce additional validity to their claims (e.g., Kisgen & 
Song, 2009; Cain & Denis, 2013). Second, fairness opinions requested by an acquirer can 
significantly improve transaction outcomes as they lead to more rigorous deal negotiations (e.g., 
Kisgen & Song, 2009); the acquirer may improve its deal-making position by using fairness 
opinion as a means to negotiation more favorable premium.  
 The value and use of information is influenced by decision-making norms in a firm (e.g., 
Feldman & March, 1981). Externally induced comprehensiveness may thus also influence how a 
target firm perceives suggested premium (e.g., Hendreon & Fredrickson, 2006). According to the 
source credibility theories (e.g., Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953) the persuasiveness of 
information depends on the expertise and trustworthiness of an information source, whereby 
more credible sources are more persuasive (e.g., Pornpitakpan, 2004). Therefore, premium 
decisions justified by an external independent expert may be more favorably perceived and more 
trusted by a target firm. Acquisition procedures infused by objectivity through external 
assessment are therefore more likely to reduce the magnitude of premiums, or put formally: 
Hypothesis 3. External comprehensiveness of the pre-acquisition process is negatively 
related to the magnitude of acquisition premium. 
The Contingent Effects of Dyadic Politicality 
Early work on decision-making suggested that decision processes are a mixture of rationality and 
politicality, where more politicality is equivalent to less rationality (e.g., Pettigrew, 1977; 
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Hickson et al., 1986). Subsequent empirical research however demonstrated that the two 
perspectives are complementary, and that rationality and politicality are independent dimensions 
of the decision-making process (e.g., Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; Dean & Sharfman, 1993a). 
We accept this view that the practice of politics is conceptually different from the extent to 
which information is collected and analyzed; these two dimensions independently affect decision 
outcomes. Nevertheless, we further propose that, in the context of acquisition decision making, 
where the levels of rationality and politicality are driven by the opposing parties, the effect of 
acquirer’s procedural rationality will depend on the extent to which the target induces politicality 
in the decision-making process. By increasing dyadic politicality through actions such as 
withholding of information, rejecting decisions based on sound analyses, or increasing 
competitive bidding (e.g., Pettigrew, 1977; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Zajac & Bazerman, 
1991), target firms increase the opportunity for shifting the deal-making process from the arena 
of rationality towards the arena of politicality. Under such risk, acquirers that adhere to 
comprehensive acquisition decision process can benefit even more. 
 Premium decisions are under extensive pressures of dyadic politicality (e.g., Pruitt, 1981; 
Zajac & Bazerman, 1991; Parola & Ellis, 2014). The target may attempt to influence 
comprehensiveness of the premium deciding process by withholding critical information (e.g., 
Pettigrew, 1977; Coff, 1999) i.e. by sustaining information asymmetries (e.g., Dierickx & Koza, 
1991) and information ambiguity (e.g., De Noble, Gustafson, & Hergert, 1988). Similarly, it may 
attempt to dictate the pace of offer revisions and use deadline pressures in order to restrict or 
interrupt due diligence (e.g., Reed-Lajoux & Elson, 2010) or to improve its bargaining position 
(e.g., Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Parola & Ellis, 2014). Often, target firm would also resist to 
grant the acquirer the exclusivity status (e.g., Boone & Mulherin, 2009) which would stipulate 
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the target from negotiating the deal with another potential buyer for a period of time (e.g., 
Coffey, Garrow, & Holbeche, 2002). Non-exclusivity increases the risk of “competitive blind 
spots” by inducing the need to consider decisions contingent on competitive others (e.g., Zajac & 
Bazerman, 1991). Under such conditions of high dyadic politicality by which the target attempts 
to influence acquisition overpayment, acquirers would more substantially benefit from 
analytically comprehensives decision-making process. In other words, 
Hypothesis 4a. Under conditions of high dyadic politicality, the negative effect of 
analytical comprehensiveness of the pre-acquisition process on the magnitude of 
acquisition premium is strengthened.  
As the acquisition process unfolds, the target may further increase the degree of dyadic 
politicality. For instance, targets may use latent (e.g., Aktas et al., 2010) or real competition (e.g., 
Boone & Mulherin, 2007) to influence the acquisition process. When additional bidders join the 
process, the intensity of political pressures in the dyad increases with every new bidder (e.g., 
Boone & Mulherin, 2007). The presence of a large number of bidders may make the target 
formalize the bidding process, impose bidding rules, and bidding deadlines (e.g., Hansen, 2001), 
thus reducing the extent to which the focal acquirer can benefit from informed decision-making. 
The presence of competitive bidders may also have a signaling effect, indicating that the target 
may have valuable resources or promising growth prospects (e.g., Fishman, 1989; Reuer, Tong, 
& Wu, 2012). Consequently, even when due diligence reveals negative information about the 
target, the acquirer may be reluctant to revise its acquisition offer (e.g., Haunschild, 1994). An 
increased fear of failure to reach an agreement in negotiations is therefore induced by the 
presence of competition, making the acquirer reluctant to rely on integrative comprehensiveness 
to decide on the premium it is willing to pay for the target (e.g., Kelley, Beckman, & Fischer, 
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1967). Finally, when additional bidders impose competition, the acquirer may be more likely to 
use preemptive bidding as means of eliminating the competition early in the acquisition process 
(e.g., Fishman, 1989; Jennings & Mazzeo, 1993). Managers tend to make subsequent decisions 
to justify their earlier charted directions (Staw, 1976) and competitive situations aggravate this 
tendency (e.g., Zajac & Bazerman, 1991). Therefore, despite limiting competitive bargaining, 
preemptive bidding may simultaneously make rational offer revision less likely, thus reducing 
the effect of integrative comprehensiveness on acquisition premiums. This argument is also in 
line with the competitive decision-making theory (Zajac & Bazerman, 1991) which suggests that 
competitive bidder may get trapped as that they fail to consider the contingent behavior of the 
competitors before making their own decision. Together, to prevent acquirers from falling into 
the above-mentioned traps under high dyadic politicality, integrative comprehensiveness 
becomes particularly beneficial. We therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4b. Under conditions of high dyadic politicality, the negative effect of 
integrative comprehensiveness of the pre-acquisition process on the magnitude of 
acquisition premium is strengthened.  
In addition to increasing dyadic politicality through competitive pressures, the target may 
directly influence premium-deciding process by counteroffering (e.g., Walsh, 1989). When the 
target counteroffers with a higher acquisition price, the acquirer may increase its reservation bid 
(e.g., Zajac & Bazerman, 1991) or neglect recommendations from the external, independent 
advisor (e.g., Kisgen & Song, 2009) to keep the negotiations alive. Moreover, recommendations 
from the acquirer’s external, independent advisor may not be equally valuable in the eyes of the 
target firm, as information that threaten the benefits of the target firm reduce their perceived 
value (e.g., Menon & Blount, 2003). Again, high levels of dyadic politicality impose additional 
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risk of overpayment for the acquirer. Under such circumstances, acquirers that adhere to 
externally comprehensive acquisition process might benefit even more. We therefore 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4c. Under conditions of high dyadic politicality, the negative effect of external 
comprehensiveness of the pre-acquisition process on the magnitude of acquisition 
premium is strengthened.  
METHODS 
Sample and Data 
We begin sample construction with all completed and withdrawn acquisition deals tracked by the 
Securities Data Company (SDC) announced during 2001-2015 in which both the acquirer and 
the target are publicly traded US companies, because acquisition premiums can be obtained only 
for publicly traded firms. We exclude all transactions labeled as divestitures, spin-offs, recaps, 
repurchases, minority stake purchases, self-tenders, acquisitions of remaining interests, self-
tenders, exchange offers, leveraged buyouts and privatizations. Following prior research on 
acquisition premiums (e.g., Reuer et al., 2012), we further exclude transactions associated with 
real estate investment trusts, closed-end mutual funds, and offerings by banks and other firms in 
the financial services sector which may be driven simply by financial motives (e.g., Haspeslagh 
& Jemison, 1991). Finally, to ensure strategic importance of deals and the significance of their 
potential economic impact, we further follow prior research and restrict our sample to 
acquisitions with a disclosed value of more than 10 million US dollars in which the acquirer 
seeks to fully own the target’s shares after the transaction (e.g., Haunschild, 1994). After 
implementing these sample screening criteria, we obtain an initial sample of 1153 completed and 
terminated acquisitions. 
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 In this study, we analyze pre-acquisition process which evolves prior to the public 
announcement of a takeover bid. In short, this phase covers the period from the first contact 
made between the acquirer and the target, until the moment acquirer publicly announces an offer 
(e.g., Boone & Mulherin, 2007). A comprehensive description of the pre-acquisition process is 
provided elsewhere (see for instance, Parola & Ellis, 2014; Marquardt & Zur, 2015). We follow 
an emerging stream of research in the domain of finance and economics (e.g., Boone & 
Mulherin, 2007; Aktas et al., 2010; Fich et al., 2011; Heitzman, 2011) and collect data on the 
pre-acquisition process from the SEC M&A-related filings around the deals’ announcements. 
Item 1005 of SEC Regulation M-A describes the target or potential acquirer’s obligation to 
disclose any “negotiations and material contacts” with the other party prior to the announcement 
of the acquisition. We search Edgar filing system for M&A filings made by the acquirer and the 
target when the deal is publicly announced. Details of the transactions and the pre-announcement 
events are provided in the following documents: DEF14A or S-4 (for transaction-related 
information in mergers), and TO-T or 14D-9 (for transaction-related information in tender 
offers) filed in connection with the deal; the target’s DEF14 statement for the year prior to the 
deal; and the acquirers’ DEF14 statement and 10-K report for the year following the deal (e.g., 
Heitzman, 2011). Information on the events and characteristics of the pre-acquisition process are 
typically reported as a narrative in the “Background of the Merger” section of these documents. 
We read these documents in detail and, using a qualitative data analysis software, document, 
extract and code data on the negotiations and due diligence process. 
Due to the intensive nature of gathering detailed data on the pre-acquisition process, we 
collected data for a random sample of 550 out of the 1153 M&A deals obtained from SDC after 
applying a set of sampling screens as described above. Two-sample t-tests revealed no signiﬁcant 
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differences between the full sample of deals and the randomly selected M&A deals with respect 
to the key deal characteristics. More information on the recoding of various information from the 
SEC M&A-related documents is provided with a description of the corresponding variables. 
In addition to the deal-level data collected from the SDC database and the process-level 
data collected from M&A filings in the SEC Edgar database, we collected various firm-level data 
on both acquirers and targets from the Compustat database. Additionally, we collected data on 
the 10-year M&A histories of both acquirers and targets from the SDC database. We also 
matched the sample with the Center for Research and Securities Prices (CRSP) data files to 
obtain accounting and financial information, again for both acquirers and targets. Finally, we 
used acquirers’ and targets’ annual reports and proxy statements to collect data on their top 
management teams and boards of directors. After matching all data, our final sample consists of 
507 acquisition deals made by 315 acquirers. The sample size and deal characteristics are 
comparable to prior studies examining the determinants of acquisition premiums (e.g., 
Haunschild, 1994; Reuer et al., 2012; Zhu, 2013). 
Variables and Measurement 
 Dependent variable. The dependent variable is Acquisition premium measured by the 
purchase price per target share paid by the acquiring firm less the target’s pre-acquisition stock 
price, divided by the target’s pre-acquisition stock price. To avoid distortions in the stock price 
caused by the leakage of information right before the announcement of the deal which causes 
premiums calculated based on short-term windows to be smaller than those calculated based on 
longer-term windows (e.g., Laamanen, 2007), we calculated acquisition premiums based on the 
four-week time lag (e.g., Haunschild, 1994). Following Officer (2003), we restrict the premium 
measure to two (or 200%) to avoid extreme outliers. In our robustness analyses, we also used 
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shorter time periods to calculate premiums (i.e., one week and one day) to rule out potential 
noise due to confounding events that may occur during the longer period. 
 Independent variables. Prior research on procedural rationality pointed out process 
comprehensiveness as the most important measure of procedural rationality in the decision-
making process (e.g., Fredrickson, 1984; Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984; Dean & Sharfman, 
1993b). As a measure of procedural rationality, comprehensiveness has been defined as the 
extent to which firms: a) attempt to be exhaustive in the collection of information relevant to the 
decision (i.e. analytical comprehensiveness), b) rely upon the analysis of this information in 
making and integrating their decisions (i.e. integrative comprehensiveness) (Fredrickson, 1984; 
Dean & Sharfman, 1993a), and c) use outside independent sources for decisions’ objectivity 
assessment (i.e. external comprehensiveness) (Fredrickson, 1984, 1985). Following this research 
stream, we construct three variables resembling acquirers’ procedural rationality in the pre-
acquisition process.  
In the acquisition context, we define analytical comprehensiveness as the extent to which 
the acquirer attempts to be exhaustive in the collection of information about the target firm in the 
due diligence review. We measure Analytical Comprehensives as the time acquirer invests in 
conducting due diligence relative to the size of the target firm. The due diligence effort is 
measured as the number of days between the signing of the NDA and the authorization of the 
public announcement of the deal by the boards of directors (e.g., Marquardt & Zur, 2015). We 
collected key dates in the pre-acquisition process from the M&A-related SEC documents (e.g., 
Boone & Mulherin, 2007; Ahern & Sosyura, 2014). Since due diligence may be interrupted for a 
number of reasons (e.g., Reed-Lajoux & Elson, 2010) we ensure that any such interruption is 
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accounted for when measuring due diligence efforts1. We measure target’s size as its total assets, 
and we also perform a sensitivity check using alternative measures of size such as market value 
and total revenues. 
 In the acquisition context, we define integrative comprehensive as the extent to which the 
acquirer relies upon the analysis of information collected in the due diligence while revising its 
acquisition offer. To measure Integrative Comprehensiveness, we create a binary variable taking 
the value of 1, if the narrative history description of the acquisition negotiations process in the 
transaction-related SEC filings explicitly points out that the acquirer revised its acquisition offer 
based on the new information obtained during the due diligence review2 (e.g., Walsh, 1989; 
Coff, 1999; Puranam et al., 2006), a 0 otherwise.  
 Lastly, we define acquirer’s external comprehensiveness as the use of independent, third-
party assessments of the objectivity of an acquisition offer, particularly with regard to price. We 
thus construct a binary variable External Comprehensiveness which takes the value of 1 if the 
                                                          
1 For instance, in a deal between Western Digital Corporation (WDS) and sTec, Inc., the acquirer began due 
diligence review after entering into a NDA with the target on April 17, 2013. As stated in the “Background of the 
Merger” section of the corresponding transaction-related DEFM14A filing in Edgar SEC database, on May 31, 
2013, “WDC discontinued their due diligence efforts with the company at that time”. The narrative further states 
that later, on June 16, 2013, WDC started conducting “additional due diligence”. This interruption in due diligence 
was accounted for by excluding the break of sixteen days from our measure of due diligence efforts, used to 
construct analytical comprehensiveness variable. 
2 For example, in a deal between Comtech Telecommunications Corp. and Radyne Corporation the “Background of 
the Merger” section of the corresponding transaction-related DEFM14A filing in Edgar SEC database states the 
following: “On February 18, 2008, Mr. Kornberg [Chairman, President and CEO of the acquirer] provided an 
updated offer letter to Radyne, reducing its offer price to a range of $11.50 to $12.00 per share based on Radyne’s 
weaker financial performance as determined during Comtech’s due diligence review.” 
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acquirer requested fairness opinion from an independent external advisor, the one not directly 
involved in merger negotiations, during the private takeover process (e.g., Kisgen & Song, 
2009). Given that information about fairness opinion advisors in the SDC database is incomplete, 
we manually collected data on fairness opinions from transaction-related SEC documents.  
 Moderating variables. Our moderating hypotheses posit that the effect of procedural 
rationality on acquisition premiums depends on the politicality conditions in the negotiating 
dyad: the higher the politicality, the stronger the negative effect of procedural rationality on 
premium. From the acquirer perspective, dyadic politicality originates in the unpredictable 
actions of the target through which it aims to influence the decision making process (e.g., 
Giammarino & Heinkel, 1986). First, the dyadic politicality increases when the target does not 
agree to sign an exclusivity or lock-out agreement (e.g., Coffey et al., 2002). Such an agreement 
would prevent the target from negotiating with third parties for the period of the duration of the 
exclusivity, which typically lasts for about a couple of weeks (e.g., Frankel, 2005). To test 
Hypothesis 4a, we use the information about the existence of exclusivity agreement between the 
acquirer and the target during M&A negotiations from the M&A-related SEC filings and 
construct a binary variable Non-exclusivity which equals 1 if the target refuses to enter into an 
exclusivity agreement with the acquirer during the pre-acquisition process, and 0 otherwise.  
Second, the dyadic politicality increase with target’s efforts to increase the bargaining 
competition by attracting additional bidders. In the presence of additional bidders, the acquirer is 
less likely to rely solely on comprehensive premium calculation but may also account for the 
effect of competitive bidding, often even just to stay in the negotiations game (e.g., Varaiya, 
1987; Varaiya & Ferris, 1987). Recently, research has pointed out that the bargaining 
competition tends to be much more intense during the pre-announcement as opposed to the post-
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announcement M&A process (e.g., Boone & Mulherin, 2007). To test Hypothesis 4b, we thus 
construct variable Competitive bidders measured by the number of potential buyers making 
written private bids during the pre-announcement process (e.g., Boone & Mulherin, 2007). We 
collected information on the number of private bidders from the M&A-related SEC filings. 
Finally, the dyadic politicality increases when the target influences decision making 
regarding the acquisition price by counteroffering. Targets that strongly persist in their preferred 
deal terms are more likely to neglect the conditions of fairness, even if imposed by the 
independent external parties (e.g., Cain & Denis, 2013). Such targets use various political tactics 
to influence the takeover process (e.g., Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003), with counteroffering 
being one of the most commonly used (e.g., Walsh, 1989). We relied upon the M&A-related 
SEC documents to extract information on target bargaining behavior and defined Counteroffer as 
a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the target firm counteroffered at least once during 
negotiations, and 0 otherwise (e.g., Walsh, 1989). 
 Control variables. First, we control for a set of features of the acquisition process. Prior 
studies pointed out that the length of the takeover process may affect deal outcomes. For 
example, acquirers may prologue deal-making when the target firm appears risky (e.g., Pablo et 
al., 1996) or the momentum may be slowed when the board or regulatory approval is lagged 
(e.g., Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). Hence, we control for Pre-acquisition process length measured as 
the number of days between the date of deal initiation and the date of its public announcement, 
both collected from the M&A-related SEC filings (Boone & Mulherin, 2007; Heitzman, 2011). 
Prior research also acknowledges the impact of advisors in the deal-making process on deal 
outcomes (e.g., Kim et al., 2011). We thus add control Advisors involvement, measured as the 
total number of acquirer’s advisors involved in the pre-acquisition process. We also incorporate a 
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dummy for a Tender offer, a public solicitation for target shareholders’ stock, because prior 
studies show that tender offers result in higher acquisition premiums (e.g., Comment & Schwert, 
1995). We control for the effect of rumors by adding a variable Rumors, coded 1 if there was any 
related rumor about the focal acquisition before the public announcement of the deal, or 0 
otherwise (e.g., Kim et al., 2011). Recent research also shows the deal-initiator effect on 
acquisition premiums. We therefore include a dummy variable Target-initiated deal, which 
equals 1 if the deal is initiated by the target, and 0 if the deal is initiated by the acquirer (e.g., 
Boone & Mulherin, 2007).  
 Second, we control for the key features of the focal acquisition deal that could influence 
acquisition premium. We control for Deal size measured as the logged value of the transaction 
(e.g., Beckman & Haunschild, 2002). To control for synergies between the acquirer and the 
target we included a variable Financial synergy measured as the debt-equity ratio of the target 
less the same ratio of the acquirer in the year prior to the acquisition (e.g., Slusky & Caves, 
1991) and a variable Product-market synergy measured using the SIC codes: equal to i if the 
target and the acquirer share a common i-digit SIC code, where i = 1, 2, 3, 4; and 0 if the target 
and the acquirer are in unrelated industries (e.g., Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Acquisition 
premium may differ depending on whether the price is paid in cash, stock, or as a mix of the two 
(e.g., Faccio & Masulis, 2005). We include a variable Payment method which captures the 
proportion of payment made in cash (e.g., Travlos, 1987). Finally, acquisition decisions are 
affected by the attitude towards the deal. Thus, we control for Hostile deals with a dummy 
variable that equals to 1 for non-friendly deals, and 0 otherwise (e.g., Laamanen, 2007).  
 Third, we control for various characteristics of acquirers. Prior research shows that hubris 
affects acquisition premiums (e.g., Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Our control variable Hubris 
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draws on CEOs’ option-exercise and is measured as the log-transformed ratio of acquirer CEO’s 
vested in-the-money option value to his or her total compensation value in a year prior to the 
focal acquisition negotiations (e.g., Malmendier & Tate, 2008). We also control for Acquirer 
relative size, measured as the ratio of the target’s assets to the acquirer’s assets (e.g., Kim et al., 
2011). Acquirers with significant financial slack and strong performance may afford to overpay 
for targets (e.g., Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan, 2006). We add a control Acquirer slack 
measured as the ratio of core deposits to the total assets of acquirers (e.g.,  Kim et al., 2011) and 
a control Acquirer performance measured by the acquirer’s return on assets in a year preceding 
the year of the deal (e.g., Kim et al., 2011). Firms with more acquisition experience may be 
better in selecting, managing, and negotiating acquisitions (e.g., Barkema & Schijven, 2008). We 
thus control for Acquirer acquisition experience by counting the number of deals that each 
acquirer had made during the five years preceding a focal deal. Due to positive skewness, we 
transformed count measure by taking the log of 1 plus the number of acquisitions. Finally, to 
control for potential interests of managers, we include Acquirer managerial ownership measured 
by the percentage of shares held by the acquirer’s executives (e.g., Hayward & Hambrick, 1997).  
Fourth, we controlled for various characteristics of targets. Acquirers are prone to paying 
higher premiums when the target is well-performing and exhibits strong potential for future 
growth (e.g., Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). We include controls for Target slack and Target 
performance measured in the same way as the corresponding variables for the acquirers. 
Additionally, we include a control for Target growth potential measured using the market-to-
book value ratio of target’s equity, i.e. by diving target pre-acquisition market value by its book 
value of equity (e.g., Laamanen, 2007). Managers of target firms holding equity ownership may 
require higher acquisition payments to compensate for their loss of control rights, or may trade-
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off compensation from the acquisition payment with the positions in the combined firm (e.g., 
Wulf, 2004). Hence, we incorporate a variable Target managerial ownership measuring the 
percentage of shares held by target firm executives. Further, boards with more outside directors 
are less likely to favor managers’ interests from acquisitions (e.g., Bange & Mazzeo, 2004). We 
thus include the control Target board independence measured as the proportion of independent 
directors in the target firm board. Because firms in high-tech industries often present attractive 
growth opportunities, we also add a binary variable High-tech firm which equals 1 if the target is 
high-tech, or 0 otherwise (e.g., Reuer et al., 2012). To control for the signaling effect, we include 
a binary variable Target advisor reputation which equals 1 if the target’s financial advisor is one 
of the top ten financial institutions by market share, and 0 otherwise (e.g., Fang, 2005). 
To control for potential industry effects, we include a series of industry fixed effects 
based on the target firms’ two-digit industry SIC codes. Finally, to control for the broader 
macroeconomic factors, we include year-fixed effects. 
Statistical Methods 
 Our final sample consists of 507 acquisitions made by 315 firms. OLS regression, used in 
prior research on acquisition premiums (e.g., Haunschild, 1994) is not suitable for our model 
estimations because many acquirers in the sample negotiated more than one acquisition deal (i.e., 
assumption of independent observations is violated). Similarly, within-group fixed effects 
generalized least squares (GLS) regression, also used in prior research on acquisition premium 
(e.g., Kim et al., 2011) is not suitable for our analyses because in our sample there are multiple 
firms with only one acquisition deal (i.e., impossible to model within-group fixed-effects). We 
therefore use simple GLS regression models and account for the dependence between 
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observations by clustering the acquirers and producing robust clustered standard errors (e.g., 
Reuer et al., 2012).  
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for the variables used in the 
study. Correlations are in low range, the average variance inflation factor (VIF) for Model 4 with 
the main effects is 1.36, and the highest VIF value across all independent variables is 2.21. VIF 
values across all models are below the commonly used maximum value of 10, suggesting that 
multicollinearity should not be an issue in our analyses.  
 The average acquisition premium is 46.14 percent, which greatly corresponds to average 
premiums reported in previous studies based on different samples (e.g., Laamanen, 2007; Reuer 
et al., 2012). The average length of the pre-acquisition process is 7.15 months, and the average 
length of due diligence is 3.75 months, consistent with the figures reported in previous studies 
based on similar samples (e.g., Heitzman, 2011). We also divide deals into different subsamples 
based on the level of procedural rationality (i.e., analytical, integrative, and external 
comprehensiveness) exhibited in the acquisition process and compared acquisition premiums 
across the deals in these subsamples. In deals with analytical comprehensiveness of above the 
median, an average premium is 43.01 which compares to an average premium of 48.87 for deals 
with lower degree of analytical comprehensiveness (t = 1.26, n.s.). Similarly, in deals with high 
integrative comprehensiveness, an average premium is 44.71, whereas in a subset of deals that 
exhibited low levels of integrative comprehensiveness, an average premium is 51.09 (t = 3.69, p 
< .001). Finally, in deals with high external comprehensiveness, and average premium is 40.79 
which compares to an average premium of 49.55 for deal with low integrative 
comprehensiveness (t = 3.12, p < .01) 
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---------- Insert Table 1 about here ---------- 
 Table 2 presents the results for testing Hypotheses 1-3. Model I is a baseline specification 
comprising all control variables and moderating variables. Models II, III and IV augment model I 
by adding theoretical variables, three dimensions of procedural rationality – analytical 
comprehensiveness, integrative comprehensiveness, and external comprehensiveness, 
respectively. As predicted in Hypothesis 1, analytical comprehensiveness of the pre-acquisition 
process is negatively related to acquisition premiums. Across models II-IV, the coefficient 
estimate for the analytical comprehensives variable is negative and statistically significant (p < 
.01). Similarly, in models III and IV, the coefficient estimate for integrative comprehensiveness 
variable is negative and statistically significant (both p < .05). Finally, in model IV, the 
coefficient estimate for external comprehensiveness is negative and statistically significant (p < 
.05). Furthermore, procedural rationality also matters in terms of economics significance. A one 
standard deviation increase in comprehensiveness jointly leads to about 1 percentage point 
reduction in acquisition premium. In absolute terms, for a deal of an average value in our sample, 
this means that the acquirer reduces acquisition premium for about 8 million US dollars.  
---------- Insert Table 2 about here ---------- 
 Table 3 reports the regression results testing the propositions stated in Hypotheses 4a-c 
that the relationship between procedural rationality and acquisition premiums depends on the 
level of politicality in the acquirer-target negotiation dyad. Hypothesis 4a suggests that dyadic 
politicality (target influence through non-exclusivity of negotiations) strengthens the negative 
effect of analytical comprehensiveness on acquisition premiums. In model I, the interaction of 
analytical comprehensiveness with non-exclusivity is negative and significant (p < .01). Thus, 
Hypothesis 4a supported. Hypothesis 4b suggests that dyadic politicality (target influence 
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through increased competitive bidding) strengthens the negative effect of integrative 
comprehensiveness on acquisition premiums, which we test in model II. The negative and 
significant interaction coefficient (p < .05) indicates support for Hypothesis 4b. Further, 
Hypothesis 4c proposes that dyadic politicality (target influence through counteroffering) 
strengthens the negative effect of external comprehensiveness on acquisition premiums. In model 
III, the corresponding interaction coefficient is negative and significant (p < .05), lending support 
for Hypothesis 4c.  
Overall, these results suggest that the reducing effect of procedural rationality on 
acquisition premiums is particularly pronounced under conditions of high dyadic politicality. 
Under conditions in which the target firm attempts to exercise strong influence on the acquisition 
decision making process, efforts put in collecting and analyzing information about the target 
(analytical comprehensiveness effect), revising acquisition offers solely based on the factual 
information from the due diligence review (integrative comprehensiveness effect), and relying on 
externally infused objectivity in acquisition price (external comprehensiveness effect) are 
particularly beneficial for the acquirer as they prevent the acquirer from shifting its decision 
making from the domain of rationality into the domain of politicality. Finally, Model IV that 
contains all interaction effects at the same time provides consistent interpretation of the findings. 
---------- Insert Table 3 about here ---------- 
 The analyses of other variables also provide results that are worth pointing out. First, 
several characteristics of the pre-acquisition process have significant effect on acquisition 
premiums. In line with prior research in finance and economics, the presence of competitive 
bidders during negotiations increases premiums (e.g., Slusky & Caves, 1991) while longer 
negotiations benefit acquirers as they lead to lower premiums (e.g., Coff, 1999). Second, 
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consistent with research on managerial biases in acquisition decision-making, acquirer CEO 
hubris leads to high acquisition premiums (e.g., Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). Third, several 
target characteristics significantly influence acquisition premiums. Acquirers are more likely to 
overpay for targets in high-tech industries (e.g., Coff, 1999) and for those that indicate strong 
growth potential (e.g., Laamanen, 2007). Finally, in line with signaling theory of acquisition 
premiums, we find that acquirers overpay more for the targets with prominent advisors (e.g., 
Reuer et al., 2012).  
Robustness and Supplementary Analyses 
We investigate the robustness of our results in several ways. First, it is possible that one or more 
omitted factors drive both procedural rationality and acquisition premium decisions, resulting in 
endogeneity due to omitted variable bias. To account for this possibility, we follow a two-stage 
estimation process, similar to that used in prior studies on acquisition premiums (e.g., Malhotra 
et al., 2015). In the first-stage, we regress the three dependent variables (i.e. analytical, 
integrative, and external comprehensiveness) on a set of exogenous variables. We identify the 
determinants of procedural rationality in pre-acquisition process based on the extensive review of 
prior literature on procedural rationality in strategic decision making (e.g., Rajagopalan et al., 
1993; Elbanna & Child, 2007) and prior literature acquisition process (e.g., Haleblian et al., 
2009; Parola & Ellis, 2014). In the first stage model, we include three sets of predictors on the 
contextual-, acquirer-, and decision- (deal) level. In the second-stage model, we then include the 
fitted values of all three variables as additional predictors of acquisition premiums. After 
controlling for endogeneity, the results continue to support the hypothesized effects. 
 Second, a potential concern for the interpretation of the results is the endogeneity of 
procedural rationality. In our study context, acquirers could invest in preliminary collection and 
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analysis of information, or prepare and plan the acquisition process in anticipation of an 
acquisition of a focal target (e.g., Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). In such cases, the negative 
effect of procedural rationality on acquisition premiums that we find might stem from reverse 
causality. We could not find a strong instrument to address this concern with the instrumental 
variable approach (e.g., Semadeni, Withers, & Certo, 2014), however we conduct a set of 
regression analyses using subsamples from which we remove observations that are relatively 
prone to endogeneity bias. For example, anticipation effect with respect to the deal and the 
corresponding price would naturally be higher in an acquirer-initiated than in a target-initiated 
deal (e.g., Boone & Mulherin, 2007). We thus test the main effect on a subset of deals which 
originate from targets’ decisions to sell their firms. Similarly, acquirers are more likely to 
possess private information about the target when they have prior ties (e.g., Porrini, 2004) and 
such information could affect anticipated premiums necessary to close the deal. We thus test the 
robustness of our results on a subset of deals in which no prior ties between the acquirer and the 
target are evident. Finally, to further rule out the possibility that the differences in how much the 
acquirer knows about the target prior to due diligence drive premium decisions (and cause 
reverse causality), we use absolute difference between the initial and final premium paid as the 
dependent variable. The logic behind is that any pre-existing knowledge on the target would 
already be accounted for in the initial premium. This analysis also yielded consistent results.   
 Third, in our main analyses of moderating effects we have matched dimensions of 
procedural rationality with the corresponding sources of dyadic politicality that become 
important as the acquisition process unfolds over time. For example, in the initial stage of the 
pre-acquisition process, when the acquirer is focused on collecting information about the target 
to decide on the premium (i.e. analytical comprehensiveness), exclusivity of a dialogue between 
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the acquirer and the target may significantly reduce dyadic uncertainty. In a robustness check we 
further analyse interaction effects between each dimensions of procedural rationality and other 
two sources of dyadic politicality, originally not included in the main analysis. The only 
additional finding is that the interaction effect of integrative comprehensiveness and dyadic 
politicality stemming from counteroffering is negative and significant (p < 0.5). The remaining 
interaction effects are consistently negative, though not significant. 
Fourth, although the use of longer time windows (i.e., four weeks) for calculating 
acquisition premium reduces the market anticipation effect of the transaction prior to its 
announcement, it could also introduce noise due to compounding events that may occur during 
the period (e.g., Kim et al., 2011). We thus test the robustness of our results with alternative 
measures of acquisition premiums by using shorter time windows (i.e., one week and one day). 
In all cases, we found consistent results. 
 Fifth, to make sure that our results do not change quantitatively when we further control 
for other (less common) variables, we add additional characteristics of the acquirer and the target 
such as operating cash flow, sock return volatility, serial acquirers, and target acquisition 
experience; additional deal characteristics such as termination fees, deal relatedness, and prior 
ties; and additional process features such as acquirer and target special acquisition committees, 
and acquirer parallel negotiations. The inclusion of these controls does not change the results. 
Finally, we use alternative regression estimations of our results. We applied OLS 
regression on a subsample on acquirers with only one acquisition deal in our original sample 
(i.e., to avoid violating the assumption of independent observations required for OLS). We also 
applied within-group fixed effects GLS regression on a subsample of acquirers with multiple 
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acquisition deals (i.e., to model within-group fixed-effects). The choice of an estimation 
technique does not affect our findings. 
DISCUSSION 
We introduced the notion of procedural rationality in the context of acquisition decision-making. 
Our results suggest when firms conduct acquisition-related due diligence and negotiations 
through a comprehensive approach, they substantially benefit from paying lower acquisition 
premiums. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to quantify the benefits of 
procedural rationality in acquisition processes. Specifically, we found evidence that the extent to 
which acquirer firm (a) puts effort in collecting and evaluating information during the due 
diligence, (b) analyzes and uses this information when revising its acquisition offers, and (c) 
relies on credible external sources for objectivity assessment, decreases the magnitude of 
premiums paid to the target firm. In addition, we theorize and find that the effect of procedural 
rationality in the pre-acquisition process on premium decisions depends upon the level of dyadic 
politicality, suggesting that comprehensive acquisition process is particularly beneficial for the 
acquirer when the target tries to influence the deal-making process politically. These findings 
speak directly to the theoretical mechanism underlying the effect of procedural rationality on 
acquisition premiums and they have multiple implications for both research and practice. 
Implications for Acquisitions Research 
We believe our study contributes to the literature on acquisitions in several ways. First, by 
delineating prior empirical research according to its focus on either substantive rationality or 
procedural rationality, we provide novel synthesis that allows developing more complete 
predictions that flow from these distinct, but complementary theoretical perspectives. Taking the 
procedural rationality perspective allows redirecting acquisitions research from examining the 
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substance of acquisition decision towards the investigation of processes by which they are 
reached. For example, while we acknowledge findings from prior research with regard to the 
impact of strategic fit on acquisition premiums (e.g., Slusky & Caves, 1991), we show that the 
comprehensiveness of the due diligence process during which firms assess strategic fit also 
impacts premium decisions. The substance of acquisition choices therefore sets the upper limit to 
the potential of acquisition success, whereas the rationality of acquisition procedures impacts the 
degree to which that potential is realized (Pablo et al., 1996).  
 Second, we contribute to the research on acquisition negotiation process. Although the 
importance of the pre-acquisition process for acquisition outcomes has been argued for a long 
time (e.g., Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Pablo et al., 1996), this phase 
of the acquisition process received significantly less attention than other phases, and modest 
developments have been primarily conceptual. Furthermore, recent empirical research on the 
negotiations phase in the domain of finance (e.g., Boone & Mulherin, 2007; Aktas et al., 2010; 
Fich et al., 2011; Heitzman, 2011) predominately focuses on substantive rationality and study the 
characteristics of choices firms make at this stage and their performance implications. We, on the 
contrary, focus on procedural rationality and study the characteristics of processes and their 
impact on acquisition outcomes. Our study complements prior acquisition research in 
management and finance with findings that procedural rationality of the pre-acquisition process 
reduces premiums that acquirers pay for targets. We accordingly respond to recent calls for 
empirical research on pre-deal process considerations in the acquisitions research (e.g., Haleblian 
et al., 2009; Parola & Ellis, 2014). 
 Third, our study complements research on antecedents of acquisition premiums. This 
research suggests and shows that various characteristics of acquirers (e.g., Haunschild, 1994; 
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Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Kim et al., 2011) and targets (e.g., Laamanen, 2007; Reuer et al., 
2012) determine acquisition premiums. We add to this research by showing that the decision-
making procedures through which premium decisions are made affect their magnitude. 
Relatedly, we also contribute to the enduring research stream that tries to understand 
performance implications of acquisitions for acquirers’ stakeholders (e.g., Bradley, Desai, & 
Kim, 1988; King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004). Although we do not test the relationship 
between premiums and acquisition performance, recent research finds negative relationship 
between the magnitude of premiums and the acquiring firms’ stock market returns to an 
acquisition announcements (e.g., Schijven & Hitt, 2012). Investigating the mediating role of 
acquisition terms in a relationship between the characteristics of the negotiation process and 
acquisition performance is a promising avenue for future research. 
More broadly, our study lays the initial groundwork for developing a deeper 
understanding of how firms can counter decision-makers’ biased and self-centered decision-
making. A growing body of research on acquisition behavior and performance finds the effect of 
executives’ biases (e.g., Roll, 1986; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997), group biases (e.g., Zhu, 
2013), growth pressures (e.g., Kim et al., 2011), personal interests (e.g., Grinstein & Hribar, 
2004; Harford & Li, 2007), and cognitive simplifications (e.g., Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985; 
Malhotra et al., 2015) during the acquisition decision-making process. Most of this literature is, 
however, concerned with the consequences of such decision-making irrationalities, with limited 
attention being given to the mechanisms that can counter biases and increase rationality of key 
acquisition decisions such as premiums. Research within a behavioral theory of the firm has long 
established that organizations are means for dealing with boundedly rational and self-interested 
decision-makers (e.g., Simon, 1947; Cyert & March, 1963), but the extent to which 
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organizational procedures can counter various behavioral tendencies of individuals in the 
acquisition context has been largely underexplored. The findings from our study suggest that 
imposing comprehensiveness in acquisition procedures during the due diligence and negotiations 
process may, if not entirely prevent, then at least diminish the negative effect of executives’ 
decision-making that is not aligned with the value enhancement goals of acquirers’ shareholders. 
Implications for Procedural Rationality Research 
Our findings also contribute to the research on procedural rationality in strategic decision-
making. First, we extend research on procedural rationality to the acquisitions context, thereby 
adding to the nascent stream of research on procedural rationality in inter-organizational 
decision-making processes (e.g., Walter et al., 2012). While this stream started looking at the 
benefits of procedural rationality in decision-making process after the inter-firm partnership has 
been formed, our study investigates the effect of procedural rationality during their formation. 
Together, these findings provide preliminary evidence that adopting procedural rationality 
perspective may provide novel insights into the dynamics of inter-organizational arrangements 
over the course of their whole life-cycle.  
Second, by introducing the notion of dyadic politicality in the acquisition deal-making 
process, we demonstrate how politics may make the effect of procedural rationality on the 
magnitude of acquisition premiums more pronounced. We therefore contribute to the research 
stream that investigates the interdependency of politicality and rationality within organizations 
(e.g., Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; Dean & Sharfman, 1993a, 1996). These finding suggest that 
studies of acquisition decision-making that utilize either rational models (e.g., Trautwein, 1990) 
or political models (e.g., Parola & Ellis, 2014) are unlikely to reveal the full picture on the 
ongoing dependencies, suggesting the need to combine perspectives toward a more realistic 
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understanding of acquisition decision processes as comprising both aspects. As an example, 
while Boone and Mulherin (2007) show that politicality induced by competitive bargaining does 
not have a direct impact on premiums, our results suggest that dyadic politicality both directly, 
and indirectly impacts the magnitude of premiums. 
Finally, from an empirical point of view, our study also provides several advancements. 
Prior studies on procedural rationality exclusively use survey data to construct measures of 
procedural rationality. Managerial perceptions of decision-making contexts increase the potential 
for common method bias and raise other theoretical and methodological challenges (e.g., Boyd, 
Dess, & Rasheed, 1993). We try to address some of those limitations by using the objective 
features of the decision-making process to construct measures of procedural rationality. Further, 
unlike most prior studies which use performance as the decision process outcome, thus 
neglecting potential confounds, we follow Atuahene-Gima and Li (2004) and use a direct 
outcome of the acquisition process – premium, rather than the overall deal performance as the 
dependent variable. We hope our approach encourages future research on acquisition processes 
as it demonstrates the possibility to examine process issues without studying an endless number 
of decisions at any given point in time, and by focusing on the structural, objectively observable 
dimensions of the decision processes (e.g., Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984). 
Practical Implications 
Our results also have practical implications for managers and boards of directors. We found that 
relying on a high degree of procedural rationality reduces premiums in our sample of acquisition 
deals. Hence, our results may encourage organizational leaders to intentionally improve 
comprehensiveness of the decision-making processes during merger negotiations. Moreover, 
rather than just improving the rationality of deal-making procedures within individual deals, 
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acquirers may try to adopt such procedures to be consistently used across deals. Similarly, our 
findings on the contingent effect of procedural rationality based on different politicality 
conditions in the dyad suggest that acquirers’ negotiation teams need to align bargaining tactics 
with their due diligence efforts. For investors and other market participants, the effectiveness of 
procedural rationality in adjusting the magnitude of premiums suggests that they should be aware 
of how an acquirer manages the deal-making process, and whether to take that into consideration 
when reacting to the public announcement. Finally, our results have practical implications for 
boards of directors. Boards should be aware that various managerial biases and self-serving 
interests may be at play during acquisition negotiations. As a remedy to potential flaws in the 
acquisition decision-making process, boards should therefore impose rational due diligence and 
negotiations procedures. By being more extensively involved in the acquisition decision process, 
or simply by setting rules to be followed during the negotiations of key acquisition terms, boards 
could substantially influence acquisition outcomes and protect the wealth of shareholders. 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Below, we emphasize key areas in which we believe future research can continue to advance 
understanding of procedural rationality in acquisitions. First, because consequences of 
procedural rationality map directly on to issues at the core of premium decision-making, we 
focus on due diligence and negotiations phase. Future research should explore the implications of 
procedural rationality in other phases of the acquisition process. For example, prior research 
explored a range of factors affecting the choice of an acquisition target (e.g., Capron & Shen, 
2007; Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2013), but we have substantially less insights into the 
characteristics of intra-firm processes through which such decisions are made. Acquirers that 
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follow comprehensive target selection procedures, may be able to prevent many hurdles that can 
occur in the later stages of the deal-making process. 
 Second, future research might examine the generalizability of our findings on the 
value of procedural rationality by studying acquisitions of private and cross-border firms. Prior 
research demonstrated that in the acquisitions of private (e.g., Capron & Shen, 2007) and 
international (e.g., Reuer, Tong, Tyler, & Ariño, 2013) firms, information regarding the target is 
harder to obtain and value, making subsequent decision-making more challenging, and therefore 
procedural rationality potentially more valuable. In an international context, different 
institutional and cultural factors, as well as different business practices may impose rules on 
acquisition negotiations and due diligence (e.g., Meyer & Altenborg, 2008) thus affecting the 
level of procedural rationality that the acquirers can achieve. Moreover, the interplay between 
intended rationality and politicality may be even more complex in an international setting (e.g., 
Bertrand, Betschinger, & Settles, 2016). In general, research using other samples to study 
procedural rationality might also be valuable to examine multi-level influences on acquisition 
process and draw comparison with other perspectives used in previous research on acquisitions. 
Third, given our focus on the due diligence and negotiations phase of the acquisition 
process, ample opportunities exist to examine other facets of this phase and their impact on 
various decisions that take place as the acquisition process unfolds over time. Many theoretical 
ideas about success factors in acquisition deals put forward in early work on acquisition process 
(e.g., Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Pablo et al., 1996), such as for 
instance composition of the negotiating and due diligence teams, CEO involvement in merger 
negotiations, or deal origin, wait to be empirically tested. Similarly, while we focus only on one 
characteristic of acquisition procedures, namely their comprehensiveness, future research should 
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investigate the effect of other characteristics such as formalization (e.g., Dean & Sharfman, 
1996) or speed (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989) on acquisition premiums. 
Fourth, it has often been argued that rational models of decision processes assume that 
information will be available when needed (e.g., Fredrickson, 1984), but neglect the potential 
resource limitations, or costs associated with obtaining it (e.g., Summer, 1959). Our theoretical 
model is based on a similar assumption. While we posit that acquirers that invest in highly 
disciplined approach to the due diligence process will pay less for the targets, we do not consider 
resource investments necessary to conduct comprehensive due diligence (e.g., Cullinan et al., 
2004). Moreover, substantial investments in the due diligence phase may outweigh potential 
savings from acquisition price reduction, thus making process comprehensiveness unjustifiable. 
We therefore suggest further research to take the cost-benefit perspective and further examine 
conditions under which rationality of the acquisition procedures is economically meaningful. 
Fifth, one limitation of our study is that we were not able to directly observe information 
processing of organizational leaders’ during acquisitions due diligence and negotiations. We 
rather inferred it based upon observable, objective characteristics of the acquisition process. 
Specifically, we calculated analytical comprehensiveness as the duration of due diligence relative 
to the target size, integrative comprehensiveness based on the offer revisions during merger 
negotiations, and external comprehensiveness based on fairness opinion requests. Our approach, 
however, is consistent with the practitioners’ approach to assessing due diligence efforts (e.g., 
Cullinan et al., 2004; Nolop, 2007). Similarly, we acknowledge that our discrete measures of 
integrative and external comprehensiveness cannot and does not capture many nuances on the 
effect of formal analysis on acquisition premiums and suffers from variation in disclosure 
choices. In future, researchers may wish to collect primary data during the due diligence and 
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negotiations process to better understand decision-makers’ efforts with respect to information 
collection and the use of that information in acquisition decisions. 
Sixth, we do not empirically examine performance implications of procedural rationality. 
However, anecdotal evidence exist that stock market reacts not only to the terms of acquisition 
deals but also to the certain facets of the process through which these terms have been decided 
upon. For example, stock market negatively reacted to a recent 2-billion dollars’ acquisition deal 
in which Facebook acquired Oculus VR. Mainstream press suggests that the negative reaction 
occurred partially because of the rather short due diligence that Facebook concluded in just a 
couple of days. Such cases suggest that analysts may have certain expectation in terms of the due 
diligence effort relative to the target size and other deal characteristics. Investigating the 
relationship between procedural rationality of acquisition process and the post-announcement 
returns to shareholders is a promising idea for future research. 
Finally, we hope our study inspires more research on the mechanisms that can counter 
executives’ biases, self-centered motives, and other drivers of flawed acquisition decisions. We 
emphasized that prior research is predominately concerned with sources and consequences of 
such flaws. On the contrary, it provides only modest evidence with respect to effective 
mechanism that mitigate these irrationalities in acquisition decisions. Kim et al. (2011), for 
instance, show that advisors’ acquisition experience may be one such countering mechanism. 
Research in the domain of corporate governance also suggests that board independence (e.g., 
Kroll, Walters, & Wright, 2008), director compensation (e.g., Deutsch, Keil, & Laamanen, 
2007), or director acquisition experience (e.g., McDonald, Westphal, & Graebner, 2008) may 
improve acquisition decision making, but provides no direct evidence on their impact during the 
acquisition process. For example, future research should examine the extent to which board 
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involvement in merger negotiations prevents self-interested motives of executives, or the extent 
to which board-imposed deal-making rules can improve procedural rationality of the acquisition 
process. Such findings would concurrently contribute to the acquisition literature by pointing out 
mechanisms that improve acquisition decisions and corporate governance research by pointing to 
the effectiveness of the commonly used governance mechanisms. 
Conclusions 
We introduced “diligentia quam in suis rebus”, an old Roman law principle imposing the duty of 
care and discipline with respect to important matters, in the context of mergers and acquisitions. 
Our results suggest that acquirers that carefully negotiate transactions through a comprehensive 
and disciplined approach pay lower premiums to the targets. Hence, our study on procedural 
rationality in acquisition process develops a more complete understanding of how characteristics 
of acquisition processes affect deal outcomes. We also find that the effect of procedural 
rationality on acquisition premium decisions depends on dyadic politicality – political influences 
on the deal-making process by the target firm. To build on our findings, we encourage future 
work on procedural rationality in other stages of the acquisition process and deeper investigation 
on what other mechanisms organizations can put in place to prevent biased and self-interested 
acquisition decision-making of executives. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrixa 
a n = 507. Correlation coefficients with a magnitude larger than .088 are significant at p < .05 level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Variables   Mean  S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1.   Acquisition premium (%) 46.14 40.04               
 Process-level variables                 
2.   Analytical comprehensiveness 0.118 0.503 -0.042              
3.   Integrative comprehensiveness 0.360 0.480 -0.107 0.051             
4.   External comprehensiveness 0.330 0.471 -0.166 0.035 0.048            
5.   Non-exclusivity 0.638 0.281 0.081 -0.072 0.011 0.054           
6.   Competitive bidders 2.356 5.933 0.068 -0.017 0.007 -0.064 -0.080          
7.   Counteroffer 0.216 0.398 0.159 -0.029 0.023 -0.148 -0.015 -0.004         
8.   Pre-acquisition process length 7.150 6.386 -0.068 0.007 0.088 0.080 -0.010 -0.064 -0.107        
9.   Advisors involvement 3.344 1.510 -0.075 0.006 -0.019 -0.085 -0.070  0.127 -0.061 -0.107       
10.   Tender offer 0.261 0.439 0.126 -0.044 0.001 0.045  0.654 0.025 -0.016 -0.074 -0.229      
11.   Rumors 0.071 0.259 -0.041 -0.022 0.058 -0.132 0.025 -0.009 -0.050  0.132 -0.012 0.005     
12.   Target-initiated deal 0.375 0.484 -0.018 0.013 -0.015  0.100 -0.110 -0.015 0.057 -0.121 0.053 -0.148 -0.003    
 Deal-level variables                 
13.   Deal size 6.432 1.772 -0.161 -0.120 -0.057 -0.296 -0.011 0.025 -0.233  0.399 0.079 -0.045  0.321 -0.228   
14.   Financial synergy 0.587 6.629 0.006 0.007 0.003 -0.030 0.036 0.011 0.016 -0.037 -0.008 0.041 0.032 -0.011 -0.033  
15.   Product-market synergy 2.151 1.669 0.055 -0.043 0.033 -0.039 0.048 0.009 -0.003 0.043 -0.044 0.056 0.065 0.027 0.023 0.014 
16.   Payment method 0.811 0.348 -0.097 -0.042 -0.001 -0.064 -0.194 0.037 0.017  0.275 0.028 -0.250  0.098 0.076  0.161 -0.032 
17.   Hostile deal 0.025 0.157 -0.001 -0.013 -0.018 -0.096 0.011  0.138 -0.043  -0.045 -0.072 0.045 -0.045 0.029 0.040 -0.005 
 Acquirer-level variables                 
18.   Hubris   0.342 0.376  0.082 -0.054  0.091  0.005  0.018  0.032  0.003 -0.077  0.014  0.014  0.029  0.031  0.002  0.006 
19.   Relative size 1.856 3.709 0.051 -0.001 -0.032 0.063 -0.016 -0.012 -0.017 -0.044 -0.064 -0.025 -0.015 0.058 -0.067 0.001 
20.   Slack 0.468 0.806 0.009 0.040  0.096 0.054 -0.003 0.079 0.083 -0.066 -0.051 0.018 -0.089 -0.027 -0.141 0.040 
21.   Performance 0.028 0.396 -0.007 -0.003 -0.045 0.035 0.019 -0.001 0.036 -0.010 -0.032 0.026 0.014 0.019  0.095 0.011 
22.   Acquisition experience 19.50 32.39 -0.014 -0.026 -0.033 0.058 -0.010 -0.082 -0.037 -0.039 0.050 -0.004 0.017 -0.006  0.089 -0.008 
23.   Managerial ownership 3.556 6.420 0.004 0.024 0.071 -0.031 -0.031 0.087 0.023 -0.070 0.011 0.006 -0.020 0.057 -0.186 0.010 
 Target-level variables                 
24.   Slack 0.421 3.532 0.017 0.013 0.042 -0.010 0.131 0.006 0.053 -0.016 -0.031 0.127 -0.049 0.002 0.006 0.006 
25.   Performance -0.101 0.542 -0.056 -0.170 -0.030 -0.015 0.018 0.034 0.005 0.107 -0.004 0.019 0.072 -0.084 0.086 -0.010 
26.   Growth potential 2.679 6.901 0.013 0.496 0.017 0.026 -0.029 -0.016 -0.017 0.016 -0.011 -0.044 -0.021 -0.042 -0.008 0.116 
27.   Managerial ownership 11.76 15.25 0.125 0.063 0.017 0.075 0.020 -0.075 0.124 -0.159 0.023 -0.014 -0.068 0.116 -0.331 -0.060 
28.   Board independence 0.801 0.107 -0.017 0.021 0.049 -0.029 0.002 -0.044 -0.080 0.101 -0.017 0.014 0.114 -0.104 0.273 -0.028 
29.   High-tech firm 0.673 0.469 0.199 0.047 -0.045 0.211 0.110 -0.081 -0.013 -0.091 -0.008 0.119 -0.031 0.004 -0.135 0.021 
30.   Advisor reputation   0.429 0.494 0.114 -0.006 -0.021 -0.124 -0.021 -0.052 -0.075  0.384  0.068 -0.010  0.094 -0.074  0.408 -0.021 
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Table 1. Continued 
a n = 507. Correlation coefficients with a magnitude larger than .088 are significant at p < .05 level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Variables   15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
16.   Payment method 0.058               
17.   Hostile deal -0.007 0.073              
 Acquirer-level variables                
18.   Hubris   0.062  -0.103  -0.017             
19.   Relative size -0.060  0.101 -0.009 -0.038            
20.   Slack  0.092  0.098 -0.006 -0.049 -0.018           
21.   Performance -0.058 -0.044 -0.033 0.074 0.006 -0.014          
22.   Acquisition experience -0.122 -0.190 -0.049 -0.015 -0.002 -0.111 -0.054         
23.   Managerial ownership -0.009 0.001 -0.015 0.037 -0.001  0.108 0.017 -0.084        
 Target-level variables                
24.   Slack 0.067 -0.019 -0.040 0.008 -0.017 0.093 0.019 0.054 -0.022       
25.   Performance 0.107 0.003 0.042 0.051 -0.061 -0.023 0.005 0.038 0.005 -0.003      
26.   Growth potential -0.014 0.038 -0.012 -0.022 -0.007 0.049 0.008 -0.025 -0.019 0.021 -0.136     
27.   Managerial ownership 0.027 -0.069 -0.060 0.019 0.217 -0.035 -0.009 -0.043 0.012 -0.034 -0.060 -0.028    
28.   Board independence 0.005 0.072 -0.018 0.004 -0.029 -0.064 -0.013 -0.032 -0.057 -0.044 -0.031 -0.006  -0.187   
29.   High-tech firm 0.073 -0.186 -0.020 -0.005 0.036 0.158 0.062 0.148 -0.044 0.124 -0.030 -0.009   0.024 -0.051  
30.   Advisor reputation 0.036 0.095 -0.040 -0.056 -0.042 -0.059 0.029 0.118 -0.078 0.049 0.070 0.021 -0.151 0.159 -0.066 
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Table 2. GLS Regression Results for the Determinants of Acquisition Premiumsa 
a n = 507. Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < .10  ** p < .05  *** p < .01 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
  H1: Analytical comprehensiveness   -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) 
  H2: Integrative comprehensiveness     -0.095** (0.044) -0.093** (0.044) 
  H3: External comprehensiveness       -0.104** (0.049) 
Process-level variables         
  Non-exclusivity  0.020 (0.048) 0.015 (0.047) 0.020 (0.047) 0.015 (0.046) 
  Competitive bidders 0.153* (0.080) 0.159** (0.079) 0.159** (0.079) 0.159** (0.075) 
  Counteroffer 0.161** (0.074) 0.163** (0.074) 0.164** (0.074) 0.166** (0.073) 
  Pre-acquisition process length -0.006** (0.003) -0.006** (0.003) -0.006** (0.002) -0.006** (0.002) 
  Advisors involvement 0.010 (0.014) 0.012 (0.014) 0.010 (0.014) 0.012 (0.014) 
  Tender offer -0.048 (0.064) -0.062 (0.062) -0.049 (0.063) -0.063 (0.061) 
  Rumors -0.036 (0.069) -0.029 (0.070) -0.021 (0.069) -0.012 (0.069) 
  Target-initiated deal -0.018 (0.050) -0.015 (0.050) -0.019 (0.049) -0.016 (0.048) 
Deal-level variables         
  Deal size -0.030 (0.019) -0.035* (0.018) -0.032* (0.019) -0.038** (0.018) 
  Financial synergy 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 
  Product-market synergy 0.009 (0.014) 0.008 (0.014) 0.010 (0.014) 0.009 (0.014) 
  Payment method -0.033 (0.058) -0.037 (0.059) -0.025 (0.058) -0.029 (0.059) 
  Hostile deal 0.023 (0.230) 0.031 (0.229) 0.026 (0.229) 0.035 (0.228) 
Acquirer-level variables         
  Hubris          0.112**         (0.053)          0.118**         (0.052)          0.100*         (0.053)          0.106**         (0.053) 
  Relative size 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 
  Slack -0.012 (0.024) -0.011 (0.024) -0.009 (0.024) -0.006 (0.024) 
  Performance 0.024 (0.029) 0.028 (0.029) 0.019 (0.029) 0.022 (0.030) 
  Acquisition experience -0.001 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) 
  Managerial ownership 0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 
Target-level variables         
  Slack 0.001 (0.006) 0.001 (0.006) 0.001 (0.006) 0.001 (0.006) 
  Performance -0.016 (0.033) -0.027 (0.034) -0.019 (0.034) -0.030 (0.035) 
  Growth potential 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 
  Managerial ownership 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 
  Board independence 0.087 (0.185) 0.121 (0.183) 0.123 (0.184) 0.163 (0.180) 
  High-tech firm 0.149*** (0.045) 0.157*** (0.045) 0.144*** (0.045) 0.151*** (0.046) 
  Advisor reputation 0.077* (0.043) 0.073* (0.043) 0.075* (0.042) 0.071* (0.042) 
Industry fixed-effects        Included        Included        Included        Included 
Year fixed-effects        Included        Included        Included        Included 
Constant 0.544** (0.246) 0.554** (0.247) 0.544** (0.246) 0.544** (0.246) 
AIC 701.91  696.63  698.74  692.39  
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Table 3. GLS Regression Results for the Interaction Effectsa 
a n = 507. Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < .10  ** p < .05  *** p < .01 
 
Variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
  Analytical comprehensiveness (AC) -0.005*** (0.002) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.014*** (0.002) 
  Integrative comprehensiveness (IC) -0.093** (0.044) -0.153*** (0.051) -0.093** (0.045) -0.104** (0.045) 
  Integrative comprehensiveness (EC) -0.116** (0.058) -0.117** (0.058) -0.109** (0.053) -0.116** (0.058) 
  H4a: AC x Non-exclusivity -0.011*** (0.002)     -0.012*** (0.002) 
  H4b: IC x Competitive bidders   -0.055** (0.027)   -0.055** (0.027) 
  H4c: EC x Counteroffer     -0.091** (0.043) -0.090* (0.052) 
Process-level variables         
  Non-exclusivity 0.047 (0.061) 0.022 (0.048) 0.011 (0.047) 0.052 (0.062) 
  Competitive bidders 0.159* (0.080) 0.159** (0.078) 0.158** (0.079) 0.159** (0.073) 
  Counteroffer 0.171** (0.074) 0.278** (0.111) 0.164** (0.073) 0.297*** (0.111) 
  Pre-acquisition process length -0.006** (0.002) -0.005** (0.002) -0.006** (0.002) -0.005** (0.002) 
  Advisors involvement 0.014 (0.015) 0.011 (0.014) 0.012 (0.015) 0.016 (0.015) 
  Tender offer -0.073 (0.062) -0.060 (0.062) -0.067 (0.062) -0.081 (0.063) 
  Rumors -0.007 (0.070) -0.021 (0.067) -0.017 (0.069) -0.025 (0.068) 
  Target-initiated deal -0.020 (0.048) -0.012 (0.048) -0.018 (0.049) -0.018 (0.048) 
Deal-level variables         
  Deal size -0.040** (0.019) -0.036* (0.019) -0.042** (0.019) -0.042** (0.019) 
  Financial synergy 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 
  Product-market synergy 0.007 (0.014) 0.010 (0.014) 0.009 (0.014) 0.009 (0.013) 
  Payment method -0.031 (0.059) -0.043 (0.061) -0.032 (0.059) -0.052 (0.061) 
  Hostile deal 0.032 (0.227) 0.011 (0.236) 0.038 (0.226) 0.009 (0.232) 
Acquirer-level variables         
  Hubris          0.104**         (0.052)          0.091*         (0.054)          0.097*         (0.051)          0.073         (0.050) 
  Relative size 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
  Slack -0.007 (0.024) -0.010 (0.024) -0.005 (0.024) -0.009 (0.024) 
  Performance 0.021 (0.029) 0.023 (0.029) 0.022 (0.031) 0.021 (0.029) 
  Acquisition experience -0.001 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
  Managerial ownership 0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 
Target-level variables         
  Slack 0.002 (0.006) 0.002 (0.005) 0.001 (0.006) 0.003 (0.005) 
  Performance -0.045 (0.038) -0.033 (0.035) -0.031 (0.047) -0.045 (0.048) 
  Growth potential 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 
  Managerial ownership 0.003* (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 
  Board independence 0.192 (0.176) 0.132 (0.180) 0.192 (0.176) 0.168 (0.175) 
  High-tech firm 0.150*** (0.045) 0.158*** (0.047) 0.154*** (0.046) 0.162*** (0.046) 
  Advisor reputation 0.074* (0.042) 0.067* (0.040) 0.069* (0.042) 0.066* (0.040) 
Industry fixed-effects        Included        Included        Included        Included 
Year fixed-effects        Included        Included        Included        Included 
Constant 0.560** (0.246) 0.562** (0.240) 0.529** (0.247) 0.533** (0.242) 
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Periculum in Mora:  
Board Meeting Frequency and Timeliness, M&A Process and Acquisition Premium 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Prior work has often shown that, despite a number of structural remedies introduced in recent 
years, boards of directors continue to exercise relatively little influence over firm performance. 
In this paper, we argue that board processes may be an important, yet poorly understood, 
determinant that enables boards to protect shareholders’ interests and affect performance in 
important strategic decisions. In particular, drawing on the group process literature, we argue that 
board meeting frequency and meeting timeliness jointly effect decision-making in strategic 
decisions. We test our predictions in firms that are acquisition targets—a context in which boards 
likely have significant influence over strategic decisions. Specifically, we find a mediated 
relationship where meeting frequency is linked to the propensity of making value-enhancing 
decisions such as rejecting a first offer, negotiating with multiple bidders, counteroffering, and 
requesting fairness opinion which in return increase the acquisition premium. The effect of 
meeting frequency on value enhancing decisions is strengthened by board meeting timeliness 
that is when board meetings occur early during the negotiation process. The implications of these 
findings for research in corporate governance, acquisitions and the group process literature are 
discussed.  
 
Keywords: acquisition negotiations; acquisition premium; board of directors; board meetings; 
meeting frequency; meeting timeliness; 
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INTRODUCTION 
Research on corporate governance suggests that, despite their important formal role, boards of 
directors are often ineffective in protecting stockholders’ interests (e.g., Jensen, 1993; Johnson, 
Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996). Scholars in strategy and related disciplines have examined a range of 
mechanisms that should increase the ability of boards to monitor and advise in managerial 
decision making. These suggested mechanisms include the following: increase board 
independence (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983), change the size of the board (e.g., Dowell, Shackell, 
& Stuart, 2011), promote one of the independent directors as a lead director (e.g., Gordon, 2007), 
separate the roles of chief executive officer and chairman of the board (e.g., Tuggle, Sirmon, 
Reutzel, & Bierman, 2010), adjust the board committees’ structure (e.g., Ruigrok, Peck, 
Tacheva, Greve, & Hu, 2006), or ensure the diversity of board members (e.g., Goodstein, 
Gautam, & Boeker, 1994). However, despite the increasing use of these structural adjustments, 
research suggests that boards continue to have relatively little impact on the effectiveness of 
strategic decisions and firm performance (e.g., Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; 
Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007; Dalton & Dalton, 2011). 
 Recently, strategy scholars have urged that, in order to better understand board 
monitoring and more broadly to improve the efficacy of boards, research should move beyond 
structural characteristics to a focus on board processes and their outcomes (e.g., Hambrick, 
Misangyi, & Park, 2015; Boivie, Bednar, Aguilera, & Andrus, 2016). Boards are groups of 
individual directors, and like most groups, they face process related challenges with regards to 
their attentional resources, information processing capabilities, information sharing, and joint 
decision making (e.g., Simon, 1947; Cyert & March, 1963; Forbes & Milliken, 1999) which 
influence the effectiveness of their decision making. Accordingly, drawing from the theory and 
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research on group processes (e.g., Steiner, 1972; Hackman & Morris, 1975; Gladstein, 1984; 
McGrath, 1984; Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; Waller, 1999) should help us shed light on the 
under-examined, but potentially important board processes. 
 In this paper we focus on two process characteristics that have been utilized across 
multiple lines of group research: group interaction frequency (e.g., Lott & Lott, 1961; Ancona & 
Caldwell, 1992; Smith et al., 1994; Hinsz et al., 1997; Chatman & Flynn, 2001) and group 
interaction timeliness (e.g., McGrath & Rotchford, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989; Lim & Murnighan, 
1994; Ancona & Chong, 1996; Waller, 1999; Chatman & Flynn, 2001; Marks, Mathieu, & 
Zaccaro, 2001). Research on groups has accounted for differences in the manner in which groups 
interact as they direct attention (e.g., Gersick, 1994), collect information (e.g., Weick & Roberts, 
1993), share information (e.g., Hackman & Morris, 1975), build consensus (e.g., Collins & 
Guetzkow, 1964), and make joint decisions (e.g., Gersick, 1989). This research has shown that 
the frequency with which groups engage in such activities to perform group tasks is important. 
Groups which interact more frequently with respect to a task at hand tend to outperform those 
that interact less often (e.g., Waller, 1999; Chatman & Flynn, 2001; Kerr & Tindale, 2004). 
 A second process characteristic that emerges from the group process literature is group 
meeting timeliness, which may be defined as the degree to which a group responds to a task at 
hand in a timely manner (e.g., Waller, 1999). Groups that, in response to a group project, hold 
meetings early tend to improve group decision effectiveness by reducing initial task ambiguity 
(e.g., Huey & Wickens, 1993), by allowing early consensus on the project strategy (e.g., Gersick, 
1988), by ensuring that substantial attention is given to critical issues (e.g., Waller, Gupta, & 
Giambatista, 2004), and by aligning external schedules with group activities to reduce potential 
time pressures (e.g., Gersick, 1989). Group interaction timeliness therefore might enhance the 
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effect of group interactions on decision process and outcomes (e.g., Gersick, 1988; Lim & 
Murnighan, 1994; Parks & Cowlin, 1995; Waller, 1999).  
 The effects of group meeting frequency and meeting timeliness are likely to become 
particularly pronounced when groups are faced with non-routine decisions because such 
decisions require intense information processing (e.g., Waller et al., 2004; Stachowski, Kaplan, 
& Waller, 2009). We therefore examine the influence of board group processes on one such non-
routine task: the decision to sell the firm. Board activities during the sale of the firm are 
particularly suitable for the test of our theory for several reasons. First, boards are central 
decision makers in corporate takeovers (e.g., Deutsch, Keil, & Laamanen, 2007) as they meet 
their fiduciary responsibility to ensure managers do not use deals to gain personal benefits at the 
expense of shareholders’ returns (e.g., Singh & Harianto, 1989; Wulf, 2004). Moreover, target 
directors often have high personal stakes in the deal (e.g., Kosnik, 1987). By approving the 
acquisition, they might also vote themselves out of a job. Thus, target boards are additionally 
motivated to be diligent in acquisition decision-making (e.g., Harford, 2003). Second, during 
acquisition negotiations, there is a high demand for information processing among the board 
members in order to fulfill their duties (e.g., Dalton & Dalton, 2011). The importance of group 
meetings in which boards make decisions and influence the takeover process and outcomes thus 
becomes particularly emphasized (e.g., Hinsz et al., 1997). Finally, the punctuated nature of the 
acquisition negotiation process allows the investigation of the role of group meeting timeliness in 
response to the acquisition – a board characteristic that is difficult to examine during the periods 
of business normalcy (e.g., Boivie et al., 2016).  
The target side in the acquisition context further allows us to focus on intermediate 
mechanisms through which the final outcomes of the acquisition are created (e.g., Desender, 
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Aguilera, Crespi, & Garcia-Cestona, 2013). Specifically, we hypothesize that the target’s board 
meeting frequency during private negotiations will lead to decisions made by the board during 
negotiations that enhance the value for the target’s shareholders in the acquisition. We focus on 
four value-enhancing decisions (the decision to reject the first offer, to negotiate with more than 
one bidder, to counteroffer, and to request a fairness opinion) which importance has been pointed 
out in prior research on the sell-side perspective in acquisitions (e.g., Walsh, 1989; Graebner & 
Eisenhardt, 2004; Betton, Eckbo, & Thorburn, 2009; Kisgen & Song, 2009) and we consider 
premium as the ultimate acquisition outcome of interest to the target’s shareholders (e.g., 
Haunschild, Davis-Blake, & Fichman, 1994). Furthermore, we test whether the effect of board 
meeting frequency is conditioned on the timeliness of the board meetings.  
 Our study makes several theoretical contributions. First, contrary to the prevailing 
wisdom that boards are not effective in performing their fiduciary duties (e.g., Dalton et al., 
1998), we show that the board process variable of meeting frequency positively impacts 
acquisition negotiation process and outcomes. Second, we consider board meeting timeliness and 
find that board meetings that occur early in the process have an even stronger positive effect on 
decision-making effectiveness. We thereby introduce time as a new lens in the governance 
research (e.g., Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, & Tushman, 2001) and show that, not only the 
number of meetings, but the timely sequence in which they occur impacts board effectiveness in 
our non-routine decision task. Third, we fill two critical gaps in the strategy literature on M&As. 
We contribute to the relatively under-explored “sell-side” perspective on acquisitions (e.g., 
Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004) and we extend M&A process theory to acquisition negotiations – 
a previously under-examined phase of the acquisition process (e.g., Jemison & Sitkin, 1986).  
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Corporate governance theory has often at least implicitly assumed that a properly structured 
board will lead to greater board effectiveness (e.g., Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). However, 
empirical findings on the relationship between structural board characteristics and board 
effectiveness have been inconsistent (e.g., Dalton et al., 1998; Bhagat & Black, 2001; Dalton et 
al., 2007). For example, some studies suggest that board independence does not lead as expected 
to better strategic decisions (e.g., Westphal, 1999) and increased firm performance (e.g., Dalton 
et al., 1998), and in some instances is even related to worse firm performance (e.g., Kumar & 
Sivaramakrishnan, 2008). Rather than being a universally effective governance mechanism 
independent directors may often be busy due to multiple board and executive appointments and 
in particular such busy directors may be detrimental to board decision quality and shareholder 
value (e.g., Fich & Shivdasani, 2006; Falato, Kadyrzhanova, & Lel, 2014). Outside directors 
might often have only an impression management role without in substance leading to effective 
governance (e.g., Westphal & Graebner, 2010). Similarly, there is no conclusive evidence that 
CEO duality (e.g., Dalton & Dalton, 2011) or board size (e.g., Yermack, 1996) affect firm 
performance. Overall, prior research suggests that structural governance mechanisms seem to 
have little bearing on strategic decision effectiveness during normal operations of the firm.  
Comparable empirical evidence exists with respect to the role of structural governance 
mechanisms on board effectiveness during exceptional corporate events. For instance, prior 
research finds rather weak relationship between poor firm performance and CEO dismissal (e.g., 
Boeker, 1992) suggesting that governance mechanism do not enable effective board decision 
making in the context of CEO succession. Similarly, in the context of organizational 
restructuring, evidence demonstrate that independent board members become involved in 
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restructuring only reactively - when strategy implementation led by managers begins to reach the 
critical threshold of failure (e.g., Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993). Widely adopted governance 
mechanisms do not necessarily yield benefits to firms during mergers and acquisitions either. For 
instance, independent boards of target firms are found to be less likely to close attractive deals 
and less likely to receive high acquisition premiums (e.g., Bange & Mazzeo, 2004). Additionally, 
structural governance mechanisms seem not to prevent biases in transaction-related decision 
making. For example, when making CEO compensation decisions, boards tend to rewards CEOs 
for the volume of corporate transactions regardless of their performance (e.g., Fich, Starks, & 
Yore, 2014). Overall, these findings suggest that the key to effective governance might not 
entirely rest within the structural board characteristics. 
Several authors argued that more nuanced insights could be obtained by conceptualizing 
boards as decision-making groups (e.g., Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Hambrick et al., 2015; Boivie 
et al., 2016) and encouraged scholars to consider group processes through which boards make 
decisions. This has triggered some recent work. For example, Westphal and Bednar (2005) 
showed that, when faced with declining firm performance, outside directors tend to 
underestimate the degree to which other board members share their concerns about the firm’s 
strategy, which is a group decision-making bias known as pluralistic ignorance. Relatedly, Zhu 
(2013) shows another decision-making bias, namely group polarization, in boards’ decision-
making about acquisition premiums. Although this work made important steps towards a better 
understanding of boards as decision-making groups, it has focused on the negative aspects of 
board processes. Socio-psychological research on groups, however, suggests that group 
processes can be designed to improve effectiveness that may provide pointers how to improve 
board decision making in strategic decisions (e.g., Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp, & Gilson, 2008).  
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 Group processes are a central element in models of group effectiveness developed 
originally in the social psychology literature but also applied to the management literature (e.g., 
McGrath, 1964; Hackman & Morris, 1975; Gladstein, 1984). The relation between interaction 
processes and group effectiveness has been pivotal since the inception of group research (e.g., 
Steiner, 1972; Hackman & Morris, 1975). The essence of group processes lies in interactions that 
take place among group members during the course of task accomplishment (e.g., Marks et al., 
2001) and either improve or hamper group effectiveness (Collins & Guetzkow, 1964). This 
interaction process includes scanning and information collection, communication and knowledge 
sharing, discussion and brainstorming, evaluation of alternatives, coordination activities 
feedback, and other activities related to the group task (e.g., Kerr & Tindale, 2004; Mathieu et 
al., 2008).  
We draw from the work that examined group processes in naturalistic settings (e.g., 
Gladstein, 1984; Waller, 1999). A review of this literature revealed two common process 
characteristics that have been examined across multiple lines of group research – group 
interaction frequency (e.g., Lott & Lott, 1961; Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Smith et al., 1994; 
Hinsz et al., 1997; Chatman & Flynn, 2001) and group interaction timeliness (e.g., McGrath & 
Rotchford, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989; Lim & Murnighan, 1994; Ancona & Chong, 1996; Waller, 
1999; Chatman & Flynn, 2001; Marks et al., 2001) – and which might play essential roles in 
group decision effectiveness. We discuss each in turn. 
Group Interaction Frequency 
The role of interaction frequency for group effectiveness permeates several lines of group 
research. First, the literature on group information processing has shown the degree to which 
groups collect and share task-related information is linked with group effectiveness (e.g., Hinsz 
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et al., 1997). Information collection by group members about group task and goals precedes 
other group activities (e.g., Beach, 1993) and plays a critical role in reducing ambiguity and 
increasing group’s awareness of the situation (e.g., Prince & Salas, 2000). As critical information 
about the group task might appear through the whole course of the task, frequent scanning and 
information collection prevents unexpected turns in task accomplishment (e.g., Stasser & Titus, 
1985; Weick & Roberts, 1993) that could harm team effectiveness. Groups that meet more often 
engage in more information collection and therefore limit the potential for uninformed decision-
making (e.g., Streufert & Nogami, 1992; Hinsz et al., 1997).  
Further, to become a focus of group attention, information must be shared among its 
members (e.g., Ancona & Caldwell, 1992). Despite the intuitive importance of effective 
information exchange between group members, research has demonstrated that groups often 
deviate from the optimal use of information in decision-making (e.g., Stasser & Titus, 1985). 
However, groups that meet more frequently to exchange information are more likely to counter 
biased decision processes in groups (e.g., Janis, 1982). Additionally, groups that more frequently 
engage in repetitive discussions tend to process the information more thoroughly as they 
examine more alternatives before selecting the response (e.g., Gladstein, 1984; Streufert & 
Nogami, 1992). The frequency with which groups exchange large amount of information thus 
affects group effectiveness (e.g., Stasser, Taylor, & Hanna, 1989; Waller, 1999). 
Second, research on human communication in groups also points to frequency as a key 
dimension of communication in groups (e.g., Hirokawa, 1990; Moreland & Myaskovsky, 2000). 
Teams that communicate more often build shared mental models regarding the task at hand and 
are thus able to better coordinate their activities towards goal achievement (e.g., Orasanu, 1993). 
Furthermore, groups that frequently communicate exert more positive influence over decision 
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preferences of other group members (e.g., Thorndike, 1938; Shaw & Penrod, 1962). Extensive 
communication in group decision making also has a functional role – it ensures that group 
members attempt to meet the prerequisites for high-quality problem solving (e.g., Lott & Lott, 
1961; Hirokawa, 1985; Hirokawa, 1988). A related argument has been put forward by the 
research on procedural rationality in decision-making (e.g., Simon, 1976), which proposes and 
demonstrates that individuals and groups that follow comprehensive decision procedures achieve 
more favorable outcomes (e.g., Dean & Sharfman, 1993b). In all, communication frequency has 
been found to have a positive bearing of group effectiveness (e.g., Cohen & Bailey, 1997). 
Third, research on behavioral integration in groups has been concerned with "the degree 
to which a group engages in mutual and collective interaction" and its subsequent consequences 
(Hambrick, 1994: 188). Groups whose members interact for frequently achieve higher levels of 
behavioral integration, resulting in open discussion and information exchange, mutually 
acceptable solutions, and intragroup feedback (e.g., Carmeli & Schaubroeck, 2006). Such groups 
build commitment with respect to the group task and prioritize group interests over the interests 
of individual members (e.g., Mudrack, 1989). Moreover, members of integrated groups are more 
likely to develop positive sentiment toward one another and reduce conﬂict (e.g., Allport, 1954). 
As a result, groups that interact more frequently tend to achieve better decision performance 
(e.g., Carmeli & Schaubroeck, 2006) 
Group Interaction Timeliness 
Time is an inseparable feature of any framework trying to capture the relationship between group 
interactions and group effectiveness (e.g., Gersick, 1989; Locke & Latham, 1990; McGrath, 
1991; Guzzo, 1995; Ancona & Chong, 1996; Waller, 1999). Work on dynamic models of group 
development (e.g., Gersick, 1988, 1989) or episodic models of groups (e.g., Kelly & McGrath, 
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1985; Mathieu et al., 2008), suggest that group processes are influenced by time such that timing 
in group tasks needs to be aligned to the demands of dynamic tasks. Work on time, interaction 
and performance within groups builds on the assumption that the timing of group interactions is 
a key determinant of group effectiveness (e.g., McGrath, 1984; McGrath, 1991).  
 Relating to the issue of time in groups, models of group development (e.g., Gersick, 
1988, 1989) indicate that, once faced with the group task, groups benefit substantially from early 
meetings. There appear to be multiple reasons as to why early group meetings facilitate group 
interactions. First, group interactions at an early stage result in “crystallization of group norms” 
(Stewart & Barrick, 2000: 138) which reduces potential for conflict among group members in the 
later stages of the project. Second, during initial meetings, groups tend to decide on the 
acceptable goals and a strategy for achieving task goals (e.g., Gersick, 1988) which they tend to 
follow throughout the project (e.g., McGrath, 1991). This suggests that early group meetings 
have high influence on project outcomes. Third, since task objectives serve as a basis for how 
groups process information (e.g., Mackie & Goethals, 1987) defining such objectives as early as 
possible allows a group to fully exploit its information-processing potential (e.g., Hinsz et al., 
1997). Groups that do so deal with less task ambiguity and uncertainty during later meetings. 
 Models of group pacing emphasize that no work-related task is unaffected by schedules 
and deadlines (e.g., Marks et al., 2001). Project schedules, deadlines, and requirements for 
coordinated effort inevitably affect group decisions with respect to the use of tactics, exploration 
of alternatives, and prioritization of tasks to most effectively accomplish the task goal. Related 
work has been conducted on the relationship between time pressure and group functioning and 
performance  in which time pressure affects group information-processing (e.g., Gersick, 1989; 
Waller, Zellmer-Bruhn, & Giambatista, 2002). Groups exposed to high levels of time pressure 
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collect less information (e.g., Christensen-Szalanski, 1980; Bowden, 1985), process information 
less thoroughly (e.g., Maier & Hoffman, 1960) and examine a more constrained set of decision 
alternatives before making a final decision (e.g., Karau & Kelly, 1992). Also, as time pressure 
increases, group members initiate less group interactions and are less like to participate in group 
discussions (e.g., Isenberg, 1981). Groups that meet early are less likely to experience time 
pressure and the accompanying information-processing limitations (e.g., Hinsz et al., 1997).  
 Early group meetings might prevent biases in group decision-making in several 
additional ways. Group timeliness prevents attentional overload (e.g., Karau & Kelly, 1992), 
consequentially decreasing the likelihood of employing decision heuristics as opposed to 
comprehensive decision procedures (e.g., Cohen, 1978). For instance, Easterbrook (1959) 
pointed out that under severe time pressure, groups account for a rather limited set of task-
relevant cues to make decisions. Similarly, in time-pressured situations, groups might miss the 
opportunity to pool information possessed by individual members (e.g., Stasser & Titus, 1985) or 
might suffer from pre-mature acceptance of proposal by individual members (e.g., Janis, 1982). 
Moreover, group members have a tendency to share exclusive information (those that only they 
possess) relatively late in the decision-making process, suggesting that time pressure might 
create a self-reinforcing loop that limits the opportunity for those biases to be mitigated (e.g., 
Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Keys, 1994). Groups with early meetings thus cover a wider range of 
relevant cues, pool more exclusive information, and prevent non-negotiated solutions. 
 Early group meetings might also prevent premature task completion. In highly pressured 
situations, groups that meet early might not only process more information, but also keep their 
attention on relevant information and critical tasks rather than on tasks that simply move the 
project forward (e.g., Karau & Kelly, 1992; Kelly & Karau, 1993). As the requirement to reach 
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group consensus might be externally imposed, groups that meet early are less likely to fall victim 
of further drifting group attention towards finalization of the task at the expense of the quality of 
output (e.g., Kerr & Tindale, 2004). Group timeliness affects how much awareness of time 
groups exhibit – which is a distinct group characteristic (e.g., Gersick, 1988), and therefore 
determines how detrimental the effect of time pressure on group effectiveness will be.  
Target Boards, Acquisition Process, and Value-Enhancing Acquisition Decisions 
Non-routine events are often used as an empirical context for investigating patterns of 
group interactions (e.g., Waller, 1999; Stachowski et al., 2009). Compared to periods of 
normalcy crises and other special events (e.g., Yu, Sengul, & Lester, 2008) are surrounded by 
ambiguity, often impose high information-processing demands, and might even involve threats 
to group survival (e.g., Gladstein & Reilly, 1985). Therefore, group meeting frequency and 
meeting timeliness become even more critical in response to non-routine events. In line with this 
research on groups, governance literature argues that “the power of boards becomes apparent 
especially when a company is in crisis, for instance (…) when it becomes a target of acquisition” 
(Singh & Harianto, 1989: 12). Takeovers are significantly different from other events the firm 
faces on an ongoing basis because they result in high uncertainty (e.g., Pablo, Sitkin, & Jemison, 
1996), emphasized conflict of interests (e.g., Wulf, 2004) and decision-making under pressure 
(e.g., Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985). According to early governance research, such events in fact 
truly justify the existence of board of directors (e.g., Mizruchi, 1983).  
Boards of firms that are acquisition targets face a challenge of protecting shareholders’ 
interests as they should accept an offer only if it yields excess returns. Over the course of deal 
negotiations, boards thus need to make a series of decisions to ensure the value-enhancing 
acquisition process is in place (e.g., Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). A typical private negotiation 
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between public firms encompasses a period between the first contact between acquirer and target 
and the public announcement of the deal (e.g., Boone & Mulherin, 2007). From the perspective 
of the target firm (e.g., Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004), the process begins with receiving an 
indication of interest or an initial acquisition offer. Following the closing of a non-disclosure 
agreement (NDA), the target allows financial and other due diligence. The target firm might sign 
a NDA with one or more potential bidders. In parallel to due diligence, extensive negotiations 
regarding the terms of an acquisition take place often involving external actors to support 
negotiations and decision-making. Once the agreement on the terms is achieved, the board must 
approve the acquisition and a public announcement denotes the end of private negotiations.3 
Both governance theory and process theory of acquisitions suggest that the board task is to 
ensure that the process is managed so that it leads to favorable outcomes for target shareholders.  
A review of prior M&A research reveals four distinct value-enhancing decisions that 
target firms can make during acquisition negotiations. First, the target board might reject the 
initial acquisition offer. Initial offers covey information about acquirer’s aspirations and 
preferences (e.g., Barry & Friedman, 1998), thus allowing the target to continue negotiations 
with an improved relative bargaining position (e.g., Pruitt, 1981). Similarly, closing the deal 
quickly by accepting the first offer is typically associated with less thorough deal analyses (e.g., 
Chatterjee, Harrison, & Bergh, 2003). Targets might thereby miss the opportunity to reveal 
additional synergy gains from the deal which would call for a higher price (e.g., Vaara & Tienari, 
2011). Acquirers might use the first offer to preempt competitive bidding (e.g., Fishman, 1989) 
which also leads to a higher premium (e.g., Slusky & Caves, 1991). Rejecting the first offer 
might make sense even if the offer is high, as a high offer indicates that the acquirer has a high 
                                                          
3 A more detailed description of the acquisition negotiation process is provided elsewhere (e.g., Boone & Mulherin, 
2007; Reed-Lajoux & Elson, 2010; Parola & Ellis, 2014). 
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valuation of the target and may subsequently increase its offer during competitive bidding (e.g., 
Bange & Mazzeo, 2004). 
Second, target firms may increase the search for and negotiations with multiple potential 
acquirers during merger negotiations. Empirical evidence from prior research reveal target 
executives’ biases towards certain acquirers that they are social tied to (e.g., Ishii & Xuan, 2014) 
or from which deal closure they would personally benefit (e.g., Wulf, 2004). Boards might 
therefore increase the search for and negotiations with alternative bidders to protect shareholders 
interests. Moreover, negotiating with multiple bidders intensifies competitive behavior and might 
make acquirers fall victim to the "winner's curse" (e.g., Bazerman & Samuelson, 1983), which in 
the context of acquisition has been shown to results in higher acquisition premiums being paid to 
the target firm (e.g., Giliberto & Varaiya, 1989; Haunschild, 1994). 
 Third, target firms might decide to counteroffer during negotiations (e.g., Walsh, 1989; 
Parola & Ellis, 2014). Because evaluating and deciding on bids is a boards’ central responsibility 
during negotiations (e.g., Singh & Harianto, 1989), effective boards would oppose inadequate 
bids and use counteroffering with the expectation that the potential acquirer directly accepts the 
price or improves its original price proposal (e.g., Walkling & Long, 1984). Moreover, target 
counteroffering might not only be seen as a bargaining tactic, but also as a comprehensive 
acquisition-making procedure when the acquirer fail to revise the price following the discovery 
of positive new information in due diligence (e.g., Puranam, Powell, & Singh, 2006). 
 Fourth, in decision-making regarding acquisition terms, target firms might rely on the 
support of external parties. Specifically, an often-used tactic by firms involved in acquisition 
negotiations is to request a fairness opinion by an independent third-party, typically an 
investment bank (e.g., Bebchuk & Kahan, 1989; Cain & Denis, 2013). Boards of target firms use 
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fairness opinions to verify legal aspects of the transaction as well as the adequacy of the 
proposed acquisition price. Fairness opinions improve acquisition outcomes for the target firm as 
they typically impose a more rigorous due diligence and negotiations (e.g., Kisgen & Song, 
2009). A fairness opinion request by the target firm is a value-enhancing decision as it reflects 
not only board’s intention to ensure legal protection, but also the effort to achieve high returns 
for target firm shareholders (e.g., Cai & Sevilir, 2012; Cain & Denis, 2013). 
---------- Insert Figure 1 about here ---------- 
Our theoretical model – presented in Figure 1- illustrates multiple moderated-mediation 
paths by which board meeting frequency and timeliness influence value-enhancing decisions by 
the target firms’ boards, and subsequently, acquisition premiums they receive. In particular, we 
first propose that the target board meeting frequency increases premiums through value-
enhancing decisions during acquisition negotiations. We further propose that board meeting 
timeliness amplifies these effects. In the next section, we develop each hypothesis in detail. 
HYPOTHESES 
Board Meeting Frequency, Value-Enhancing Decisions, and Acquisition Premium 
According to group effectiveness theory (e.g., Hackman & Morris, 1975; Gladstein, 1984), target 
board meeting frequency is expected to positively affect acquisition decisions and subsequently 
increase shareholder value in several ways. First, boards that meet more frequently are more 
likely to prevent biased and self-interested decisions of individual negotiators (e.g., Stasser & 
Titus, 1985; Hinsz et al., 1997). Specifically, prior acquisitions research argued that negotiators 
on behalf of the target firm might escalate their commitment to the deal (e.g., Duhaime & 
Schwenk, 1985), their overconfidence might rush decisions and deal closure (e.g., Jemison & 
Sitkin, 1986), they might favor certain acquirers such as those they are socially tied to (e.g., Ishii 
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& Xuan, 2014), and they might neglect decision alternatives for the sake of personal benefits 
(e.g., Wulf, 2004). Boards that meet more frequently during deal negotiations collect, share and 
process more information to prevent potentially value-destructing decisions (e.g., Judge & 
Zeithaml, 1992). At the same time, they more often require executives to provide additional 
information and justifications for critical decisions (e.g., Forbes & Milliken, 1999). In fact, prior 
research shows that in about two thirds of board meetings, boards undertake at least one such 
initiative to challenge executives’ proposals (Schwartz-Ziv & Weisbach, 2013). 
 Second, board meeting frequency is positively associated with structured acquisition 
decision making centered on shareholders’ value creation. Descriptive research on complex 
decision-making in organizational context demonstrates that decision-makers often skip steps in 
the decision process (e.g., Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976; Nutt, 1984). As a potential 
remedy to such acquisition decision-making concerns, group research suggests that boards 
should meet more frequently during the acquisition process to reduce information ambiguity, 
improve problem formulation, deploy formal analyses, and consider a more extensive set of 
decision alternatives (e.g., Stasser & Titus, 1985; Srivastava, Bartol, & Locke, 2006). Frequent 
communication between board members also has a functional role as it improves the 
comprehensiveness of acquisition decision-making (e.g., Hirokawa, 1985; Hirokawa, 1988). 
Furthermore, outside directors use board meetings to push performance—based assessments of 
decisions (e.g., Johnson et al., 1993). Boards that follow structured acquisition process thus pay 
more attention to the due diligence process to identify synergies, consider more alternative 
bidders, and rely on external support to assess deal terms (e.g., Langley, 1989), all of which tend 
to improve the quality of deal outcomes (e.g., Haunschild, 1994). 
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 Third, target board meeting frequency is positively associated to the quality of 
bargaining-related decisions. Evaluating and deciding on takeover bids is a boards’ central 
responsibility during acquisition negotiations (e.g., Singh & Harianto, 1989). As multiple 
individuals might be involved, fragmented perspectives on acquisition terms might occur (e.g., 
Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). Boards that interact intensively are better able to unify those 
perspectives and come up with a mutually acceptable bargaining strategy (e.g., Carmeli & 
Schaubroeck, 2006). Unified perspectives ensure that no internal firm conflict could harm 
acquirer-target negotiations. Furthermore, boards that meet more frequently process more 
information thereby increasing their bargaining power which relates to information asymmetries 
(e.g., Coff, 1999). Consequently, such boards are more prepared and more likely to respond to a 
changing bargaining situation by opposing inadequate bids (e.g., Walkling & Long, 1984), by 
requesting revisions of acquisition terms, or by pursuing counteroffers (e.g., Walsh, 1989; 
Gersick & Hackman, 1990), all of which aim to enhance the value for shareholders. 
 Taken together, we suggest that board meeting frequency increases the likelihood that the 
target firm makes value-enhancing decisions, which in turn results in higher acquisition premium 
paid to the target firm. We therefore hypothesize the following mediating relationship: 
Hypothesis 1: Target board meeting frequency is positively associated with value-
enhancing decisions during acquisition negotiations, i.e. decisions to (a) reject the first 
acquisition offer, (b) negotiate with multiple bidders, (c) counteroffer and (d) request 
fairness opinion, which in turn are positively associated with the acquisition premium the 
target firm receives.  
The Moderating Effect of Target Board Meeting Timeliness 
According to group dynamics theory (e.g., McGrath, 1991), the positive effect of target board 
meeting frequency on acquisition decisions and subsequently increase in shareholder value is 
expected to be amplified by the timeliness of board meetings for several reasons. First, initial 
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actions in the process tend to be critical as they largely determine what is done throughout the 
process (e.g., Dutton, Fahey, & Narayanan, 1983). Early in the decision process, groups tend to 
process more critical information that reduce initial ambiguity and set precedents regarding the 
decision-making strategy and tactics (e.g., Gersick, 1988) and the same holds for boards of 
directors (e.g., McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999). Timely boards define decision principles to preempt 
potential decision flaws and self-serving behaviors of negotiators (e.g., Narayanan & Fahey, 
1982). Thus, board meeting timeliness amplifies the decision debiasing effect of board meeting 
frequency. Moreover, as directors often lack time to significantly contribute to decision-making 
(e.g., Lorsch & McIver, 1989), early meetings ensure that directors “temporarily marshal their 
limited time and cognitive resources” when mostly needed (Boivie et al., 2016: 10). 
 Second, boards that meet more often in the early stages of the acquisition negotiation 
process are less likely to be exposed to time pressure which would affect their decision-making  
(e.g., Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). When no time pressure is present, boards would process more 
information and process them more thoroughly (e.g., Bowden, 1985). Time abundance boards 
would also be less likely to focus on activities that move deal-making towards its completion at 
the expense of the quality of acquisition decisions (e.g., Karau & Kelly, 1992). Under time 
pressure free conditions, the boards would also have more latitude in conducting comprehensive 
decision processes. For instance, such boards would consider even more acquisition alternatives 
and makes less distortion of information that promote or suppress certain alternatives (e.g., 
Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985; Hinsz et al., 1997) and use external advice to scrutinize the 
acquisition decisions (e.g., Reed-Lajoux & Elson, 2010). Therefore, by preventing time pressure, 
board meeting timeliness amplifies the positive effect of board meeting frequency on value-
enhancing decisions and subsequent acquisition premium received.  
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 Third, board meeting timeliness might positively affect the quality of bargaining. Early 
phases of acquisition negotiations are characterized by highly competitive behavior between the 
acquirer and target which, as the deal negotiations advance, shift towards more cooperative 
behavior (e.g., Pruitt, 1981; Parola & Ellis, 2014). The danger that high competitive behavior 
induces managers make political rather than value-enhancing decisions is thus greater at the 
early stage of the acquisition process (e.g., Dean & Sharfman, 1993a). Similarly, when more 
board meetings is held early in negotiations, the target faces less information asymmetries 
thereby improving its bargaining position in negotiations and the quality of decisions (e.g., Coff, 
1999). Such an improved bargaining position due to timely information processing by the board 
allows the target to conduct more rigorous deal negotiations (e.g., Parola & Ellis, 2014) in order 
to increase shareholders’ returns from the deal.  
In all, we suggest that target board meeting timeliness amplifies the positive effect of 
board meeting frequency on the likelihood that the target makes value-enhancing decisions, 
which in turn results in higher acquisition premium. We thus formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Target board meeting timeliness moderates the indirect effect of target 
board meeting frequency on acquisition premium via value-enhancing decisions to (a) 
reject the first acquisition offer, (b) negotiate with multiple bidders, (c) counteroffer, and 
(d) request fairness opinion, such that the relationship is stronger when the target board 
meeting timeliness is high.  
METHODS 
Sample and Data 
The base sample for this study was obtained from Thomson Financial’s Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) database. We constructed the initial sample of all acquisitions announced 
between 2002 and 2015 in which both the target and the acquirer are publicly traded US 
companies. We then apply several filters commonly used in the literature indicating that the deal 
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value is greater than 10 million US dollars to ensure strategic importance of the deal (e.g., Reuer, 
Tong, & Wu, 2012), that the acquirer seeks to fully own the firm’s shares after the transaction 
(e.g., Haunschild, 1994), and that the transaction is not associated with the real estate investment 
trust, closed-end mutual funds, banks or other financial institutions which engagement in a deal 
may be driven simply by financial motives (e.g., Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). After using these 
filters, we obtain an initial sample of 1153 attempted and completed acquisitions. 
 The focus of this study is the negotiation phase which covers the period from the 
initiation of the deal to its public announcement. We collected data on the negotiation process 
from the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings made by the acquirer and the 
target after the takeover is publicly announced (e.g., Boone & Mulherin, 2007). Item 1005 of 
SEC Regulation M-A (“Past contacts, transactions, negotiations and agreements”) describes the 
obligation of the target or potential acquirer to disclose any negotiations, contacts, discussions, 
and agreements with the other party prior to the public announcement of the deal. We read the 
documents in detail, and with the support of textual data analysis software, coded data on target 
firms’ board meetings and other features of acquisition negotiation processes. Due to the 
intensive nature of gathering information on the board of directors’ meetings, data was collected 
for a random subsample of 550 deals from the initial sample of 1153. We conducted a two-
sample t-test analysis which did not reveal any significant differences between the base sample 
of deals and the randomly selected deals with respect to the key deal characteristics. We provide 
detail information on the data coding in the subsequent chapter on variables and measurement. 
 We complemented deal-level and process-level data with various characteristics of the 
acquirers and targets collected from the Compustat database. Additionally, we collected data on 
the acquirers’ and targets’ prior acquisition experience from the SDC database. We also matched 
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the CRSP data files to obtain financial information for both acquirers and targets. Finally, we 
collected data on acquirers’ and targets’ TMTs and boards of directors from annual reports and 
proxy statements in Edgar filing system of the SEC. After matching all data segments, the 
resulting sample consists of 503 negotiated acquisitions. The sample size and deal characteristics 
are comparable to prior research on seller-side acquisitions (e.g., Reuer et al., 2012).  
Variables and Measurement 
 Dependent variable. The dependent variable is Acquisition premium measured by the 
purchase price per target share paid by the acquiring firm less the target’s pre-acquisition stock 
price, divided by the target’s pre-acquisition stock price. To avoid distortions in the stock price 
caused by the leakage of information right before the announcement of the deal which causes 
premiums calculated based on short-term windows to be smaller than those calculated based on 
longer-term windows (e.g., Laamanen, 2007), we calculated acquisition premiums based on the 
four-week time lag (e.g., Haunschild, 1994). Following Officer (2003), we restrict the premium 
measure to two (or 200%) to avoid extreme outliers. In our robustness analyses, we used shorter 
time periods to calculate premiums (i.e., one week) to rule out potential noise due to confounding 
events that may occur during the longer period, and we found consistent results. 
Independent variable. We extracted data on M&A-related board meetings of target firms 
from the M&A-related SEC filings. First, we recorded the date on which the target or a potential 
acquirer initiated acquisition conversations and the date of deal public announcement (e.g., 
Boone & Mulherin, 2007). Then, we captured all target firm’s board meetings that took place 
during this period. Our main theoretical variable Board meeting frequency is measured as the 
total number of the acquisition related board meetings of the target firm that took place over the 
course of acquisition negotiations (e.g., Vafeas, 1999).  
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 Mediating variables. Our first mediating variable, First offer rejection is dichotomous, 
taking a value of 1 if the target rejected the first bid, and 0 if the target accepted the first bid 
made by the acquirer (e.g., Betton et al., 2009). Our second mediator is a dummy variable 
Multiple bidders, taking a value of 1 if the target privately negotiated with more than one 
potential bidder, and 0 if the negotiations were taken exclusively with the focal bidder (e.g., 
Boone & Mulherin, 2007). Our third mediator - Counteroffer is a binary variable which equals to 
1 if the target firm countered the focal acquirer’s offer at least once during negotiations, and 0 
otherwise (e.g., Walsh, 1989). Finally, Fairness opinion is our fourth mediator coded as a binary 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the target firm requested at least one fairness opinion 
during negotiations, and 0 otherwise (e.g., Kisgen & Song, 2009). The data for all mediating 
variables is collected from the deal-related SEC filings following the procedures from the 
corresponding references. 
 Moderating variable. To examine the role of timing of board meetings in the acquisition 
process, we introduce the variable Board meetings timeliness. Prior research on groups indicates 
midpoint in the group tasks’ lifecycle as a critical point for group decision making and outcomes 
of the group task (e.g., Gersick, 1988). Following this research we split the negotiation process in 
two halves, and measured board meeting timeliness as a ratio with the number of meetings 
during the first half of the negotiation process as the numerator and the number of meetings held 
during the second half of the negotiations as the denominator (e.g., Chatman & Flynn, 2001).  
 Control variables. First, we control for a set of features of the acquisition process. To 
control for the deal-initiator effect (e.g., Hunt, 1990), we incorporate a binary variable Deal 
initiator which equals 1 if the acquisition is initiated by the target, and 0 if it is initiated by a 
potential acquirer, captured using the data from the transaction-related SEC filings (e.g., Boone 
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& Mulherin, 2007). We also control for Takeover process length measured as the number of 
months between the deal initiation date and the date of public announcement (e.g., Heitzman, 
2011). We also incorporate a dummy for a Tender offer, a public solicitation for target 
shareholders’ stock, because prior studies show that tender offers affect acquisition premiums 
(e.g., Comment & Schwert, 1995). 
Second, we control for a set of deal characteristics. We add control for Deal size 
measured as the natural logarithm of the value of transaction (e.g., Beckman & Haunschild, 
2002). Also, we control for synergies between the focal acquirer and the target by including a 
variable Product-market synergy measured on a 0-4 scale by SIC code-based industry 
relatedness (e.g., Hayward & Hambrick, 1997), and a variable Financial synergy measured as the 
debt-equity ratio of the target less the same ratio of the acquirer in the year prior to the deal (e.g., 
Slusky & Caves, 1991). As the method of payment may influence the acquisition process (e.g., 
Coff, 1999), we add a binary variable Cash deal which equals 1 if the target is fully paid for in 
cash, and 0 otherwise (e.g., Walsh, 1989). 
 Third, we control for characteristics of the targets. Target’s performance may affect 
acquisition premium (e.g., Reuer et al., 2012). Hence, we control for Target performance 
measured by the target’s return on assets in a year prior to the year of deal announcement. 
Additionally, we include a control for Target growth potential, measured using the market-to-
book value ratio of the target’s equity (e.g., Laamanen, 2007), because firms with high growth 
potential may be more attractive targets. Further, because the features of the takeover process in 
high-tech industry may have distinct features (e.g., Coff, 1999), we incorporate a binary variable 
High-tech firm which takes the value of 1 if the target is in the high-tech sector, and 0 otherwise. 
Firms with more acquisition experience may differ in managing and negotiating firm sale (e.g., 
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Barkema & Schijven, 2008). We thus control for Target’s acquisition experience by counting the 
number of deals the targets made during the five years prior to a focal deal. Due to positive 
skewness, we transformed count measure by taking the log of 1 plus the number of deals. To 
control for the structural characteristics of the target board, we included Target board 
independence measured as the proportion of outside directors in the target firm board; Target 
CEO duality which is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is also a chairman of the board, 
and 0 otherwise; and Target insider ownership measuring the percentage of the target’s shares 
held by directors and managers (e.g., Byrd & Hickman, 1992). 
Finally, we control for various characteristics of the acquirers. Acquirers with significant 
financial slack may afford to overpay for targets (e.g., Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan, 2006). 
We add a control Acquirer slack measured as the ratio of core deposits to the total assets of 
acquirers (e.g.,  Kim, Haleblian, & Finkelstein, 2011). We add control for Acquirer acquisition 
experience by counting the number of deals that each acquirer had made during the five years 
preceding a focal deal and again log-transformed the count measure. Finally, to control for 
potential interests of managers, we include Acquirer managerial ownership measured by the 
percentage of shares held by the acquirer’s executives (e.g., Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). 
Statistical Methods 
To examine the impact of target board meeting frequency and timeliness on acquisition 
premium, we use structural equation modeling (SEM) with objective measures used as indicators 
(e.g., Williams, Vandenberg, & Edwards, 2009). SEM methods are the most efficient and the 
least troublesome means of testing mediations, especially recommended for testing mediated 
relationships when there are more than one independent or mediating variable in the conceptual 
model (e.g., Iacobucci, Saldanha, & Deng, 2007; Williams et al., 2009). In our study, there were 
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several advantages of using SEM compared to the traditional approach to testing mediation and 
moderated-mediation by running separate regressions (e.g., Baron & Kenny, 1986). First, 
simultaneous equations allowed us to control for measurement errors that might lead to 
underestimation or overestimation of mediation effects (e.g., Shaver, 2005). Second, a goal of 
our study was to explore multiple mediating mechanisms by which target board meeting 
frequency affects acquisition premiums. Given that mediating variables represent conceptually 
related features of the acquisition process, using SEM allowed us to set error terms of the 
mediators to covary. Finally, Hypotheses 2a-d describe four first-stage moderated mediation 
models, where we proposed that the moderator (board meetings timeliness) interacts with the 
independent variable (board meeting frequency) in relating to the mediators (value-enhancing 
decisions), which in turn relates to the outcome variable (acquisition premium). SEM allowed to 
simultaneously test the full moderated mediation model (e.g., Edwards & Lambert, 2007). As a 
robustness check, we conduct mediation and moderated mediation analysis with separate 
regressions for each of the four main paths in our model. We found highly consistent results in 
both the effect size and significance. 
 Traditional SEM approach is primarily designed for analyses involving continuous 
variables. However, our mediating variables were of different nature – all were dichotomous. 
Using linear models with binary variables could have produced biased results. To overcome this 
limitation of the traditional SEM approach, we used the generalized SEM (GSEM) model 
introduced in R package lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) which enables generalized linear response 
functions with binary outcomes. For regressions with binary mediators we deploy logit function 
and for regression with count mediator we use a negative binomial function. Additionally, to 
adjust estimates for bias, we used nonparametric bootstrapping with 10,000 replications. All 
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significance levels in our results were produces by the bias-adjusted bootstrap confidence 
intervals (e.g., Mooney & Duval, 1993). 
RESULTS 
Table 1 details the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for the variables used in the 
analyses. The average acquisition premium paid to the target is 46.13 percent, which greatly 
corresponds to the premium levels reported in previous studies (e.g., Laamanen, 2007; Reuer et 
al., 2012). The average length of the private takeover process is 7.15 months, consistent with the 
figures reported in previous studies based on similar samples (e.g., Heitzman, 2011). On average, 
the target boards meet 5.34 times during the private takeover phase. Moreover, low average 
value of board meeting timeliness suggests that target boards, on average, meet more often in the 
second half of the private takeover process. With respect to the correlation coefficients, we find 
that they are generally in a low range. 
---------- Insert Table 1 about here ---------- 
Figure 2 reports path coefficients of the structural equation models testing our four 
mediating and four moderated-mediating hypotheses. For the ease of readability, we did not 
present the coefficients of the paths from the control variables in the model. Among the control 
variables, deal value appears negatively related to acquisition premium (β = -.03, p < .05). 
Targets in high-tech industries receive higher acquisition premiums (e.g., Coff, 1999) as 
suggested by the positive and statistically significant coefficient (β = .15, p < .001). Finally, in 
line with prior research (e.g., Cotter, Shivdasani, & Zenner, 1997; Bargeron, Schlingemann, 
Stulz, & Zutter, 2008), target board independence (β = .38, p < .05) and target inside ownership 
(β = .01, p < .05) are positively related to the magnitude of acquisition premium. 
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 Hypothesis 1a states that rejecting first acquisition offer fully mediates the positive 
relationship between target’s board meeting frequency and acquisition premium. Our results 
show that target’s board meeting frequency is positively related to the likelihood of first offer 
rejection (β = .09, p < .05), which in turn is positively associated with acquisition premium (β = 
.11, p < .05). Hypothesis 1b indicates that negotiating with multiple bidders fully mediates the 
positive relationship between target’s board meeting frequency and acquisition premium. As 
seen from the second mediation path in Figure 2, board meeting frequency is shown to be 
positively related to the number of competitive bidders (β = .04, p < .01), which is positively 
related to acquisition premium (β = .17, p < .01). Hypothesis 1c posits that counteroffering fully 
mediates the positive relationship between target’s board meeting frequency and acquisition 
premium. Path coefficients suggest that board meeting frequency is positively related to 
counteroffering (β = .04, p < .05), which is subsequently positively related to acquisition 
premium (β = .13, p < .05). Finally, Hypothesis 1d predicts that requesting fairness opinion fully 
mediates the positive relationship between target’s board meeting frequency and acquisition 
premium. The estimates in Figure 2 reveal that board meeting frequency is positively associated 
with fairness opinion (β = .06, p < .01), which in turn is positively associated with premium (β = 
.09, p < .10). Thus, H1a, H1b, and H1c are fully supported, whilst H1d is partially supported. 
---------- Insert Figure 2 about here ---------- 
 Hypotheses 2a-d suggests that board meeting timeliness moderates the indirect effect of 
the target board meeting frequency on the final premium received via four value-enhancing 
decisions made during negotiations, such that the relationship is stronger when the board meets 
early in the negotiation process. Results for moderated mediation hypotheses testing are also 
shown in Figure 2. First, board meeting frequency and timeliness interact in relation to the first 
111 
 
offer rejection (β = .19, p < .05), which in turn is positively related to acquisition premium (β = 
.11, p < .05). Second, the interaction between board meeting frequency and timeliness is 
positively associated with the number of bidders (β = .21, p < .05), which is positively related to 
acquisition premium (β = .17, p < .01). Third, board meeting frequency and timeliness interact in 
relation to counteroffering (β = .02, n.s.), which in turn is positively related to acquisition 
premium (β = .13, p < .05). Finally, the interaction between board meeting frequency and 
timeliness is positively associated with the fairness opinion (β = .09, p < .10), which is also 
positively related to acquisition premium (β = .09, p < .10). In addition, results from the adjusted 
R2 analyses indicate that the inclusion of the interaction term between board meeting frequency 
and timeliness accounts for 3% additional variance in first offer rejection (ΔR2 = .03), 2% in 
multiple bidders (ΔR2 = .02), 1% in counteroffering (ΔR2 = .01), and 2% in fairness opinion (ΔR2 
= .02), suggesting that board meeting timeliness impacts the first stage of the mediation. In all, 
H2a and H2b are fully supported, H2d is partially supported, and H2c is not supported.  
Results show that the full moderated mediation model provides a good fit to the data (χ2 = 
9.268, df = 7, RMSEA = .03, CFI = 0.98, NFI = 0.96; MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). 
To further examine whether the four value-enhancing decisions fully or partially mediate the 
relationship between target board meeting frequency and acquisition premium, we tested an 
alternative model that included direct path from the independent variable to the dependent 
variable. This model of partial mediation also has a good fit to the data (χ2 = 9.141, df = 6, 
RMSEA = .03, CFI = 0.97, NFI = 0.96). However, a chi-squared difference test revealed no 
significant differences in the model fit between the full and partial mediation model. This 
suggests that target board meeting frequency does not exert direct effect on acquisition premium. 
Results show insignificant direct path from target board meeting frequency to acquisition 
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premium (β = .03, n.s.). We thus conclude that value-enhancing decisions during negotiations 
fully mediate the relationship between target board meeting frequency and premium.  
DISCUSSION 
Empirical findings from prior governance literature suggest that boards exercise little influence 
over strategic decisions and firm performance. We add to this body of research by examining 
board processes as a potential source of board decision-making effectiveness. Drawing from the 
social-psychological research on groups, we investigated whether board meeting frequency and 
meeting timeliness over the course of major corporate event – firm sale through an acquisition - 
positively influence board decision effectiveness and subsequent acquisition returns for 
shareholders. We hypothesized and found that target board meeting frequency increases the 
likelihood of making value-enhancing decisions during acquisition negotiations, which in turn 
leads to higher acquisitions premiums paid to the target. We further found that board meeting 
timeliness amplifies these positive effects. Our results suggest that antecedents of board 
governance reside in group processes through which directors interact to make effective and 
timely strategic decisions. We next discuss theoretical and practical implications of our findings.  
Theoretical Implications 
Our results advance governance theory in several ways. First, contrary to prior research 
which has predominantly focused on structural characteristics of boards and found little 
consistent evidence of their benefits, we argue and find that group processes of boards influence 
their decisions making effectiveness, in particular in the context of acquisitions. We 
conceptualize boards as groups (e.g., Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Zhu, 2013; Boivie et al., 2016) 
and we develop and test theory about the important group process attributes – meeting frequency 
and timeliness. Board meeting frequency and timeliness constitute distinct attributes of board 
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process that can influence decision effectiveness during major corporate events and performance 
outcomes of these events. Groups literature suggests that boards that meet more often collect, 
share and process more information, prioritize group over individual interests, prevent biases in 
decision-making and engage in more comprehensive decision procedures (e.g., Hackman & 
Morris, 1975; Hinsz et al., 1997). Additionally, theory of group dynamics suggests that these 
effect become particularly pronounced when groups respond to a task at hand in a timely manner 
(e.g., Gersick, 1988; Waller, 1999). Extending this research to decision-making of boards in 
acquisitions, we found that boards of target firms that meet frequently and timely make more 
value-enhancing decisions during acquisition negotiations and subsequently receive higher 
acquisition premiums. Our findings are novel as they reveal a new theoretical mechanism 
through which group processes of boards can meaningfully influence their effectiveness in term 
of shareholder value creation. We thereby answer to recent calls (e.g., Boivie et al., 2016) to 
extend board research from what boards look like (board structure) towards what they actually 
do (board process). 
Second, we introduce time as a new research lens in the governance research (e.g., 
Ancona et al., 2001). Our findings on board meeting frequency and timeliness suggest the 
important role of timing and patterns of board interactions over time for decision-making 
effectiveness. Taking a temporal perspective on board effectiveness is particularly suitable for 
studying large scale corporate actions that unfold over longer periods of time and have clearly 
defined temporal properties (beginning, end, etc.). For instance, as our results suggest, boards’ 
participation in different stages of corporate acquisition processes influence the decision-making 
process and outcomes of acquisitions. Investigating such large scale actions cross-sectionally as 
prior research on structural board characteristics has mostly done, is incomplete and unlikely to 
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lead to a full understanding of the effects of boards. Our results suggest that a temporal 
perspective that investigates how temporal patterns link to intermediate mechanisms (e.g., 
Kosnik, 1987; Desender et al., 2013), such as, specific decisions within the acquisition process, 
is an important complement to prior cross-sectional research. 
Third, we complement research on corporate governance with a distinct group process 
perspective derived from social-psychological research. Although there is a substantial body of 
organizational research that has investigated the influence of boards on key corporate decisions 
from a socio-psychological perspective (e.g., Westphal & Bednar, 2005), empirical research on 
group processes has been mostly absent. Yet, much theoretical work argued that board 
effectiveness is likely to depend heavily on socio-psychological processes, particularly those that 
pertain to group interactions (e.g., Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Boivie et al., 2016). With this study 
we begin to fill that gap and show that the frequency which board engages in group interactions 
as well as the timing of those interactions impact board effectiveness. More broadly, our overall 
results suggest that board effectiveness cannot be fully explained by one theoretical perspective 
(e.g., Johnson et al., 1993). 
Our findings also have important implications for M&A research. Specifically, we 
advance process theory of mergers and acquisitions (e.g., Jemison & Sitkin, 1986; Pablo et al., 
1996) by focusing on the negotiations phase which has received less attention compared to other 
phases of the overall acquisition process (e.g., Parola & Ellis, 2014). Relatedly, by focusing on 
the acquisition decision process from the perspective of the target firm, we add to the “sell-side” 
research on acquisitions (e.g., Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004) which, although equally important, 
has been less often taken in the acquisitions research than the acquirer perspective. Finally, our 
study identifies a novel target-side antecedent to the magnitude of acquisition premium (e.g., 
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Reuer et al., 2012). Our results are in line with prior research which argued that staggered boards 
in target firms might be detrimental to acquisition premiums (e.g., Moeller, 2005). 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 Our study has several limitations that present opportunities for future research. First, we 
examine the effect of board meeting frequency and timeliness in the context of one specific 
corporate event in which board of directors may matter the most - firm targeted for an 
acquisition. Future research should examine the influence of board processes during other major 
corporate events. Second, we were not able to account for potential informal interactions 
between directors. A nascent research on the role of informal social interactions between 
directors outside the boardroom provides some contradictory findings. For example, Lorsch and 
McIver (1989) point to evidence that directors typically do not interact with each other outside 
the boardroom to discuss strategic issues, while Westphal and Bednar (2005) argue for the 
importance of social interaction outside the boardroom for the discovery of shared concerns. 
Future research should thus investigate whether the characteristics of informal social interactions 
such as their frequency and timeliness, affect board decision effectiveness. Finally, we were not 
able to account for the costs associated with board meetings such as the time directors invest to 
travel to and attend the board meetings, the corresponding travel expenses and meeting fees, and 
the opportunity costs (e.g., Vafeas, 1999). Future research could therefore take the cost-benefit 
perspective to examine whether frequent board meetings are economically justifiable. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrixa 
 
 
a n = 503. Correlation coefficients with a magnitude larger than .088 are significant at p < .05 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
                 
  1.   Acquisition premium (%)   46.13  40.01               
2.   Board meeting frequency 5.348 4.218 0.091             
3.   Board meeting timeliness 0.357 0.548 0.002 0.280            
4.   First offer rejection 0.895 0.292 0.038 0.097 0.038           
5.   Number of bidders 2.356 5.932  0.042 0.121 0.113 0.011          
6.   Counteroffering 0.216 0.398 0.030 0.115 0.144 0.109 0.050         
7.   Fairness opinion 0.739 0.470 0.130 0.204 0.014 0.045 0.093  0.001        
 Process-level controls                
8.   Deal initiator 0.375 0.485 -0.018 -0.016 0.043 -0.055 0.323 -0.037 0.053       
9.   Takeover process length 7.152 6.386 -0.068 0.165 -0.111 0.037 0.019 -0.010 0.037 0.057      
10.   Tender offer 0.261 0.439 0.126 -0.477 -0.243 0.070 -0.203 -0.092 -0.229 -0.148 -0.016     
 Deal-level controls                
11.   Deal size 6.432 1.772 -0.161 0.070 -0.007 0.104 -0.111 0.027 0.079 -0.228 -0.233 -0.045     
12.   Product-market synergy 2.151 1.669 0.055 0.011 0.039 -0.015 0.038 0.068 -0.044 0.027 -0.003 0.056 0.023   
13.   Financial synergy 0.587 6.629 0.006 -0.080 0.154 -0.017 0.010 0.024 -0.008 -0.011 0.016 0.041 -0.033 0.014  
14.   Cash deal 0.811 0.348 -0.097 0.202 0.138 -0.164 0.023 -0.061 0.028  0.076 0.017 -0.250  0.161 0.058 -0.032 
 Target-level controls                 
15.   Performance -0.101 0.543 -0.056 0.022 0.036 -0.049 -0.041  0.063 -0.004  -0.084 0.005 0.019 0.086 0.107 -0.010 
16.   Growth potential 2.679 6.901 0.012 -0.022 0.010 0.022 -0.011 0.058 -0.011 -0.042 -0.017 -0.044 -0.008 -0.014 0.116 
17.   High-tech firm  0.673 0.469 0.199 -0.097 -0.087 -0.082 -0.053 -0.077 -0.008 0.004 -0.013 0.119 -0.135 0.073 0.021 
18.   Acquisition experience 3.777 5.506 -0.088 -0.016 0.006 -0.033 -0.027 -0.032 -0.027 -0.085 -0.106 -0.022 0.342 -0.150 0.047 
19.   Board independence 0.791 0.107 0.039 0.088 0.052 0.091 -0.104 -0.048 -0.017 -0.104 -0.080 0.014 0.273 0.005 -0.028 
20.   CEO duality 0.405 0.491 -0.053 0.046 0.046 0.006 -0.014 0.025 0.018 0.020 -0.109 -0.109 0.234 -0.041  0.034 
21.   Insider ownership 11.764 15.272 0.116 -0.054 -0.055 -0.071 0.158 -0.024 0.023 0.116 0.124 -0.014 -0.331 0.027 -0.060 
 Acquirer-level controls                
 22.   Slack 0.468 0.806 0.016 0.011 -0.069 0.025 -0.031 -0.057 -0.051 -0.027 0.083 0.018 -0.141 0.092 0.040 
 23.   Acquisition experience 19.503 32.422 -0.033 -0.006 0.002 0.043 0.036 0.010 0.050 -0.006 -0.037 -0.004 0.089 -0.121 -0.008 
 24.   Managerial ownership 6.217 9.360 -0.038 -0.096 -0.092 -0.011 0.067 0.026 -0.008 0.078 0.090 0.001 -0.171 0.001 0.003 
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Table 1. Continued 
a n = 503. Correlation coefficients with a magnitude larger than .088 are significant at p < .05 level.
 Variables   14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
 Target-level controls                
15.   Performance 0.003          
16.   Growth potential 0.038 -0.136         
17.   High-tech firm  -0.186 -0.030 -0.009        
18.   Acquisition experience 0.039 0.107 -0.007 -0.072       
19.   Board independence 0.072 -0.031 -0.006 -0.051 0.106      
20.   CEO duality 0.188 0.067 0.006  -0.134 0.162 0.138     
21.   Insider ownership -0.069 -0.060 -0.028 0.024 -0.171 -0.187 -0.230 
 Acquirer-level controls                
22.   Slack 0.098 -0.023 0.049 0.158 -0.107 -0.064 -0.046 -0.035 
23.   Acquisition experience -0.190 0.038 -0.025 0.148 0.067 -0.032 0.001 -0.043 -0.111 
24.   Managerial ownership -0.042 0.015 -0.026 -0.024 -0.021 -0.032 0.022 0.037 0.108 -0.055 
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FIGURE 1 
Overall Theoretical Model 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
Structural Model Results for the Overall Moderated Mediation Modela 
 
 
 
a N = 503. Standardized path estimates are reported. For the ease of readability, we do not 
present the coefficients of the paths from the controls in the model. †p<0.10, *p<0.05, **<0.01. 
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The Lure of Extraverted CEOs: How Personality and Interpersonal Dynamics  
Affect Acquired Firms’ CEO Retention 
 
Abstract 
Scholars commonly argue that situational and firm conditions matter when it comes to CEO 
retention. Yet, whether a CEO stays or leaves a firm inherently is also a very personal and inter-
personal decision. Particularly following consequential strategic events, decisions regarding 
CEO turnover can have major implications for firms. We therefore study the role of personality 
and interpersonal dynamics on acquired firms’ CEO retention following mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A). Building on personality theory, we posit that, compared to less extraverted 
acquiring CEOs, more extraverted acquiring CEOs likely have greater appeal to their recently 
acquired counterparts, increasing the likelihood that the latter stays with the newly combined 
firm. In contrast, compared to less extraverted acquired CEOs, we expect that more extraverted 
acquired CEOs will have more outside options, increasing the likelihood that they leave the 
newly combined firm. We expect that these personality effects of the acquiring and acquired 
CEOs depend on important interpersonal dynamics during M&A negotiations – in terms of the 
duration, intensity and nature of interpersonal interactions – that affect the extent to which they 
get to know each other. Such interpersonal dynamics work to increase the appeal for the newly 
combined firm for extraverted CEOs from the acquiring as well as the target firm. Evidence from 
371 M&As among publicly listed US firms provide support for the important role of personality 
and interpersonal dynamics in CEO retention. 
 
Keywords: CEO personality; CEO turnover; extraversion; mergers and acquisitions;  
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"With an extraordinary set of combined assets and the proven value creation records of 
both Weyerhaeuser and Plum Creek, the combined company will offer a compelling opportunity 
for shareholders. […] Doyle Simons and I share a commitment to disciplined capital allocation 
and sustained value creation, and I look forward to working together as we build a great new 
company," said Rick R. Holley, CEO of Plum Creek. 
 
 "We're excited to combine the two leaders in our industry to create the world's premier 
timber, land and forest products company. […] Our customers and employees will also benefit 
as we form a winning team with common values and unparalleled expertise in timber, land and 
manufacturing. I have the utmost respect for Rick Holley and the Plum Creek team and look 
forward to working together to successfully integrate these two outstanding companies," said 
Doyle R. Simons, CEO of Weyerhaeuser.  
 
  Official announcement of a merger between  
Weyerhaeuser Company and Plum Creek (November 8th, 2015)  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the more critical and delicate relationships in business is that between two CEOs 
of firms that are consolidating, particularly when the acquired firm is large enough to warrant 
close CEO involvement throughout the transformational process. The media often capture these 
relationships in deal announcements, when both CEOs showcase not only anticipated synergies 
from the deal but also their shared future together. Executives emphasize such display together in 
part because there is an expectation that CEOs of recently acquired firms are key to the success 
of the implementation of M&As. Yet, many acquired firms’ CEOs leave within a few years 
following the acquisition of the firms they led (e.g., Walsh, 1988, 1989; Walsh & Ellwood, 1991; 
Krug & Hegarty, 1997; Wulf & Singh, 2011). 
 When it comes to understanding why acquired CEOs stay or leave, scholars generally 
have relied on two perspectives. The market-for-corporate control perspective emphasizes that 
acquired CEOs leave the firm following the acquisition because the market disciplines acquired 
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CEOs that ran poorly performing firms (e.g., Walsh & Ellwood, 1991). In contrast, the human 
capital perspective argues that unique skills, knowledge and resources of acquired CEOs explain 
CEO retention following M&As (e.g., Buchholtz, Ribbens, & Houle, 2003). Acquired CEOs are 
important for acquisition success because they for example have an intimate understanding of 
their own organization (e.g., Bergh, 2001), can foster a sense of stability following the 
acquisition (e.g., Jemison & Sitkin, 1986a, 1986b), and can help acquirers avoid misapplications 
of acquirers’ acquisition routines (e.g., Ellis, Reus, Lamont, & Ranft, 2011). While there might 
be a market for corporate control that would force poor-performing CEOs to leave following 
acquisitions, scholars agree that acquired CEO departures generally are harmful for post-
acquisition performance (e.g., Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; Krishnan, Miller, & Judge, 1997). 
While these perspectives indicate a wide range of market and strategic factors that can 
explain acquired CEO retention, they both omit an important socio-psychological reality: 
inherently the choice to stay or leave is a very personal and interpersonal decision. An increasing 
number of scholars do focus on socio-psychological and personality theories to understand 
consequential strategic decisions such as M&As (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Zhu, 2013; 
Malhotra, Reus, Zhu, & Roelofsen, 2017). Yet, scholars have not built on socio-psychological 
theories on personality and interpersonal relationships to explain why acquired CEOs would stay 
with or leave the newly combined firm. In fact, we still lack insight about whether fundamental 
socio-psychological dynamics influence CEO retention more generally.  
In the current study, we build on dynamic interactionism to understand how the dyadic 
relationship between an acquiring CEO and acquired CEO influences acquired CEO retention.  
Dynamic interactionism is a dominant paradigm in social psychology to argue that behavior is an 
outcome of the interactions between a person and the situations they encounter (e.g., Reynolds et 
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al., 2010). In such dyadic relationships, the personality of the other person is an important part of 
the situation (e.g., Baldwin, 1992). Dynamic interactionism therefore suggests that the quality of 
dyadic relationships is a function of the personalities of both participants and their interaction 
history (e.g., Baldwin, 1992; Asendorpf & Wilpers, 1998). Scholars have documented this effect 
in the literature on new employee socialization, indicating that establishing effective working 
relationships with their leaders early on increased the likelihood of successful integration, and 
retention, of new employees (e.g., Major, Kozlowski, Chao, & Gardner, 1995; Kammeyer-
Mueller & Wanberg, 2003). A complete understanding of acquired CEO retention following deal 
completion from a social-psychological perspective therefore calls for studying the personalities 
of both CEOs in combination with their interaction history early on during the M&A 
negotiations.  
We focus on the role of extraversion of both the acquiring and acquired CEOs.  
Extraversion is a personality trait that reflects a tendency for positive affect, assertive behavior, 
decisive thinking, and a desire for social engagement (e.g., Wilt & Revelle, 2009; Wilt & 
Revelle, 2016). Extraversion plays a central role in the dynamic interactionism perspective (e.g., 
Bolger & Eckenrode, 1991; Wanberg, Kanfer, & Banas, 2000). Extraverts excel in relationship-
building situations as they are more decisive and assertive (e.g., Wilt & Revelle, 2016) and are 
more likely to influence other to join the effort (e.g., Morrone-Strupinsky & Depue, 2004). 
Compared to other acquiring CEOs, a more extraverted acquiring CEO (1) sees more 
opportunities for collaborations with the acquired CEO; (2) views the relationship with the 
acquired CEO more positively; (3) instills more confidence in acquired CEO regarding a shared 
future together. In contrast, compared to other acquired CEOs, a more extraverted acquired CEO 
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(1) sees more outside options; (2) attracts more attention and interest from external parties; (3) 
forms a greater threat to the acquiring CEO. 
Dynamic interactionism further suggests that these personality effects of the acquiring 
and acquired CEOs depend on the interaction history that likely evolves during M&A 
negotiations depending on the time spent in negotiations (e.g., Pavot, Diener, & Fujita, 1990), 
the extent of involvement of individuals in interpersonal bargaining (e.g., Funder, Kolar, & 
Blackman, 1995; Lippa & Dietz, 2000), and the nature of interactions – face-to-face vs. 
technology-mediated interactions – between the two CEOs in M&A negotiations (e.g., Williams, 
1977; Drolet & Morris, 2000). Such interpersonal dynamics induces the activation of the 
personality traits of CEOs and thus works to increase the appeal for the newly combined firm for 
extraverted CEOs from the acquiring as well as the acquired firm.   
The purpose of this study is to understand how CEO personality and interpersonal 
dynamics explain why some top executives tend to stay while others leave following the 
acquisition of their companies. Several studies hinted to the importance of personality and 
interpersonal dynamics in the negotiation and subsequent acquisition process (Barry & 
Friedman, 1998; Judge, Bono, Ilies, & Gerhardt, 2002; Do & Minbashian, 2014; Wilson, DeRue, 
Matta, Howe, & Conlon, 2016). However, missing from the literature is a study on how these 
factors influence perhaps the most definitive decision for acquired CEOs – whether to stay or 
leave following the acquisition. While more extraverted acquired firms’ CEOs likely will be 
attracted to the many opportunities outside of the new company, more extraverted acquiring 
firms’ CEOs will likely attract their acquired CEOs to stay with the company and build on the 
shared future together. We investigate the role of CEO extraversion on CEO turnover in the 
context of large acquisitions by S&P500 and S&P400 MidCap firms.  
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Post-Acquisition CEO Turnover 
Turnover of key employees is a critical challenge for most firms. Considering the direct impact 
on firm performance, it is not surprising that the study of executive turnover long has been a 
dominant stream of strategy research (e.g., Harrison, Torres, & Kukalis, 1988; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996; Griffeth, Hom, & Gaertner, 2000). The topic has received particular attention in 
relation to M&As, as scholars found that top management turnover rates following M&As tend 
to be higher than the normal turnover rates for comparable firms not taking part in acquisitions 
(e.g., Walsh, 1988; Walsh & Ellwood, 1991). As the rates are particularly high for target firms 
(e.g., Walsh, 1989), the departure of acquired executives is considered an important case of 
executive, and more broadly, employee turnover (e.g., Hambrick & Cannella, 1993). 
 There are several theoretical perspectives put forth to explain why acquired executives 
leave or stay following an acquisition. Early on, a market-for-corporate control perspective 
dominated this line of research. This perspective emphasizes that the market (other firms) 
discipline bad management of target firms and use M&As to replace managers (e.g., Jensen, 
1988; Franks & Mayer, 1996). M&As are driven by acquiring firm’s belief that the combination 
of target firm’s resources and new leadership can substantially increase the market value of the 
target firm (e.g., Fama, 1980; Jensen, 1988). Entrenched and inefficient executives in charge of 
poorly performing firms are therefore more likely to be “disciplined” through dismissal from the 
acquired firm (e.g., Walsh & Ellwood, 1991; Heyden, Kavadis, & Neuman, 2014).  
 One line of research also emerged around the role of financial and strategic incentives for 
post-acquisition executive turnover. Target firm executives who possess substantial ownership 
positions in the target firm would be more incentivized to remain in the combined company. For 
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example, executives-owners might require a seat at the combined firm’s board of directors, as 
such position would allow them to monitor managers and safeguard their equity investment (e.g., 
Chang, Mais, & Sullivan, 2013). Because of the ownership stake, these executives have higher 
bargaining power which they might exploit during acquisition negotiations to secure their future 
employment in the combined firm (e.g., Ghosh & Ruland, 1998; Chang et al., 2013). Moreover, 
even executives without ownership in the target firm might be ready to strategically negotiate 
staying in the acquired firm. Prior research shows that they often do so at the expense of 
shareholders’ benefits from the deal (e.g., Hartzell, Ofek, & Yermack, 2004; Wulf, 2004; Qiu, 
Trapkov, & Yakoub, 2014). 
 In contrast, a human capital perspective places more emphasis on skills, knowledge and 
resources of executives and predicts that acquirers would want to prevent acquired managers’ 
turnover following an acquisition. From this perspective, scholars argue M&A success depends 
in large part of target CEOs’ experience and knowledge in general (e.g., Jemison & Sitkin, 
1986a; Cannella & Hambrick, 1993), and particularly their unique firm-specific knowledge 
which is critical for the integration process (e.g., Bergh, 2001). Acquirers thus also have interest 
in retaining such executives in the target firm. Similarly, acquirers would be more likely to 
prevent the turnover of executives with a proven track record (e.g., executives of well-
performing target firms) in order to exploit such a valuable human capital in future endeavors 
(e.g., Wulf & Singh, 2011). However, a large pool of skills, knowledge and resources might also 
affect executives’ decisions on whether to stay or leave the combined firm. Human capital rich 
executives typically have more external opportunities and might be less concerned with job 
security or short-term financial gains (e.g., Buchholtz et al., 2003) and thus might be more likely 
to depart. 
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 The relative standing perspective suggests that executive turnover is best understood as a 
social process. According to the theory of relative standing (Frank, 1985), acquisitions should be 
seen as a conquest in which the acquirer typically acts dominantly towards the target (e.g., 
Hirsch, 1986; Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). The feel of dominance or superiority would be 
revealed already in the interactions between the acquirer and target executives during the 
negotiations phase and might be extended throughout the acquisition process (e.g., Hambrick & 
Cannella, 1993). Target firm executives would be more likely to depart when they feel inferior to 
acquiring firm executives. In particular, when target executives face a possibility to lose status 
within the firm, to suffer damage to personal reputation, or to become involved in power 
struggles with the acquiring firm executives, their turnover is more likely to occur (e.g., Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Cannella & Hambrick, 1993). 
 Finally, social embeddedness perspective suggests that social ties play a role in executive 
turnover. In particular, two types of social ties matter in this context. First, social relationships 
between the acquirer firm executives and the target firm executives increase the likelihood that 
executives of the target firm preserve their employment in the merged firm (e.g., Ishii & Xuan, 
2014). This happens because social ties increase the trust between individuals, make people more 
likely to interact due to the homophily effect, induce comfort in inter-personal exchange, and 
lead to more favorable interpretation of each other’s actions (e.g., Uzzi, 1996; McPherson, 
Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). Second, the size of target executive’s social network plays an 
important role. Large social networks provide access to more external employment opportunities 
(e.g., Granovetter, 1973). Following acquisition, especially if dissatisfied with it, acquired 
executives with large networks might be search for employment opportunities elsewhere and 
depart thereafter (e.g., Buono, Bowditch, & Lewis, 1985). 
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Taken together, prior research on target executive turnover had emphasized a wide range 
of situations factors, particularly firm performance, incentives, firm-specific knowledge, relative 
standing, and social embeddedness, thereby leaving a critical gap in our understanding of how 
personality of and interpersonal dynamics between acquirer firm and target firm executives 
impact target executive turnover. Although prior research suggested that post-M&A turnover 
decisions emerge through joint interactions between the acquirer firm and target firm executives 
(e.g., Buchholtz et al., 2003) and that the acquisition negotiation process largely shapes the 
climate surrounding the acquisition (e.g., Walsh, 1989; Hambrick & Cannella, 1993), how 
executives’ personality and inter-personal dynamics affects executive turnover remains a critical 
untested research question. 
CEO Personality and Executive Turnover 
Although personality has a long history in employee turnover research, the direct relationship 
between personality and turnover has been characterized as “disappointing and inconsistent” 
(Allen, Weeks, & Moffitt, 2005). Prior empirical research primarily investigated the contextual 
causes of employee turnover, thereby leaving individual differences as a cause of turnover 
decisions largely under-explored (e.g., Zimmerman, 2008). The effect of individual differences 
on turnover has been proposed already in the theoretical model of March and Simon (1958) and 
was emphasized by the subsequent work which placed personality as the earliest precursors to 
turnover (e.g., Mobley, Griffeth, Hand, & Meglino, 1979; Steers & Mowday, 1981). In 
particular, extraversion was argued to be strongly predictive of turnover (e.g., Salgado, 2002; 
Bauer, Erdogan, Liden, & Wayne, 2006).  
In the Big Five model of personality, extraversion is the dominant factor and is most 
theoretically and empirically related to a range of organizational phenomena including turnover 
141 
 
(e.g., Bauer et al., 2006). Extraversion is a higher order dimension of personality which reflects 
tendencies to experience and exhibit positive affect, assertive behavior, decisive thinking, and 
desires for social attention (e.g., Wilt & Revelle, 2009; Wilt & Revelle, 2016). It is comprised of 
two central properties, affiliative extraversion – resembling the tendency to have and value warm 
social relationships and agentic extraversion – reflecting the tendency to be socially dominant, 
assertive, and influential (e.g., Depue & Collins, 1999). As such, the personality trait became 
pivotal in virtually every investigation of personality structure and inter-personal social 
interactions (e.g., Burger & Caldwell, 2000).  
Extraversion is strongly related to inter-personal behavior (e.g., DeYoung, Weisberg, 
Quilty, & Peterson, 2013). Individuals high on extraversion trait are more efficient and effective 
in creating and maintaining social network of contacts (e.g., Bolger & Eckenrode, 1991; 
Wanberg et al., 2000), they positively affect interactions with these contacts over time (e.g., 
Costa & McCrae, 1992), and are more likely to utilize networks when faced with a challenge 
(e.g., Russell, Booth, Reed, & Laughlin, 1997). The importance of extraversion for situations 
featured with social interactions was also demonstrated in an organizational context where, for 
instance, extraversion was predictive of performance in jobs were social interaction and 
interpersonal dynamics was critical job feature (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1991).  
Relatedly, extraverts are expressive and articulate individuals will the ability to persuade, 
influence, and organize others (e.g., Bono & Judge, 2004), therefore being more likely to 
perform well in leadership positions within organizations. Because extraversion is manifestly 
related to social interactions and social behavior, it plays a central role in performing critical 
leadership activities such as bargaining (e.g., Barry & Friedman, 1998), facilitating discussions 
and stimulating social interactions (e.g., House & Howell, 1992; Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010), 
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and gaining wide support for initiating and implementing organizational change (e.g., Judge et 
al., 2002; Bono & Judge, 2004). Moreover, recent findings suggest that extraversion was even 
found to positively affect strategic flexibility and firm performance (Nadkarni & Herrmann, 
2010). Together, these characteristics make extraversion an important personality trait of CEOs, 
with CEO extraversion having impact on major corporate events such as M&A (e.g., Malhotra et 
al., 2017). Nevertheless, there are virtually no insights into the influence of CEO extraversion on 
post-acquisition turnover decisions. We turn to this question next. 
HYPOTHESES 
Acquirer CEO Extraversion and Target CEO Turnover 
We argue that more extraverted acquirer CEOs are better able to convince target CEOs not to 
depart from the combined firm following acquisitions due to their tendency to create positive 
social environment, efficiently build social relationships, foster optimism and confidence 
regarding the shared future, and facilitate integrative bargaining in dyadic interactions. 
Considering the central role of acquirer CEO and target CEO in M&As (e.g., Heitzman, 2011) as 
well as the fact that target CEO turnover is a central outcome of M&A negotiations (e.g., 
Buchholtz et al., 2003), more-extraverted acquirer CEOs are more likely to behave and negotiate 
in a way which decreases the prospects for target CEO’s departure from the acquired business. 
 Extraverted acquirer CEOs are more likely to create positive social environment during 
M&A negotiations. The communication style of extraverted CEOs is typically enthusiastic and 
outgoing (e.g., Thorne, 1987) which helps to set a positive tone of negotiations. Relatedly, 
extraverted acquirer CEOs are able to affect the contextual experience of the deal-making 
process for the parties involved (e.g., Furr & Funder, 1998; Eaton & Funder, 2003) making them 
more likely to recall positive information about the deal (e.g., Brief, Butcher, & Roberson, 
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1995). Extraversion is also associated with self-confidence (e.g., Cheng & Furnham, 2002). 
Moreover, extraverted CEO are more effective in performing corporate tasks not just because 
they are more confident, but because they instill confidence among others involved in and 
affected by the task (e.g., Bono & Judge, 2004). Under the social influence of an extraverted 
acquirer CEO, the target CEO is thus more likely to be positive, enthusiastic, and confident about 
the prospects of deal and the combined firm, he or she starts to develop the feel of belonging to 
the combined firm (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995), and is subsequently more likely to stay. 
Leadership of extraverted CEOs comprises of network-building, engagement, and 
inspiration of others (e.g., House & Howell, 1992). Extraverted acquirer CEO are thus likely to 
influence target CEO’s with the ingratiation approach to M&A negotiations (e.g., Cable & 
Judge, 2003). Further, extraverted acquirer CEO are better able to motivate the target CEO to 
prioritize interests of the firm over his or her private interests (e.g., Do & Minbashian, 2014). In 
the M&A context, this could mean that the target CEO would remain with the firm instead of 
pursuing other, potentially more attractive, business endeavors (e.g., Buono et al., 1985). 
Extraverts are often also characterized by assertiveness and decisiveness (e.g., Wilt & Revelle, 
2016). Extraverted acquirer CEOs are therefore more likely to mobilize target CEO and other 
executives to join the effort in making the acquisition effective (e.g., Morrone-Strupinsky & 
Depue, 2004). Finally, extraverted acquirer CEO exhibit greater social seeking tendency when 
faced with a challenge (e.g., Swickert, Rosentreter, Hittner, & Mushrush, 2002) and, in their 
effort to prevent the turnover of target CEO, they might effectively mobilize other acquirer and 
target executives, directors, or shareholders to help retain the acquired CEO. 
Extraverted acquirer CEO’s bargaining style may also have a positive bearing on the 
target CEO’s turnover decision. During M&A negotiations, more extraverted acquirer CEOs 
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more extensively engage with the bargaining counterparty to explore alternatives (e.g., Barry & 
Friedman, 1998). Similarly, they foster openness in communication and consider requirements of 
the target, therefore increase the chances that the target CEO reveals true attitudes, interests and 
concerns (e.g., Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991). As a result, extraverted acquirer CEOs are more 
likely to achieve integrative bargaining and arrive to mutually satisfactory solutions with respect 
to the deal and the future of the firm (e.g., Barry & Friedman, 1998), thus diminishing the 
likelihood that the target CEO will depart following the acquisition.  
Hypothesis 1: Acquirer CEO extraversion is positively related to target CEO retention 
following M&A. 
 
Target CEO Extraversion and Target CEO Turnover 
We further argue that more extraverted target CEOs are more likely to depart from the combined 
firms following acquisitions due to their tendency to seek and maintain social status and to be 
strongly oriented towards achievement and reward, as well as because the size of their external 
social networks typically provides them with an access to alternative employment opportunities.  
 At the real core of extraversion is the tendency to value social status and social attention 
that typically comes with it (e.g., Ashton, Lee, & Paunonen, 2002), as well as to exhibit high 
degrees of achievement orientation (e.g., Meyer & Cuomo, 1962). Extraverted leaders tend to 
seek out status which will allow them to maintain hierarchy and dominance (e.g., Barrick, 
Stewart, & Piotrowski, 2002). Extraverted CEOs which firms are targeted for an acquisition 
would therefore strongly feel that their internal and external statuses are threatened. Indeed, 
evidence suggest that following acquisitions, retained target CEOs change the hierarchical status 
and become “just” one of the directors in the board or members of the executive team (e.g., Wulf 
& Singh, 2011). Because when faced with an acquisition their status and dominant position are at 
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risk, extraverted target CEOs are more likely to entirely “withdraw from the situation” (e.g., 
Ames & Flynn, 2007).  
 Target CEOs high in extraversion trait are more likely to create and maintain a social 
network of contacts at other firms (e.g., Bolger & Eckenrode, 1991; Wanberg et al., 2000). As a 
result, they are more likely to observe a higher number of alternative employment opportunities 
(e.g., March & Simon, 1958). Moreover, extraverted CEOs seek to establish social ties not 
merely for the sake of socializing but rather for instrumental purposes such as access to 
influence, business prospects or personal opportunities (e.g., Do & Minbashian, 2014). 
Extraverted target CEOs are also more likely to occupy central positions in their social networks 
(e.g., Klein, Lim, Saltz, & Mayer, 2004) which gives them not just mere visibility of more job 
opportunities, but also better access and insight into those opportunities. Finally, extraverted 
target CEOs not only possess larger social networks and are better positions within them, but are 
also more inclined to contact network members and actively seek information when faced with a 
personal or professional challenge (e.g., Russell et al., 1997; Burger & Caldwell, 2000). Taken 
together, extraverted target CEOs have more effective social networks giving them access to 
more job opportunities and making their turnover following acquisitions more likely. 
Hypothesis 2: Target CEO extraversion is negatively related to target CEO retention 
following M&A. 
The Contingent Effect of Interpersonal Interactions 
Drawing from the research on dynamic interactionism (e.g., Weiss & Adler, 1984; Reynolds et 
al., 2010), we further propose that the degree to which extraversion of the acquirer CEO and the 
target CEO affects the target CEO’s post-M&A turnover decision depends on the duration, 
intensity, and nature of interpersonal interactions between the two CEOs during M&A 
negotiations. Social psychological research argues that behavior is an outcome of the continuous 
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and reciprocal interaction between the person and the situations they encounter (e.g., Endler & 
Parker, 1992). The concept ‘person’ typically refers to a stable characteristic that deﬁnes the 
individual – such as personality – and  the concept ‘situation’ describes the environmental 
context that exists outside of the person (e.g., Reynolds et al., 2010). According to the dynamic 
interactionism, social context is an important dimension of the situation (e.g., Baldwin, 1992; 
Asendorpf & Wilpers, 1998). In the context of our study, behavior is therefore seen as an 
outcome of the interplay between personality and social context. 
 A dyadic social relationship between the acquirer and the target CEO is the key feature of 
social context in the M&A negotiations setting. Broadly, such relationship is typically 
characterized at the behavioral level by a relatively stable interaction pattern and at the cognitive 
level by a relationship schema that consists of relationship-specific mental representations of 
self, other, and the interaction pattern (e.g., Baldwin, 1992). Because the personality of the other 
is part of one's own environment (and vice versa), dyadic social relationships can be viewed as 
products of the transaction of two individuals. From this perspective, the quality of a social 
relationship becomes a function of the personality of both participants and their interaction 
history (including third-party influences and chance) (e.g., Asendorpf & Wilpers, 1998). People 
actively influence their environments and the people in them (e.g., Snyder & Monson, 1975; 
Magnusson & Endler, 1977; Bandura, 1978; Funder, 1991). A personality trait such as 
extraversion, seen as “intra-individual consistency and inter-individual uniqueness in 
propensities to behave in identifiable ways”, will be expressed in light of the presence of others 
(e.g., Tett & Guterman, 2000; Tett & Burnett, 2003). Therefore, in the context of our study, any 
effect of extraversion of acquirer and target CEOs on the target CEO retention in the combined 
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company will depend on the pattern of dyadic social interactions between the acquirer and target 
CEO during M&A negotiations. 
Based on the extensive review of prior social psychology research, we identified three 
critical factors best capturing the pattern of dyadic interactions between individuals and thus 
affecting the degree to which the effect of personality of acquirer CEO and target CEO affect 
post-M&A turnover decision. The first important characteristic of interpersonal dynamics is the 
time that individuals spend in dyadic social interactions (e.g., Pavot et al., 1990). Lengthy M&A 
negotiations provide more latitude for extraverted CEOs to increase the appeal for the newly 
combined firm. The second important property of interpersonal dynamics is the intensity, or the 
extent of involvement of individuals in dyadic interactions (e.g., Funder et al., 1995; Lippa & 
Dietz, 2000). Extraverted nature of CEOs is more likely to be activated if they are directly 
involved in M&A negotiations thereby strengthening the effect of CEO extraversion on 
relationship building. Finally, the nature of interactions – face-to-face vs. technology-mediated 
interactions – is a third central facet of interpersonal dynamics (e.g., Williams, 1977; Drolet & 
Morris, 2000). The influence of extraversion on social behavior becomes particularly salient in 
direct social relationships.  
Taken together, dynamic interactionism suggests that these personality effects of the 
acquiring and acquired CEOs depend on the interaction history that likely evolves during M&A 
negotiations. The more lengthy, rich and direct social contact between the more extraverted 
acquiring CEO and target CEO will increase their mutual pleasant affect (e.g., Pavot et al., 1990; 
Lucas & Diener, 2001). Moreover, it will allow them to more accurately judge each other’s 
personality, expectations and intentions, and thus behave in a way to ensure ground for the joint 
future (e.g., Funder et al., 1995; Lippa & Dietz, 2000). Interpersonal dynamics thus works to 
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increase the appeal for the newly combined firm for extraverted CEOs from the acquiring as well 
as the acquired firm. Accordingly, we propose the following two moderating hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 3: The (a) duration, (b) intensity and (c) nature of interpersonal interactions 
between the acquirer CEO and target CEO during M&A negotiations moderate the 
positive relationship between acquirer CEO extraversion and target CEO retention, such 
that the relationship is stronger for longer, more intense and more direct interactions. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The (a) duration, (b) intensity and (c) nature of interpersonal interactions 
between the acquirer CEO and target CEO during M&A negotiations moderate the 
negative relationship between target CEO extraversion and target CEO retention, such 
that the relationship is weaker for longer, more intense and more direct interactions. 
 
METHODS 
Sample and Data 
We obtained the base sample for this study from the Thomson Financial’s Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC) database. It comprises of all acquisition deals between the publicly listed US 
companies between 2002 and 2012. We excluded transactions labeled as divestitures, spin-offs, 
recaps, repurchases, minority stake purchases, self-tenders, acquisitions of remaining interests, 
self-tenders, exchange offers, leveraged buyouts and privatizations. We further excluded deals 
associated with real estate investment trusts, closed-end mutual funds, and offerings by firms in 
the financial services sector which may be driven simply by financial motives (e.g., Haspeslagh 
& Jemison, 1991) as well as deals with value of less than 10 million US dollars to ensure the 
strategic importance of deals (e.g., Haunschild, 1994) and the extensive CEO involvement in 
acquisition decision-making (e.g., Malmendier & Tate, 2008). The resulting sample contained 
959 acquisition deals. To make ensure that, by using these screen criteria, we did not 
systematically bias the sample in such a way that the study results would not be representative of 
a larger sample of deals, we conducted statistical tests on the differences between means of 
various transaction, acquirer and target characteristics.  
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 In this paper, we examined target CEO retention as the outcome of the acquisition 
negotiation process. The negotiation phase is the period from the first contact made between the 
acquirer and the target until the publicly announcement of the acquisition (e.g., Boone & 
Mulherin, 2007). To collect various data on acquisition negotiations (as described in detail in the 
variables section) we followed an emerging stream of finance research (e.g., Boone & Mulherin, 
2007; Fich, Cai, & Tran, 2011; Heitzman, 2011) and hand-collected data on negotiation process 
from the M&A-related filings available via the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Edgar database. Details regarding acquisition terms (i.e. target CEO 
retention decisions) and key features of negotiations (i.e. negotiations start and end date, CEO 
involvement in negotiations, etc.) are provided in the following documents: DEF14A or S-4 (for 
transaction-related information in mergers), and TO-T or 14D-9 (for transaction-related 
information in tender offers) filed in connection with the deal; the target’s DEF14 statement for 
the year prior to the deal; and the acquirers’ DEF14 statement and 10-K report for the year 
following the deal (e.g., Heitzman, 2011). We read these documents in detail and extracted 
various data on the acquisition negotiation process and outcomes. Due to the intensive nature of 
gathering the data, we did the coding for a random sample of 500 out of the 959 acquisitions 
from the initial sample. For 27 out of the 500 randomly sampled deals we could not identify 
corresponding M&A-related SEC filings.  
 To assess the acquirer and the target CEOs extraversion, as well as other personality 
dimensions that we controlled for, we obtained transcripts from Thomson Street Events of all 
recorded conference calls that covered quarterly earnings announcements in which CEOs 
participated between 2002 and 2012 (e.g., Malhotra et al., 2017). Specifically, we extracted the 
text spoken by CEOs during the Q&A section of analyst conference calls which is comprised of 
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CEO’s own words as opposed to the text from the presentation segment which tends to be 
scripted and prepared in advance and often also by others (e.g., Matsumoto, Pronk, & Roelofsen, 
2011). As described in detail below, this text is particularly suitable for determining CEOs’ 
extraversion because under complex and stressful conditions such as Q&A sessions people tend 
to reveal variations in extraversion more readily (e.g., Dewaele & Furnham, 1999). After 
recording CEO personality scores, we matched the data and obtained the final sample comprised 
of 371 acquisitions.  
 We complemented the sample with financial data on both acquirer and target firms from 
the Compustat database. Additionally, we obtained data on acquirer and target boards of 
directors and top management teams from 10-Ks and proxy statements in the Edgar database. 
We used the BoardEx and ExecuComp databases to obtain information on CEO demographic 
characteristics and information about the social ties between the acquirer and target CEOs.  
Variables and Measurement 
Dependent variable. We collected information pertaining to retention of target CEOs in the 
combined business from the M&A-related SEC filings submitted around each transaction (e.g., 
Qiu et al., 2014). The retention information, in most cases, can be obtained directly from the 
DEFM14A and S-4 filings’ sections titled “Interest of Certain Persons in the Merger”. For 
example, intentions on the retention of a target CEO are typically provided in the form of a 
statement such as: “… Helen McCluskey, currently the President and Chief Executive Officer of 
Warnaco, is expected to become a member of the PVH board” (DEF14A filing regarding the 
acquisition of the Warnaco Group by PVH Corp. in 2012). Further, we reviewed the 10-K 
reports and proxy statements filed by the acquirers after the deal completion to check if the target 
CEO appears as a member of the board of directors or top management. Additionally, we also 
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collected target CEOs full employment histories from the BoardEx database to identify potential 
cases where the target CEO was retained as a non-TMT executive. Each identified case of the 
target CEO retention was further verified using press releases regarding the acquisition 
announcements from Lexis-Nexis (e.g., Wulf & Singh, 2011). Our variable Target CEO 
retention equals 1 if the target CEO was retained as a director or a manager in the combined 
company in the year following the acquisition, and 0 otherwise. Alternative measures include 
retention across the two and three years following the acquisition. 
 Independent variables. To assess CEO personality, we followed Malhotra et al. (2017) in 
using “The Personality Recognizer” (Mairesse, Walker, Mehl, & Moore, 2007) – an algorithm 
that estimates personality scores along the Big Five personality dimensions (e.g., Barrick & 
Mount, 1991) from the spoken text. Specifically, we used CEO’s quarterly earnings conference 
calls with financial analysis to extract text spoken by a CEO. Because the presentation segment 
of these calls tends to be prepared in advance, we used the Q&A segment of the calls which is 
more spontaneous and therefore more suitable for the assessment of the CEO personality traits 
(e.g., Matsumoto et al., 2011). Moreover, earnings conference calls are held quarterly over 
multiple years, thus allowing us to determine long-term stable personality traits of CEOs (e.g., 
Li, 2010). To ensure reliable personality scores, we included only those CEOs for whom we had 
at least 500 spoken words. Based on this procedure, we obtained scores of CEO extraversion 
(along with the other four personality traits from the Big Five which we include as control 
variables) and created our two independent variables Acquirer CEO extraversion and Target 
CEO extraversion. This extraversion measure has been thoroughly validated in multiple ways in 
prior research (e.g., Mairesse et al., 2007; Malhotra et al., 2017) 
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Moderating variables. Our first moderating variable is Negotiations length measured as 
the number of months between the date of deal initiation and the date of public announcement, 
both collected from the M&A-related SEC filings (e.g., Boone & Mulherin, 2007; Fich et al., 
2011). Further, to determine acquirer CEO and target CEO involvement in acquisition 
negotiations, we closely followed the coding procedure by Heitzman (2011). We accordingly 
used disclosures on the background of the transaction presented in the M&A-related SEC filings 
to determine CEO’s involvement in negotiations “based on whether the board authorizes the 
CEO to negotiate and the extent to which the CEO participates in actual negotiations over price 
and other important terms” (Heitzman, 2011: 257). We first determined the involvement in 
negotiations for the acquirer CEO and target CEO individually, and then constructed our second 
moderator CEO involvement as a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if both the acquirer 
CEO and the target CEO got involved in acquisition negotiations and 0 otherwise. From the 
narrative description of acquisition background, we additionally recoded each instance in which 
the two CEOs interacted either face-to-face or online (i.e. via phone call, teleconference, etc.) 
and counted the total number of meetings in which they participated during acquisition 
negotiations. Then, similar to Kirkman, Rosen, Tesluk, and Gibson (2004), we constructed our 
third moderator CEOs face-to-face meetings - a ratio with the number of face-to-face meeting as 
the numerator and the total number of meetings as the denominator. 
Control variables. Extraversion tends to be correlated with the other Big Five personality 
traits (e.g., Olson, 2005) and we thus controlled for Emotional stability, Agreeableness, 
Conscientiousness, and Openness of both the acquirer CEO and target CEO. Additionally, job-
related and demographic characteristics of the target CEO may affect post-acquisition retention 
decisions (e.g., Buchholtz et al., 2003; Wulf & Singh, 2011). We therefore controlled for Target 
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CEO ownership measured as the proportion of the target firm issued stocks owned by the CEO, 
Target CEO tenure measured as the number of years between the date of CEO appointment in 
the target firm and the date of acquisition announcement, and Target CEO age measured in 
years. Because target CEO retention decisions might be biased by the presence to the social ties 
between the acquirer CEO and the target CEO (e.g., Ishii & Xuan, 2014), we included a control 
Acquirer CEO–target CEO tie which is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the 
backgrounds of the two CEOs revealed time overlaps in their educational or employment 
histories and 0 otherwise.  
 We controlled for various firm-level characteristics. Specifically, we included Relative 
target size measured as the ratio of the target ﬁrm assets to that of the sum of assets for the 
acquirer and target ﬁrm and Target firm performance measured as the industry-adjusted return 
on assets, both in the year prior to the acquisition (e.g., Wulf & Singh, 2011). There is also 
evidence pointing to the role of ownership on executive retention decisions (e.g., Chang et al., 
2013). To control for this effect, we incorporated a variable Target managerial ownership 
measured as the proportion of target shares owned by the management (excluding the CEO). To 
control for the potential effect of pre-acquisition governance of the acquirer and the target on the 
post-acquisition governance structure (e.g., Harford, 2003) we add two control variables Target 
board size and Acquirer board size, both measured as the number of directors in the board in the 
year prior to the acquisition. 
 We also included a set of control variables related to the acquisition deal. When acquirer 
and target operate in the same industry, target CEOs’ industry-related skills and knowledge 
might be valued by the acquirer. To control for potentially higher CEO retention rates in within-
industry deals (e.g., Walsh, 1989) we create a binary variable Industry relatedness which equals 
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to 1 if the acquirer and target firms conduct their primary business activity in the same four-digit 
SIC industry and 0 otherwise. Because target CEOs might trade shareholders’ benefits for the 
sake of their personal benefits from the deal (e.g., Wulf, 2004) we control for Premium measured 
by the purchase price per target share paid by the acquiring firm less the target’s pre-acquisition 
stock price, divided by the target’s pre-acquisition stock price (e.g., Laamanen, 2007). Finally, 
we include a set of binary indicators for Cash deal (e.g., Ghosh & Ruland, 1998) which equals to 
1 if the acquisition payment is fully made in cash, Tender offer (e.g., Wulf & Singh, 2011) which 
equals 1 for tender offers, and Hostile deal (e.g., Chang et al., 2013) which equals 1 for non-
friendly deals, and 0 otherwise. To control for temporal trends in the environment, we included 
Year dummies in all our models. 
Statistical Methods 
Because of the dichotomous nature of our dependent variable, we used logistic regressions to test 
our hypotheses. Our final sample consisted of 371 acquisitions made by 234 acquirers suggesting 
that some acquirers negotiated multiple transactions over the sample period. We therefore 
accounted for the dependence between observations by clustering the acquirers and producing 
robust clustered standard errors. Variance inflation factors (VIF) were considerably lower 
(maximum VIF value across the models equals 2.77) than the critical value, thus ruling out 
potential multicollinearity issues in our analyses. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the variables used in the 
analyses of the post-acquisition target CEO retention. The proportion of target CEOs that remain 
in the combined entity in 0.29, which is comparable to retention rates in prior research on post-
acquisition executive turnover (e.g., Buchholtz et al., 2003), but substantially higher in 
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comparison to general turnover rates in firms without a change in ownership (e.g., Martin & 
McConnell, 1991). Univariate statistics provide support for our hypothesis that the proportion of 
retained target CEOs depends on the acquirer CEO and target CEO extraversion. The proportion 
of retained target CEOs for transactions made by acquirers led by extraverted CEOs (those 
whose extraversion scores are above the median) is 0.33 versus a proportion of 0.24 for 
acquisitions made by firms led by less extraverted CEOs (those whose extraversion scores are 
below the median) (p < 0.05). On the contrary, the proportion of retained target CEOs whose 
extraversion score is above the median is 0.26 versus a proportion of 0.32 for other target CEOs 
(p < 0.10). These statistics suggest that extraverted acquirer CEOs tend to retain target CEOs, 
while extraverted target CEOs tend to leave the company following acquisitions. Descriptive 
statistics on acquisition negotiations indicate that, on average, the private negotiations phase lasts 
for about 7 months. On average, both acquirer CEO and target CEO get involved in deal 
negotiations in about 61% of transactions and about a third of their mutual interactions occur 
face-to-face. With respect to correlations, Table 1 shows that acquirer CEO as well as target 
CEO extraversion positively and significantly correlates with conscientiousness, which is in line 
with previous personality research (e.g., John & Srivastava, 1999; Judge, Higgins, Thoresen, & 
Barrick, 1999). Other correlations are generally low.  
---------- Insert Table 1 about here ---------- 
 Table 2 reports the estimates of logistic regression models for the target CEO retention 
analyses. In general, the coefficients of control variables in the model are in line with prior 
research on post-acquisition target CEO retention (e.g., Wulf & Singh, 2011). In full support of 
Hypothesis 1, Model 4 reveals that acquirer CEO extraversion is positively associated with target 
CEO retention following acquisition of the target firm (β = 0.46, p < 0.05). Furthermore, the 
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average marginal effect (AME) of acquirer CEO extraversion on the likelihood of target CEO 
retention is 0.08 with a standard error of 0.03 (p < 0.05), suggesting that, in term of economic 
significance, the likelihood of target CEO retention increases by 8% with each point increase in 
the acquirer CEO’s extraversion score. Similarly, in fully keeping with Hypothesis 2, we found a 
negative association between the target CEO extraversion and target CEO retention (β = -0.59, p 
< 0.01) in Model 4. The corresponding AME of target CEO extraversion on the likelihood of 
target CEO retention equals -0.10 with a standard error of 0.03 (p < 0.01). In terms of economic 
significance this means that the likelihood of the target CEO retention decreases by 10% with 
each point increase in the target CEO’s extraversion score. 
---------- Insert Table 2 about here ---------- 
 Table 3 reports the estimates of logistic regression models for the interaction effects. 
Model 1 reveals that the interaction coefficient between acquirer CEO extraversion and 
negotiations length is positive and insignificant (β = 0.02, n.s.). Similarly, AME corresponding to 
this interaction equals 0.01 with a standard error of 0.02 (n.s.), yielding the same interpretation. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 3a is not supported. In Model 2, the interaction coefficient is positive and 
significant (β = 0.69, p < 0.05), indicating that the positive effect of acquirer CEO extraversion 
on target CEO retention is stronger (i.e. more positive) when the acquisition negotiations last 
longer. In line with this result, the corresponding AME equals 0.20 with a standard error of 0.06 
(p < 0.05), thus providing full support for Hypothesis 3b. Models 5 reveals results for the 
moderating effect of face-to-face meetings between acquirer and target CEOs during M&A 
negotiations. The interaction coefficient between acquirer CEO extraversion and CEOs face-to-
face meetings is positive and significant (β = 0.92, p < 0.10) with the AME of 0.16 and its 
corresponding standard error of 0.09 (p < 0.10), indicating that the effect of acquirer CEO 
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extraversion on target CEO retention is moderately stronger when CEOs interact face-to-face 
more intensively. We therefore find marginal support for Hypothesis 3c. 
---------- Insert Table 3 about here ---------- 
 We tested the moderating effect of negotiations length on the relationship between target 
CEO extraversion and target CEO retention in Model 4. The interaction coefficient between 
acquirer CEO extraversion and M&A negotiations length is positive and marginally significant 
(β = 0.03, p < 0.10) with the AME of 0.06 and the corresponding standard error of 0.04 (p < 
0.10). The results suggest that the effect of target CEO extraversion on target CEO retention is 
moderately stronger for lengthy negotiations, thus furnishing partial support to Hypothesis 4a. In 
Model 5, the interaction coefficient between target CEO extraversion and CEOs involvement in 
deal negotiations is also positive and significant (β = 0.61, p < 0.05). Additionally, the AME 
equals 0.11 with a standard error of 0.05 (p < 0.05), indicating that the negative effect of target 
CEO extraversion on target CEO retention is weaker when both CEOs participate in acquisition 
negotiations. Hypothesis 4b is therefore fully supported. Finally, as indicated by the positive and 
significant interaction coefficient in Model 6 (β = 1.10, p < 0.01) as well as AME and its 
corresponding standard error of 0.19 and 0.07 (p < 0.01), the effect of target CEO extraversion 
on target CEO retention is weakened when most of the interactions between the two CEOs 
during M&A negotiations are face-to-face. Hypothesis 4c is thus fully supported. Our models 
reveal overall fit statistics (Pseudo R2s) ranging between 0.19 and 0.29. 
---------- Insert Figures 1-5 about here ---------- 
 We further examine the interaction effects by plotting them graphically in Figures 1-5 
(e.g., Hoetker, 2007). In line with Hypotheses 3b and 3c, Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate that the 
positive effect of acquirer CEO extraversion on target CEO retention is stronger for longer 
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negotiations and negotiations in which the two CEOs are directly involved. Similarly, Figures 3-
5 illustrate that the negative effect of target CEO extraversion on target CEO retention becomes 
weaker (less negative) when the negotiations last longer, when both CEOs are actively involved 
in negotiations, and when the majority of their mutual interactions happens face-to-face as 
opposed to via telephone or conference calls. Overall, these results provide strong support for the 
effect of personality and dynamic interpersonal interactions during M&A negotiations on target 
CEO retention in the combined company. 
DISCUSSION 
 The extant literature provides evidence that executive turnover following M&A is 
affected by a range of contextual factors. We add to this body of research by examining how 
individual factors, specifically personality traits of executives involved in M&A deal making 
affect post-M&A executive turnover. Building on the social-psychological research on 
personality and dynamic interactionism perspective from personnel psychology, we explored 
whether a core personality trait of executives – extraversion – influences turnover of the target 
firm CEO from the combined company. We proposed and found that, compared to less 
extraverted acquiring CEOs, more extraverted acquiring CEOs likely have greater appeal to their 
recently acquired counterparts, increasing the likelihood that the latter stays with the newly 
combined firm. In contrast, compared to less extraverted target CEOs, we found that more 
extraverted target CEOs are more likely to they leave the newly combined firm. In addition, our 
results further revealed that the effect of acquirer CEO extraversion as well as that of target CEO 
extraversion on the target CEO turnover following M&A is contingent on the duration, intensity 
and nature of interpersonal interactions between the acquirer CEO and the target CEO during 
M&A negotiations. Hence, our findings demonstrate that executive personality is an important, 
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yet overlook, antecedent to executive turnover in the M&A context. In addition, our results 
demonstrate that social context created by the two CEOs affects personality trait activation thus 
moderating the direct effect of personality on executive turnover decisions. We now turn to the 
theoretical implications of our findings. 
Theoretical Implications 
 Our study makes several contributions to different streams of research. We advance 
research on executive turnover by developing social-psychological perspective on CEO turnover 
following M&A. Prior finance and management research (e.g., Jensen, 1988; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996) predominantly emphasized various contextual factors that influence CEO 
turnover in the acquired company, including firm performance (e.g., Walsh & Ellwood, 1991), 
financial incentives (e.g., Wulf, 2004), firm-specific human capital (e.g., Wulf & Singh, 2011), 
relative standing (e.g., Hambrick & Cannella, 1993), and social ties (e.g., Ishii & Xuan, 2014). 
Our study therefore complements prior research on executive turnover in management and 
finance with arguments and findings that executive personality and dyadic interactions between 
the executives of the acquiring and target firms during M&A negotiations can affect target CEO 
retention following deal completion. By focusing on the personality and interpersonal dynamics, 
we also respond to calls for more empirical research that goes beyond solely studying contextual 
causes of executive turnover (e.g., Zimmerman, 2008) towards research considering the interplay 
between individual and contextual factors in executive turnover decisions (e.g., Buchholtz et al., 
2003).  
 Our study also contributes to the recent social-psychological research on 
executive turnover in two ways. We extend dynamic interactionism perspective to the research 
on executive turnover. Dynamic interactionism is a dominant paradigm in social psychology to 
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argue that behavior is an outcome of the interactions between a person and the social context 
they encounter (e.g., Endler & Parker, 1992; Reynolds et al., 2010). In dyadic relationships, the 
personality of the other person is an important part of the social context (e.g., Baldwin, 1992). 
Therefore, dynamic interactionism suggests that the outcome of the dyadic relationships is a 
function of the personalities of both participants and their social interaction history (e.g., 
Baldwin, 1992; Asendorpf & Wilpers, 1998). We propose and demonstrate that this framework 
has high explanatory power in the context of executive turnover – personality and interpersonal 
dynamics are important drivers of executive turnover decisions. More specifically, our findings 
suggest that a complete understanding of target CEO retention following M&A from a social-
psychological perspective must account for the personalities of both CEOs involved in the deal 
along with their interaction history early on during the M&A negotiations. More broadly, we add 
to a nascent stream of research that has drawn from socio-psychological and personality theories 
to understand consequential strategic decisions such as M&A (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 
2007; Zhu, 2013; Malhotra et al., 2017). By building on and extending social psychological 
theory and research we can explain why CEOs of the acquired companies would stay with or 
leave the newly combined firm. 
 Lastly, our study provides contributions to several lines of M&A research. To begin with, 
target CEO retention might be a critical success factor in M&A. We complement research on the 
target CEO retention (e.g., Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; Wulf & Singh, 2011) by revealing a 
new set of antecedents to this corporate outcome. Further, we add to a growing stream of 
research that has taken the two-sided perspective on M&A (e.g., Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004; 
Ishii & Xuan, 2014; Cuypers, Cuypers, & Martin, 2017), which contrary to the most of single-
sided research which either takes the acquirer (e.g., Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & 
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Davison, 2009) or the target (e.g., Reuer, Tong, & Wu, 2012) perspective, simultaneously 
accounts for characteristics of both acquirers and targets in explaining M&A behavior and 
performance. Relatedly, we also expand research on M&A negotiations, which is the least 
studied phase of the overall M&A process (e.g., Parola & Ellis, 2014). While for example 
various facets of M&A integration processes have been empirically examined (e.g., Graebner, 
Heimeriks, Huy, & Vaara, 2016), work on M&A negotiations remains largely conceptual (e.g., 
Trautwein, 1990). In this study, we began to fill that gap. 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 Several limitations of this study are worth pointing out as they might present fruitful 
avenues for future research. First, in this study we focus on the effect of personality and 
interpersonal dynamics in a specific turnover situation - the retention of a target CEO in the 
acquired company. It would be important to investigate the generalizability of our findings in 
other turnover situations. Another limitation of this study is that we focus on M&A deals 
between large publicly-listed US companies. Future research should thus investigate the 
implications of personality and interpersonal dynamics in M&A deals of smaller size and value, 
in which the target CEO retention might not be as critical for the success of a deal. Similarly, it 
would be important to examine the implications of personality for executive turnover in other 
cultural context as it is well known that personality reflects differently across cultures (e.g., 
Hofstede & McCrae, 2004) and might thus has distinct effects in cross-cultural negotiations (e.g., 
David, Francis, & Walls, 1994). 
 Our methods also have several limitations. First, the linguistic programs and algorithm 
that we use to capture CEO extraversion are designed to assess the personality traits of a general 
population (e.g., Mairesse et al., 2007). As such, they should be further improved to fit the 
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population of executive officers. Second, we focus on the personality characteristics of CEOs 
only. However, when making decisions, CEOs typically rely on other managers as well as 
directors that sit on the board. Future research could therefore investigate the effect of 
personality traits of other decision makers for major strategic decisions such as executive 
turnover, mergers and acquisitions, reorganizations or strategic alliances and joint ventures. 
Finally, while we use novel data on patterns of social interactions between acquiring CEOs and 
target CEOs during M&A negotiations, we do not observe the verbal content of these 
interactions. In the future, novel insights about the role of interpersonal dynamics on M&A 
outcomes could be obtained by collecting transcript of conversations between the CEOs over the 
course of M&A deal-making. 
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Table 1. Sample Descriptive Statistics and Correlationsa 
 
 Variable Mean S.D. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 
1. Target CEO retention 0.29 0.45              
2. Acquirer CEO extraversion 6.74 0.82 0.10             
3. Target CEO extraversion 6.15 1.08 -0.12 0.07            
4. Negotiations length 7.22 5.96 0.11 0.02 0.01           
5. CEOs involvement 0.61 0.49 0.12 -0.10 0.04 0.12          
6. CEOs face-to-face meetings 0.35 0.37 0.05 -0.05 0.03 0.17 0.46         
7. Acquirer CEO stability 3.03 0.63 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.08        
8. Acquirer CEO agreeableness 3.28 0.42 0.03 -0.19 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.02       
9. Acquirer CEO conscientiousness 6.41 0.74 0.04 0.32 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.06 -0.29 0.47      
10. Acquirer CEO openness 6.08 0.75 0.00 0.18 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.09 -0.44 0.36 0.45     
11. Target CEO stability 2.75 0.69 0.01 0.00 0.18 -0.04 0.09 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01    
12. Target CEO agreeableness 3.35 0.50 0.05 -0.08 -0.29 0.07 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.06   
13. Target CEO conscientiousness 6.38 0.79 -0.05 0.01 0.23 0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 0.03 0.06 -0.02 -0.27 0.44  
14. Target CEO openness 6.25 0.84 -0.05 0.06 0.06 0.02 -0.10 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.42 0.33  0.74 
15. Target CEO ownership 4.09 7.59 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.05 
16. Target CEO tenure 8.05 6.20 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.07 -0.02 0.00 -0.01  0.07 
17. Target CEO age 61.52 7.27 0.01 -0.07 -0.07 0.04 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.13 0.00 -0.01 
18. Acquire CEO – target CEO tie 0.13 0.33 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 0.07 0.09 0.07 -0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.07 
19. Relative target size 0.12 0.15 0.10 0.02 0.21 -0.17 0.14 0.02 -0.11 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.15 -0.06 0.05 
20. Target firm performance 0.06 0.45 0.07 0.12 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.07 -0.05 0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.06 
21. Target board size 7.84 1.93 0.01 0.13 0.10 -0.15 0.01 -0.08 -0.09 -0.12 0.07 0.07 0.11 -0.07 -0.03 
22. Target managerial ownership 14.97 16.94 -0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.19 -0.01 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.02 -0.07 0.00 0.02 
23. Acquirer board size 10.16 2.39 0.10 0.06 -0.05 -0.11 -0.17 -0.18 -0.10 -0.16 -0.03 -0.06 0.01 -0.03 -0.08 
24. Industry relatedness 0.11 0.30 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.10 -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.05 
25. Acquisition premium 0.40 0.37 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.03 
26. Cash deal 0.73 0.44 -0.17 0.09 -0.05 -0.10 -0.25 -0.17 0.02 -0.11 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 
27. Tender offer 0.28 0.45 -0.11 -0.01 -0.13 -0.04 -0.13 -0.10 -0.05 -0.04 0.06 0.03 -0.07 0.06 0.10 
28. Hostile deal 0.11 0.34 -0.04 0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.11 -0.14 -0.07 -0.03 0.06 0.02 -0.00 0.08 0.12 
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 Variable 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 
15. Target CEO ownership -0.05              
16. Target CEO tenure 0.01 0.33             
17. Target CEO age -0.03 0.10 0.23            
18. Acquire CEO – target CEO tie -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.07           
19. Relative target size -0.04 -0.18 -0.06 -0.05 0.05          
20. Target firm performance 0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.33         
21. Target board size -0.03 -0.22 -0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.35 0.08        
22. Target managerial ownership 0.06 0.39 0.15 0.00 -0.04 -0.22 -0.05 -0.19       
23. Acquirer board size -0.02 -0.08 -0.03 -0.05 0.12 0.19 0.10 0.29 -0.09      
24. Industry relatedness 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.13 -0.07 0.07     
25. Acquisition premium 0.05 0.04 -0.03 -0.08 0.02 -0.11 -0.05 -0.06 0.15 0.05 -0.02    
26. Cash deal -0.07 -0.07 0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.15 -0.04 -0.07 0.02 0.03 -0.09 0.08   
27. Tender offer 0.06 -0.07 0.01 -0.10 0.04 -0.13 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.15 0.29  
28. Hostile deal 0.02 -0.02 0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.08 0.02 -0.15 0.15 0.42 
                
 
aN = 371. Correlation coefficients with a magnitude larger than 0.1 are significant at p < 0.05.
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         Table 2. Effect of Acquirer CEO Extraversion and Target CEO Extraversion on Target CEO Retentiona 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
H1: Acquirer CEO extraversion  0.428**  0.460** 
  (0.208)  (0.212) 
H2: Target CEO extraversion   -0.585*** -0.594*** 
   (0.182) (0.181) 
Negotiations length 0.043* 0.044** 0.049** 0.051** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) 
CEOs involvement 0.766* 0.866** 0.793* 0.893** 
 (0.427) (0.425) (0.442) (0.441) 
CEOs face-to-face meetings -0.563 -0.706 -0.552 -0.696 
 (0.579) (0.599) (0.611) (0.613) 
Target CEO ownership -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 -0.010 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) 
Target CEO tenure 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.019 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
Target CEO age -0.010 -0.008 -0.017 -0.014 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Acquirer CEO – target CEO tie 0.135 0.187 0.187 0.238 
 (0.396) (0.396) (0.400) (0.397) 
Relative target size 0.641 0.861 1.195* 1.261* 
 (0.655) (0.672) (0.680) (0.687) 
Target firm performance 0.319 0.211 0.404 0.311 
 (0.430) (0.418) (0.456) (0.465) 
Target board size -0.082 -0.094 -0.076 -0.091 
 (0.083) (0.082) (0.086) (0.085) 
Target managerial ownership -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Acquirer board size 0.139** 0.141** 0.147** 0.149** 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.066) (0.066) 
Industry relatedness 0.090 0.084 0.121 0.089 
 (0.442) (0.444) (0.435) (0.432) 
Acquisition premium -0.250 -0.351 -0.457 -0.409 
 (0.421) (0.452) (0.443) (0.447) 
Cash deal -0.567* -0.568* -0.514* -0.553* 
 (0.339) (0.343) (0.310) (0.307) 
Tender offer -0.431 -0.302 -0.531 -0.437 
 (0.447) (0.448) (0.464) (0.471) 
Hostile deal 0.278 0.169 0.173 0.101 
 (0.587) (0.576) (0.607) (0.611) 
Intercept -0.731 -2.580 -1.111 -0.895 
 (2.988) (3.264) (3.134) (3.370) 
Pseudo R2 0.192 0.212 0.239 0.256 
              a N = 371. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Two-tailed tests for all variables. To ease  
         interpretation of the table, we did not list all control variables here. Additional controls included 
         in the models were acquirer CEO / target CEO stability, agreeableness, conscientiousness and 
         openness, as well as year fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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        Table 3. Moderating Effects of Negotiations Length, CEOs Involvement, and CEOs Face-to-Face Meetingsa 
Variable Model 1   Model 2   Model 3    Model 4     Model 5     Model 6 
       
Acquirer CEO extraversion 0.482** 0.386* 0.523* 0.447** 0.454** 0.444** 
 (0.220) (0.231) (0.275) (0.212) (0.216) (0.214) 
Target CEO extraversion -0.595*** -0.611*** -0.622*** -0.827*** -0.998*** -1.030*** 
 (0.180) (0.180) (0.177) (0.240) (0.268) (0.231) 
H3a: Acquirer CEO extraversion x 0.021      
        Negotiations length (0.024)      
H3b: Acquirer CEO extraversion x  0.691**     
         CEOs involvement  (0.339)     
H3c: Acquirer CEO extraversion x   0.924*    
        CEOs face-to-face meetings   (0.556)    
H4a: Target CEO extraversion x    0.037*   
         Negotiations length    (0.021)   
H4b: Acquirer CEO extraversion x     0.617**  
         CEOs involvement     (0.287)  
H4c: Target CEO extraversion x      1.101*** 
         CEOs face-to-face meetings      (0.353) 
Negotiations length 0.027 0.049** 0.052** 0.025 0.055** 0.060** 
 (0.027) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 
CEOs involvement  0.889** 0.484* 0.938** 0.882** 0.282 1.050** 
 (0.443) (0.284) (0.443) (0.442) (0.177) (0.464) 
CEOs face-to-face meetings -0.689 -0.717 -0.707* -0.632 -0.703 -0.760*** 
 (0.615) (0.617) (0.395) (0.622) (0.606) (0.233) 
Target CEO ownership -0.010 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.011 -0.009 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
Target CEO tenure 0.018 0.019 0.014 0.022 0.019 0.019 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Target CEO age -0.015 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.009 -0.010 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
Acquirer CEO – target CEO tie 0.231 0.221 0.278 0.221 0.240 0.204 
 (0.397) (0.398) (0.401) (0.401) (0.395) (0.404) 
Relative target size 1.234* 1.203* 1.217* 1.223* 1.286* 1.241* 
 (0.699) (0.665) (0.663) (0.693) (0.662) (0.669) 
Target firm performance 0.318 0.371 0.346 0.343 0.262 0.344 
 (0.464) (0.389) (0.398) (0.470) (0.384) (0.412) 
Target board size -0.092 -0.088 -0.097 -0.088 -0.085 -0.090 
 (0.085) (0.084) (0.085) (0.086) (0.085) (0.086) 
Target managerial ownership -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.010 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Acquirer board size 0.147** 0.146** 0.144** 0.148** 0.137** 0.149** 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.066) (0.067) (0.068) (0.069) 
Industry relatedness 0.091 0.056 0.120 0.084 0.158 0.191 
 (0.435) (0.434) (0.433) (0.437) (0.437) (0.424) 
Acquisition premium -0.406 -0.466 -0.446 -0.433 -0.416 -0.348 
 (0.447) (0.455) (0.453) (0.482) (0.422) (0.436) 
Cash deal -0.554* -0.595* -0.560 -0.596* -0.598* -0.603 
 (0.332) (0.357) (0.369) (0.355) (0.362) (0.364) 
Tender offer -0.422 -0.443 -0.432 -0.460 -0.410 -0.453 
 (0.475) (0.474) (0.478) (0.478) (0.468) (0.481) 
Hostile deal 0.099 0.049 0.047 0.096 0.016 0.059 
 (0.614) (0.613) (0.608) (0.622) (0.636) (0.650) 
Intercept -0.353 -2.810 -1.243 -0.340 -1.184 -1.431 
 (3.770) (4.136) (3.634) (3.479) (3.482) (3.397) 
       
Pseudo R2 0.274 0.261 0.264 0.276 0.277 0.286 
           a N = 371. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Two-tailed tests for all variables. To ease interpretation of the table, we did not  
       list all control variables here. Additional controls included in the models were acquirer CEO / target CEO stability, agreeableness,        
       conscientiousness and openness, as well as year fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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Figure 1. Interaction Effect between 
Acquirer CEO Extraversion and CEO Involvement 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Interaction Effect between  
Acquirer CEO Extraversion and CEO Face-to-Face Meetings 
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Figure 3. Interaction Effect between  
Target CEO Extraversion and Negotiations Length 
 
            
 
 
Figure 4. Interaction Effect between  
Target CEO Extraversion and CEO Involvement 
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Figure 5. Interaction Effect between  
Target CEO Extraversion and CEO Face-to-Face Meetings 
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5. General Discussion and Conclusions 
In this dissertation, I integrated Simonian and social psychological perspectives on decision 
making with the strategy research on mergers and acquisition (M&A) to create unique insights 
into the impact of individual-level and group-level factors on M&A decision-making processes 
and outcomes. Specifically, I studied M&A negotiations phase to investigate how various 
characteristics of the M&A decision-making processes, and individuals and groups involved in 
these processes affect M&A negotiation outcomes. The findings from three dissertation essays 
provide strong support for the premise that social-psychological factors play important role in 
M&A processes and outcomes. These findings have important theoretical implications for 
several streams of literature including M&A, social psychology, corporate governance, and 
strategic decision-making. Furthermore, findings from this dissertation have numerous practical 
implications for managers, boards of directors, M&A advisors, and investors. In the remainder, I 
first summarize key insights from the dissertation, I then integrate and discuss theoretical and 
practical implications, and finally, I provide suggestions for future research for each relevant 
theoretical perspective. 
Key Dissertation Insights 
This dissertation was primarily inspired by the work of Simon (1947, 1976, 1978b, 1978a, 1979, 
1990) who noted that “behavior … is shaped by a scissors whose two blades are the structure of 
the task environment and the computation capabilities of the actor” (1990: 7). In an organization, 
according to Simonian notion of bounded rationality, behavior is an outcome of an organization 
aiming to address cognitive limitations of its individual members (Simon, 1947; Cyert & March, 
1963). In this dissertation, I specifically focused on M&A behavior of firms aiming to 
understand how the interplay between decision makers (either key individuals such as executive 
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managers or groups such boards of directors) and the organizational context affects M&A 
decisions and outcomes. On the one hand, prior research on firm decision making identified a 
number of limitations and cognitive simplifications in the context of M&A decision making of 
executives and directors (e.g., Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985; Haunschild, Davis-Blake, & 
Fichman, 1994; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Coff, 1999; Kim, Haleblian, & Finkelstein, 2011; 
Malhotra, Zhu, & Reus, 2015). On the other hand, results from this dissertation suggest potential 
remedies for these limitations. Specifically, the results imply that decision making processes can 
be designed in a way to overcome cognitive limitations of individual decision makers. For 
example, the results from Essay 1 indicate that fostering comprehensive acquisition procedures 
during due diligence and negotiations help counter managerial biases which, unless prevented, 
unfavorably affect acquisition premium decisions. Similarly, the results from Essay 2 suggest 
that promoting certain patterns of board interaction processes during decision making in M&A 
negotiations might lead to better value-creating decisions, and in turn, better acquisition 
performance. Taken together, these insights propose the need for a stronger reliance on 
procedural rationality as opposed to substantive rationality (Simon, 1976, 1978b) both in the 
study of actuality of business decision making and in its practice. 
 I specifically examined the effect of one dimension of the contextual blade from Simon’s 
scissors, namely social context, on decision making. From a Simonian perspective, 
organizational design should provide context which accounts for and counter cognitive 
limitations and biases of individuals involved in decision making. In this dissertation, “context” 
parallels to social situations surrounding managerial and board processes and I examine how 
those could be designed to allow for unbiased M&A decision making. To better understand the 
role of social context in M&A processes and outcomes, I drew from social-psychological theory 
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which explains how individual and group behavior is affected by social situations and 
interactions with others (e.g., Ross & Nisbett, 1991). Specifically, the advantage of introducing 
social psychological perspective lies in its focus on decision-making processes of individuals and 
groups as well as the contextual influences of social factors on decision making (e.g., Collins & 
Guetzkow, 1964; McGrath, 1964; Katz & Kahn, 1978). The findings from this dissertation 
suggest that social context can be shaped in a way to improve the effectiveness of strategic 
decisions. For instance, the results from Essay 2 suggest that more frequent and timely social 
interactions between directors during M&A decision making improve the effectiveness of M&A 
decisions as well as the subsequent acquisition performance. Similarly, the results from Essay 3 
indicate that the nature of social interactions between executives during M&A negotiations might 
significantly shape deal outcomes. In all, the cutting power of Simon’s rationality scissors stands 
as a theoretical lens for studying organizations as social systems primarily designed to overcome 
cognitive constraints of their decision makers. Joining Simonian perspective with the social-
psychological perspective provides much fertile ground for researchers to breed in their efforts to 
understand drivers of effective organizational decision making. 
Implications for M&A Literature 
This dissertation provides theoretical contributions to several lines of the M&A research. First, in 
Essay 1 and Essay 2, I provide contributions by addressing several critical gaps in the process 
theory of M&A (e.g., Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985; Jemison & Sitkin, 1986b, 1986a; Haspeslagh 
& Jemison, 1991; Pablo, Sitkin, & Jemison, 1996). In Essay 1, I draw from the procedural 
rationality theory (e.g., Simon, 1976; Fredrickson, 1983, 1984; Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984; 
Fredrickson & Iaquinto, 1989; Dean & Sharfman, 1993b) to suggest that process 
comprehensiveness is an important antecedent of M&A outcomes. Specifically, the findings 
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from Essay 1 suggest that comprehensiveness of M&A decision making processes has 
substantial influence on the magnitude of acquisition premiums paid by the acquirer. To the best 
of my knowledge, this is among the first large-scale quantitative studies to empirically test the 
relationship between early M&A processes and outcomes. In Essay 2, I drew from the social-
psychological literature on groups and group dynamics (e.g., Collins & Guetzkow, 1964; Steiner, 
1972; Hackman & Morris, 1975; Gladstein, 1984; McGrath, 1984; Gersick, 1988; Waller, 1999) 
to investigate how group processes of boards affect M&A processes and outcomes for the firm 
targeted for an acquisition. The findings from Essay 2 suggest that the frequency and timeliness 
of target board meetings during M&A negotiations impact underlying M&A processes and 
subsequent target returns from the deal. I thereby close a critical gap in our understanding of how 
and when boards of directors get involved in the M&A process and how they affect deal 
outcomes. These insights also open several directions for future extensions of this line of 
research. For example, to extend the findings from Essay 1, future research could pursue the 
examination of the benefits of procedural rationality in M&A processes of target firms. 
Similarly, future research could examine how group processes of boards affect M&A processes 
and outcomes for acquiring firms. Overall, process perspective appears to be a promising 
theoretical lens for the advancement of M&A research. 
 Second, across the three essays I examine various facets of the M&A negotiations phase, 
which has been substantially less explored compared to other phases of the overall M&A process 
(e.g., Walsh, 1989; Parola & Ellis, 2014). A limited prior research on M&A negotiation 
processes in the domain of strategy has been primarily conceptual (e.g., Pablo et al., 1996) or 
qualitative (e.g., Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004), whilst the corresponding research in the domain 
of finance (e.g., Aktas, De Bodt, & Roll, 2010; Fich, Cai, & Tran, 2011; Heitzman, 2011) has 
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been primarily phenomenon driven and focused on the economic M&A outcomes. By combining 
a social-psychological perspective, a large-scale quantitative empirical approach, and a novel 
fine-grained dataset capturing features of the M&A process, I advance our understanding of 
M&A negotiations; I offer robust findings on how characteristics of processes, individuals and 
groups affect M&A decisions and their effectiveness. As in this dissertation I exploit novel data 
on the structural characteristics of M&A negotiations, it would be important in future research to 
overcome some of the limitations in this data as well as to provide complementary insights by 
collecting the first-hand data on the actual content of M&A negotiations.  
 Third, this study contributes to the research that examined M&A from the perspective of 
the target firm (e.g., Heitzman, 2011; Reuer, Tong, & Wu, 2012). The results presented in Essay 
2 suggest that features of the M&A negotiations process and the resulting outcomes largely 
depend upon the actions that the board of the target firm undertakes during negotiations. I further 
extend this line of reasoning in Essay 3 where I examine M&A negotiation process from the two-
sided - acquirer-target perspective (e.g., Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004). In particular, I argue and 
empirically show that the characteristics of both acquirer CEOs and target CEOs matter for 
outcomes of M&A negotiations. Taken together, the findings from these two essays suggest that 
the research on M&A needs to go beyond examining the M&A process and outcomes solely 
from the perspective of the acquiring firm, as it is the case with the majority of prior research 
(e.g., Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009), 
to also account for the characteristics of the target firm. Moreover, I propose and demonstrate 
how applying the two-sided perspective on M&A leads to novel insights regarding the drivers 
behind the M&A processes and outcomes. Combined with the recent research taking the two-
sided perspective on M&A (e.g., Cuypers, Cuypers, & Martin, 2017), this dissertation advocates 
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the importance of accounting for the characteristics of both acquirers and targets when 
examining M&A behavior and performance.  
 Fourth, this study contributes to the research on acquisition premium and acquisition 
performance (e.g., Laamanen, 2007; Haleblian et al., 2009). Findings from Essay 1 and Essay 2 
suggest that M&A process is an important antecedent of acquisition premium decisions. This 
study thus complements prior research which primarily argued for the deal-, firm-, and 
individual-level antecedents to acquisition premiums. What is more, this dissertation provides 
empirical evidence that properties of the M&A processes are under the influence of both 
acquirers and targets, and that the emerging negotiation process between the two parties involved 
ultimately influences acquisition premiums (e.g., Jemison & Sitkin, 1986b). More broadly, these 
results imply that overall acquisition performance as well as the distribution of value between the 
acquirer and target are influenced by the features of the acquisition negotiation process (e.g., 
Seth, 1990). Future research should continue to establish the link between M&A negotiations 
and short-term performance, as well as the link between M&A negotiations and integration, and 
in turn the subsequent long-term performance. 
 Finally, the findings from this dissertation have implications for the research on executive 
turnover following M&A completion (e.g., Walsh, 1988, 1989; Walsh & Ellwood, 1991). 
Specifically, in Essay 3 I address a large gap in our understanding of how personality traits of 
executives and interpersonal dynamics between acquirer firm and target firm executives during 
M&A negotiations impact target executive turnover. I thereby complement prior research on 
post-M&A target executive retention that emphasized a wide range of contextual factors such as 
firm performance, incentives, firm-specific knowledge, relative standing, and social 
embeddedness (e.g., Hambrick & Cannella, 1993; Buchholtz, Ribbens, & Houle, 2003; Wulf & 
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Singh, 2011; Ishii & Xuan, 2014). Relatedly, the results from this study add to a growing body of 
research that examines the relationship between executive personality and M&A or corporate 
strategy (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Aktas, de Bodt, Bollaert, & Roll, 2016; Malhotra, 
Reus, Zhu, & Roelofsen, 2017) as well as the relationship between corporate strategy and 
employee turnover (e.g., Younge, Tong, & Fleming, 2015).   
Implications for Social-Psychological Literature 
This dissertation offers several advancements to the research and literature in the domain of 
social psychology. In Essay 2, I synthesized social-psychological research on groups and group 
dynamics and extended it in the context of boards of directors. To begin with, the review of 
research on group interaction processes (e.g., Hackman & Morris, 1975; Hackman, Brousseau, & 
Weiss, 1976; McGrath, 1984; McGrath, 1991; Stachowski, Kaplan, & Waller, 2009) revealed 
two important properties of group interactions, namely frequency and timeliness. I then 
empirically examined the effect of group meeting frequency and timeliness in a unique 
organizational context of boards in firms targeted for an acquisition. The results from Essay 2 
suggest that target board meeting frequency and timeliness during M&A negotiations improve 
the effectiveness of the target firm M&A decisions. I thereby also complement a stream of 
research that uses social-psychological lens to examine various corporate strategy phenomena 
(e.g.,Westphal & Bednar, 2005; Zhu, 2013). This work opens several avenues for further 
theoretical advancements. Future research could examine the role of board interaction processes 
for the acquiring firms, investigate the role of informal interactions between members of the 
board outside the boardroom for strategic decision making, or study the effectiveness of boards 
in other major strategic decisions such as alliances and joint ventures, executive successions, or 
restructuring. 
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 Relatedly, in Essay 3, I extended social-psychological literature on personality and 
interpersonal dynamics (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1991; Judge, Higgins, Thoresen, & Barrick, 
1999) to the research on M&A. The results suggest that personality of both acquirer CEO and 
target CEO affect post-M&A turnover decisions. Specifically, the acquirer CEO extraversion 
was found to increase, and the target CEO extraversion was found to decrease the probability of 
target CEO retention following M&A. Moreover, various facets of interpersonal dynamics 
during M&A negotiations moderated the effect of personality on post-M&A turnover decisions. 
Taken together, the findings from this essay indicate that personality and interpersonal dynamics 
have power in predicting important M&A-related decisions. Finally, because post-M&A 
executive turnover is a special case of employee turnover, this study also has implications for the 
general research on employee turnover (e.g., Cotton & Tuttle, 1986; Griffeth, Hom, & Gaertner, 
2000) and more specifically, for the research on the role of personality and interpersonal 
dynamics in employee turnover (e.g., Mowday & Spencer, 1981; Bauer, Erdogan, Liden, & 
Wayne, 2006; Zimmerman, 2008). There are many additional opportunities for the theory 
development and theory testing in these domains. Future research could examine the role of CEO 
personality during other major corporate events such as, for instance, CEO succession. Relatedly, 
future research could examine implications of personality of other key individuals such as 
directors or top executives for various strategic decisions. Finally, future work could tackle some 
of the critical gaps in our understanding of the interpersonal dynamics between individuals 
leading the firm (e.g., Peterson, Smith, Martorana, & Owens, 2003) for firm performance.  
Implications for Strategic Decision-Making Literature 
 By studying acquisition decision making processes and decision effectiveness, I also 
provide contributions to the literature on strategic decision-making (e.g., Hickson, Butler, Cray, 
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Mallory, & Wilson, 1986; Hitt & Tyler, 1991; Dean & Sharfman, 1996). First, in Essay 1, I 
extended the theory of procedural rationality (e.g., Simon, 1976; Simon, 1978b; Fredrickson & 
Mitchell, 1984) to the domain of acquisition decision-making, thereby contributing to the nascent 
stream of research that investigates the role of procedural rationality in inter-organizational 
decision-making (e.g., Walter, 2011; Walter, Kellermanns, & Lechner, 2012). Second, results 
from this essay also provide novel insights into the interplay of political and procedurally 
rational decision making and suggest that, when negotiating inter-organizational arrangements, 
firms benefit substantially from procedurally rational decision processes because the danger of 
political behavior tends to be particularly high in such context. These findings thus also help 
reconcile some of the inconclusive findings in the early literature on the interplay between 
political and rational strategic decision-making (e.g., Pettigrew, 1977; Dean & Sharfman, 
1993a). Future research could continue to extend theory of procedural rationality to other types 
of inter-organizational decision making. Further, it would be important to examine if and under 
what conditions procedural rationality of inter-organizational decision-making processes has an 
adverse effect on decision effectiveness. 
Implications for Corporate Governance Literature 
This dissertation provides contributions to the corporate governance literature. Boards of 
directors make major strategic decisions as groups, and a growing stream of studies has built on 
social psychological theories to understand board decisions (e.g., Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Zajac 
& Westphal, 1996; Westphal & Bednar, 2005; Boivie, Bednar, Aguilera, & Andrus, 2016). 
However, a rather limited systematic research has drawn from social psychological theories of 
group dynamics to understand how boards’ make major strategic decisions. In introducing the 
theoretical constructs of board meeting frequency and board meeting timeliness into the 
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corporate governance research, the present work complements prior limited research on group 
dynamics on boards (e.g., Westphal & Bednar, 2005) and provides new insights into social 
psychological processes that can affect board decisions during major corporate events such as 
M&As. The study of group processes of boards during major corporate event in Essay 2 
therefore answers to a recent call for more research on boards from the social psychological 
perspective (e.g., Boivie et al., 2016) and also points to several promising avenues for future 
research. Building on the insights from Essay 2, future research could examine behavior patterns 
of directors during individual meetings or advance temporal perspective on board processes by 
examining temporal patterns of board interactions other than timeliness.  
 Relatedly, results from Essay 1 suggest that firms involved in acquisitions benefit from 
procedurally rational decision processes during acquisition decision-making. As the next step in 
the study of procedural rationality in the M&A context, it would be interesting and important to 
examine the antecedents of procedural rationality in M&A processes. Specifically, it would be 
interesting to examine the role of boards or the role of individual board members. Questions such 
as, does more extensive and timely involvement of the board increase the level of procedural 
rationality in M&A decision processes or whether procedural rationality is driven by the 
involvement of directors in M&A negotiations in the capacity of an M&A negotiating team 
member, would be worth pursuing in future research endeavors. 
 Finally, the findings presented in this dissertation indicate that the potential of the boards 
in preventing managerial biases in decision making, self-serving decisions, or simply advising 
decisions that fall outside the managers’ domains of competences does not necessarily originate 
in the structural features of boards, but rather in the social psychological processes through 
which the members of the boards interaction to fulfill their fiduciary duty of being primary 
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caretakers of shareholder value (e.g., Boivie et al., 2016). Future research could take these ideas 
further and examine the effectiveness of boards of directors in preventing specific inefficiencies 
in strategic decision making of managers that occur because of managerial overconfidence or 
hubris (e.g., Haunschild et al., 1994; Malmendier & Tate, 2008), self-serving motives (e.g., 
Grinstein & Hribar, 2004), cognitive simplification processes (e.g., Malhotra et al., 2015), 
psychological attributes (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), personality (e.g., Malhotra et al., 
2017), or organizational pressures they might be exposed to (e.g., Kim et al., 2011). 
Implications for Practice 
The findings of this dissertation also have implications for practice. First, the results from Essay 
1 and Essay 3 have implications for business managers. The results from Essay 1 suggest that 
relying on procedural rationality in the context of M&A deal-making reduces acquisitions 
premiums paid by the acquirers. Hence, our results may encourage managers involved in M&A 
deal-making to intentionally apply comprehensive deal making procedures during merger 
negotiations. Moreover, rather than just improving the rationality of deal-making procedures 
within individual deals, managers of frequent acquirers may try to adopt and institutionalize such 
procedures to be systematically used across deals. Relatedly, findings on the contingent effect of 
procedural rationality suggest that acquirers’ managers, who participate in M&A negotiation 
teams, need to strategically align their bargaining tactics with the corresponding due diligence 
efforts. Further, results from Essay 3 suggest that personality of executives involved in M&A 
negotiations plays an important role for M&A outcomes. Managers negotiating M&A deals 
therefore need to carefully reflect upon how their personality, the personality of the executive 
team being acquired, as well as the interpersonal dynamics over the course of M&A negotiations 
impact the subsequent executive retentions decisions. This is a rather important matter as, on the 
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one hand, scholars and practitioners generally agree that acquired firms’ executives help the 
implementation of their firm’s acquisition because of their intimate understanding of the firm 
(e.g., Wulf & Singh, 2011), which is important for post-merger integration of the two firms (e.g., 
Graebner, Heimeriks, Huy, & Vaara, 2017) as well as routine transfer across former firm 
boundaries (e.g., Ellis, Reus, Lamont, & Ranft, 2011), yet on the other hand, many acquired 
firms’ executives leave the combined entity within a few years following an acquisition (e.g., 
Walsh, 1988; Walsh, 1989; Walsh & Ellwood, 1991).  
 Second, findings from this dissertation also have practical implications for boards of 
directors, especially boards governing firms that are active acquirers in the M&A market or 
attractive acquisition targets. Taken together, findings from Essay 1 and Essay 2 imply that 
active board involvement in M&A deals may benefit the deal from the perspective of both the 
acquiring and the target firm. The results from Essay 1 suggest that, as a potential remedy for 
various inefficiencies in the acquisition decision-making of executives, boards should foster and 
encourage rational due diligence and negotiations procedures. If boards get more extensively and 
timelier involved in the acquisition decision processes, they can substantially influence 
acquisition outcomes to protect the wealth of shareholders. On a more operational level, boards 
should consider when and how often to organize meetings when the firm gets involved in a 
major high-impact corporate event such as M&A. In particular, findings from Essay 2 suggest 
that board interactions should be more intense at the beginning of the acquisition negotiation 
process when the situational ambiguity is high, strategy and roles in M&A negotiations are not 
yet entirely clear, and information asymmetry between the parties is high. In line with the 
features of “proactive boards” proposed by Pearce and Zahra (1991), board meeting frequency 
and timeliness appear to have substantial impact on M&A performance. 
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 Finally, this dissertation provides valuable insights for M&A advisors, investors, media 
and other participants in the M&A marketplace. Nowadays, a range of M&A advisors tends to be 
involved in M&A deal-making and, as findings from this dissertation suggest, they may affect 
the process in a number of ways. For example, Essay 1 demonstrates that independent financial 
advisors, by means of providing fairness opinions on deal terms during M&A negotiations, affect 
acquisition premium decisions of acquirers and targets. Relatedly, results from Essay 2 indicate 
that advisors’ efforts during M&A negotiations perhaps need to be aligned with the activity of 
the board of directors. With respect to the implications for investors, the findings from Essay 3 
suggest that their assessment of M&A deals should take into account the personality of 
executives driving these deals. Media also gives considerable attention to M&A deal-making as 
well as to the executives involved in these deals. Therefore, the personality of executives will 
also play a major role in media-driven sentiment towards the M&A deal.  
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